free speech clause in Indiana

2005The purpose of the free-speech clause and of its judge-made corollary the right of association is to protect the market in ideas, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 680 , 40 S.Ct. 17, 22 , 68 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), broadly understood as the public expression of ideas, narrative, concepts, imagery, opinions-scientific, political, or aesthetic-to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify or entertain.

2005The purpose of the free-speech clause and of its judge-made corollary the right of association is to protect the market in ideas, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 680 , 40 S.Ct. 17, 22 , 68 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), broadly understood as the public expression of ideas, narrative, concepts, imagery, opinions-scientific, political, or aesthetic-to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify or entertain.

2005The conversation between Swank and Tina on the motorcycle was speech in the literal sense, but not speech protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states and their subdivisions via the Fourteenth Amendment by Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S.Ct. 625, 629 , 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925)).

2005The conversation between Swank and Tina on the motorcycle was speech in the literal sense, but not speech protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states and their subdivisions via the Fourteenth Amendment by Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S.Ct. 625, 629 , 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925)).

2005It was also association in the literal sense, but not association "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 , 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).

2005It was also association in the literal sense, but not association "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 , 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).

2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere

1993Fordyce v. State (1991), Ind.App., 569 N.E.2d 357, 362 .

2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere

2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere

2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere

2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere

1991In People v. Ford (1989), Colo., 773 P.2d 1059 , the Colorado supreme court addressed the issue of whether its obscenity statute violated the free speech clause of its constitution, which clause is similar to the one contained in both Oregon's and Indiana's Constitutions. 9 The Colorado court observed that at the time its constitution was written, obscenity proscriptions were prevalent and the dissemination of obscene materials was prohibited in other jurisdictions which had adopted constitutional provisions similar or identical to Colorado's.

1991In People v. Ford (1989), Colo., 773 P.2d 1059 , the Colorado supreme court addressed the issue of whether its obscenity statute violated the free speech clause of its constitution, which clause is similar to the one contained in both Oregon's and Indiana's Constitutions. [9] The Colorado court observed that at the time its constitution was written, obscenity proscriptions were prevalent and the dissemination of obscene materials was prohibited in other jurisdictions which had adopted constitutional provisions similar or identical to Colorado's.

1991Article I, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." Fordyce and the ICLU urge that this court adopt an interpretation of this clause similar to that reached by the Oregon supreme court in State v. Robertson (1982), 293 Or. 402 , 649 P.2d 569 .

1991Article I, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." Fordyce and the ICLU urge that this court adopt an interpretation of this clause similar to that reached by the Oregon supreme court in State v. Robertson (1982), 293 Or. 402 , 649 P.2d 569 .