free speech analysis (Hawaii) · Go Syfert
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free speech analysis in Hawaii

5 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Manzogreen
haw · 1977 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998We interpret [ajrticle I, [sjection [I] of the Hawaii Constitution[ 60 ] as excluding obscenity from protected speech. [[Image here]] 58 Haw. at 444 , 573 P.2d at 949 [.] Therefore, the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1214(l)(a) has been firmly established pursuant to a free speech analysis, and hence is not [violative of] the [fjirst Amendment.

1998We interpret [ajrticle I, [sjection [I] of the Hawaii Constitution[ 60 ] as excluding obscenity from protected speech. [[Image here]] 58 Haw. at 444 , 573 P.2d at 949 [.] Therefore, the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1214(l)(a) has been firmly established pursuant to a free speech analysis, and hence is not [violative of] the [fjirst Amendment.

11
State v. Rodriguesgreen
haw · 1985 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993First, Chung urges that even if the circuit court erred in its construction of terroristic threatening, it nonetheless reached the right result, see State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 134 , 706 P.2d 1293, 1300 (1985), because the evidence presented to the grand jury in support of Counts I and II of the indictment was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that he “uttered his remarks in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the person [i.e., Suyama] who was the object of his remarks.” Second, Chung contends that his statements to the teachers “do not fall within the ambit of

1993First, Chung urges that even if the circuit court erred in its construction of terroristic threatening, it nonetheless reached the right result, see State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 134 , 706 P.2d 1293, 1300 (1985), because the evidence presented to the grand jury in support of Counts I and II of the indictment was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that he “uttered his remarks in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the person [i.e., Suyama] who was the object of his remarks.” Second, Chung contends that his statements to the teachers “do not fall within the ambit of

11
State v. Masaru Shingakigreen
haw · 1982 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988See State v. Shingaki, 65 Haw. 116 , 648 P.2d 190 (1982).

1988See State v. Shingaki, 65 Haw. 116 , 648 P.2d 190 (1982).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
United States v. Russell Kelner green
ca2 · 1976
1 sentence

2014The court stated: We agree with the California Supreme Court that the “immineney” required by [United States v.] Kelner, [ 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.1976)], and hence by Chung , can be established by means other than proof that a threatening remark will be executed immediately, at once, and without delay.

12014–2014
State v. Valdivia green
haw · 2001
2 sentences

2014In rejecting Valdivia’s argument, the court clarified Chung and explained that the free speech clause of the United States and Hawai'i Constitutions did not “impose a temporal ‘immediacy’ requirement that must be met before words become subject to criminal prosecution as ‘true threats.’ ” Id. at 476 , 24 P.3d at 672 .

2014In rejecting Valdivia’s argument, the court clarified Chung and explained that the free speech clause of the United States and Hawai'i Constitutions did not “impose a temporal ‘immediacy’ requirement that must be met before words become subject to criminal prosecution as ‘true threats.’ ” Id. at 476 , 24 P.3d at 672 .

12014–2014
State v. Bloss green
haw · 1981
1 sentence

2005Appellant argues that Article 39 violates the free speech clause of article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution because (1) pursuant to Bloss, 64 Haw. 148 , 637 P.2d 1117 , Article 39 “fails to leave ample practical viewing alternatives for many viewers, making the ordinance a de facto ban on panoram booths!,]” (2) Article 39 “is plainly content based, and the City’s continued recitation of legal fictions premised on ‘secondary effects’ will not alter that basic fact!,]” and (3) “[t]his court should follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in its honest and forthright analysis

12005–2005
State v. Bloss green
haw · 1982
1 sentence

2005Appellant argues that Article 39 violates the free speech clause of article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution because (1) pursuant to Bloss, 64 Haw. 148 , 637 P.2d 1117 , Article 39 “fails to leave ample practical viewing alternatives for many viewers, making the ordinance a de facto ban on panoram booths!,]” (2) Article 39 “is plainly content based, and the City’s continued recitation of legal fictions premised on ‘secondary effects’ will not alter that basic fact!,]” and (3) “[t]his court should follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in its honest and forthright analysis

12005–2005
Eisenstadt v. Baird green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1998HRS § 712-1214(l)(a), however, was not then subjected to a right of privacy scrutiny. [[Image here]] In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 92 S.Ct. 1029 , 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a distributor of contraceptives, who had been convicted of violating a state law restrict ing the dissemination of contraceptive products, had the standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons who had been denied access to contraceptives.

1998HRS § 712-1214(l)(a), however, was not then subjected to a right of privacy scrutiny. [[Image here]] In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 92 S.Ct. 1029 , 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a distributor of contraceptives, who had been convicted of violating a state law restrict ing the dissemination of contraceptive products, had the standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons who had been denied access to contraceptives.

11998–1998

Statutes the citing opinions construe

HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1210 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 65 (1966–2026) TX 31 (1987–2026) NJ 22 (1954–2024) IL 20 (1978–2021) WA 17 (1999–2025) PA 11 (1979–2025) GA 9 (1974–2024) IN 8 (1991–2018) NC 7 (1995–2023) IA 7 (1983–2026) OH 7 (1999–2023) NY 6 (1948–2013) CT 5 (2001–2024) UT 5 (2003–2024) HI 5 (1988–2014) MI 5 (2018–2023) MT 5 (1995–2010) FL 4 (1989–2025) AZ 4 (1974–2019) MD 4 (1979–2015) OR 3 (1991–2020) MO 3 (1989–2016) CO 3 (1996–2015) WI 3 (1987–2026) AK 3 (1982–1989) OK 3 (1981–2017) NM 2 (1992–2003) MN 2 (1994–2012) DC 2 (1985–1987) MA 2 (1984–2012) NH 2 (1976–2018) VT 2 (1980–1996) NE 2 (1986–1997) ND 2 (2010–2010) VA 2 (1988–2000) WY 2 (1976–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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