free speech clause in California

2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862

2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862

2018Troester further contends that unlike the California Labor Code, the text of the FLSA does not contain a blanket requirement to pay employees for all hours worked, except in a regulation that postdated and implicitly incorporated Anderson 's de minimis rule. ( 29 C.F.R. § 778.223 (2018).) We have recognized that the maxim de minimis non curat lex is "of ancient origin" and may be incorporated by implication into the state's statutory and constitutional enactments. ( Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468 , 514, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470 , 12 P.3d 720 [recognizing the incorporation of t

2018Troester further contends that unlike the California Labor Code, the text of the FLSA does not contain a blanket requirement to pay employees for all hours worked, except in a regulation that postdated and implicitly incorporated Anderson 's de minimis rule. ( 29 C.F.R. § 778.223 (2018).) We have recognized that the maxim de minimis non curat lex is "of ancient origin" and may be incorporated by implication into the state's statutory and constitutional enactments. ( Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468 , 514, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470 , 12 P.3d 720 [recognizing the incorporation of t

2013I, § 2, subd. (a).) In considering a free speech claim under article I, “we begin with the unquestioned proposition that the California Constitution is an independent document and its constitutional protections are separate from and not dependent upon the federal Constitution . . . .” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 365 ; see Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490 (Gerawan I).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparab

2013I, § 2, subd. (a).) 9 In considering a free speech claim under article I, ―we begin with the unquestioned proposition that the California Constitution is an independent document and its constitutional protections are separate from and not dependent upon the federal Constitution . . . .‖ (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 365 ; see Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489–490 (Gerawan I).) ―The state Constitution‘s free speech provision is ‗at least as broad‘ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the compar

2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862

2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862

2013I, § 2, subd. (a).) In considering a free speech claim under article I, “we begin with the unquestioned proposition that the California Constitution is an independent document and its constitutional protections are separate from and not dependent upon the federal Constitution . . . .” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 365 ; see Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490 (Gerawan I).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparab

2013I, § 2, subd. (a).) 9 In considering a free speech claim under article I, ―we begin with the unquestioned proposition that the California Constitution is an independent document and its constitutional protections are separate from and not dependent upon the federal Constitution . . . .‖ (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 365 ; see Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489–490 (Gerawan I).) ―The state Constitution‘s free speech provision is ‗at least as broad‘ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the compar

2025(DeGrassi v. Cook (2002) 29 Cal.4th 333, 344 .) This precedent requires us to conclude that Riaz has not stated a claim for relief based on the alleged violations of the due process clause and the free speech clause of the California Constitution.

2025(DeGrassi v. Cook (2002) 29 Cal.4th 333, 344 .) This precedent requires us to conclude that Riaz has not stated a claim for relief based on the alleged violations of the due process clause and the free speech clause of the California Constitution.

2013We acknowledged in Gerawan I that the United States Supreme Court in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. (1997) 521 U.S. 457 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 585 , 117 S.Ct. 2130 ] had held that a similar program did not implicate the First Amendment’s free speech clause.

2013We acknowledged in Gerawan I that the United States Supreme Court in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. (1997) 521 U.S. 457 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 585 , 117 S.Ct. 2130 ] had held that a similar program did not implicate the First Amendment’s free speech clause.

2025Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 879 (Smith).) Moreover, “‘[f]or purposes of the free speech clause, simple obedience to a law that does not require one to convey a verbal or symbolic message cannot reasonably be seen as a statement of support 26. for the law or its purpose.

2025Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 879 (Smith).) Moreover, “‘[f]or purposes of the free speech clause, simple obedience to a law that does not require one to convey a verbal or symbolic message cannot reasonably be seen as a statement of support 26. for the law or its purpose.

2022(See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. (1961) 366 U.S. 36, 49 [rejecting the view that “where the constitutional protection [under the First Amendment] exists, it must 19 prevail”]; see, e.g., Hill v. Colorado (2000) 530 U.S. 703, 716 [the right to approach someone on the way to a healthcare facility to hand the person a leaflet and to attempt to change the person’s views not within historically unprotected categories of speech, but may be constitutionally restricted in order to protect the “unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication”].) Further, while it is also true “ ‘th

2000(See Ellis v. Railway Clerks (1984) 466 U.S. 435, 456 , 104 S.Ct. 1883 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 ; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., supra, 500 U.S. at p. 559 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 (cone. & dis. opn. of Scalia, J.) [characterizing Ellis as recognizing a "de minimis exception"]; see generally Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, 366 U.S. at pp. 50-51, 81 S.Ct. 997 .) In our view, it seems applicable as well to article I's.

2000Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 383 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [following Chaplinsky ].) Fewer than 60 years ago, the United States Supreme Court introduced a dichotomy in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment's free speech clause between commercial speech, on the one side, and noncommercial speech, including that which is political or ideological in character, on the other.

2000Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 383 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [following Chaplinsky ].) Fewer than 60 years ago, the United States Supreme Court introduced a dichotomy in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment's free speech clause between commercial speech, on the one side, and noncommercial speech, including that which is political or ideological in character, on the other.

2002(Browne, supra, at p. 31.) Because they adopted New York’s free speech clause virtually unchanged and with no debate (Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 119), the history behind New York’s clause is relevant to interpreting California’s free speech clause (see Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Education (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 1, 25-26, fn. 26 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 82 A.L.R.3d 544 ] [finding the history behind the New York Constitution relevant to interpreting a clause of the California Constitution based on a clause in the New York Constitution]).” (Golden

2002(Browne, supra, at p. 31.) Because they adopted New York’s free speech clause virtually unchanged and with no debate (Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 119), the history behind New York’s clause is relevant to interpreting California’s free speech clause (see Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Education (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 1, 25-26, fn. 26 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 82 A.L.R.3d 544 ] [finding the history behind the New York Constitution relevant to interpreting a clause of the California Constitution based on a clause in the New York Constitution]).” (Golden

2014At the time, Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1 (Gerawan II), involving the proper test to be used in determining whether a particular marketing order compelling funding of a generic advertising program violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution, was pending before the California Supreme Court.

2013Comm’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557 .‖ (Gerawan II, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 6 .) We observed that ―[i]n light of our recognition in Gerawan I that the generic advertising program does in fact implicate the free speech clause, . . . we believe it would be incongruous to subject the program to only minimal scrutiny.‖ (Id. at p. 21.) Finding persuasive Justice Souter‘s dissenting opinion in Glickman, we stated ―the conclusion of the Glickman majority that the compelled funding of generic advertising requires only minimal scrutiny is at variance with the general rule that intrusion into free speech rights

2025(Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 329 .) Similarly, the court declined to recognize a constitutional tort action for damages to remedy a violation of the free speech clause of the California Constitution.

2025(Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 329 .) Similarly, the court declined to recognize a constitutional tort action for damages to remedy a violation of the free speech clause of the California Constitution.

2025Such a rule would, in effect, permit each individual to choose which laws he would obey merely by declaring his agreement or opposition.’” (North Coast, supra, at p. 1157 , quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527 , 558–559 (Catholic Charities).) In turning to the California Constitution’s free exercise guarantee (Cal. Const., art.

2025Such a rule would, in effect, permit each individual to choose which laws he would obey merely by declaring his agreement or opposition.’” (North Coast, supra, at p. 1157 , quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527 , 558–559 (Catholic Charities).) In turning to the California Constitution’s free exercise guarantee (Cal. Const., art.

2022(Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 766 ; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (1985) 471 U.S. 626, 651 [“extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides”]; Central Hudson, at p. 563 3 Sony has not argued the California Constitution’s free speech clause, article I, section 2, requires a different analysis of whether its speech is commercial.

2015In response to the Associations’ free speech challenge to the Regulation, the Commissioner argued that restrictions on misleading commercial speech are evaluated under the “reasonably related” test in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (1985) 471 U.S. 626 [ 105 S.Ct. 2265 ] (Zauderer) and not the intermediate scrutiny criteria set forth in Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. 557 .

2016The only restrictions are that noncommercial messages must be permitted in locations where commercial messages are permitted, and the local entity cannot regulate what type of noncommercial message ... is permissible . . . .’ ”]; City and County of San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Advertising (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 643, 658-665 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 815 ].) Notwithstanding Metromedia, defendants claim that the City’s 2004 ban on all new off-site commercial billboards violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution, which states: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or he

2016The only restrictions are that noncommercial messages must be permitted in locations where commercial messages are permitted, and the local entity cannot regulate what type of noncommercial message ... is permissible . . . .’ ”]; City and County of San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Advertising (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 643, 658-665 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 815 ].) Notwithstanding Metromedia, defendants claim that the City’s 2004 ban on all new off-site commercial billboards violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution, which states: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or he

2015(Gallo Cattle, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 955 .) The Gallo Cattle court first noted that, in determining whether to follow the United States Supreme Court in matters concerning the free speech doctrine, the California Supreme Court has followed the reasoning set forth in People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822 (Teresinski).

2000Against our conclusion, the Secretary of Food and Agriculture argues, in reliance on People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822 , 180 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 640 P.2d 753 (hereafter sometimes Teresinski ), that there are "no reasons ... to justify rejecting" the Glickman majority's construction of the First Amendment's free speech clause as our construction of article I's. ( People v. Teresinski supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 836, 180 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 640 P.2d 753 .) In Teresinski the presence of all four of the following facts counseled against rejection of a decision of the United States Supreme Court there c

2003(Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons , review granted Mar. 20, 2002, S104019.) 4 As the first (and most recent) example of a prior decision that had not considered California Constitution, article I’s free speech clause and commercial speech on their own terms, the court cited Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609, 614 , footnote 2 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 423 , 704 P.2d 183 ], which it described as “dealing with commercial speech under both article I’s free speech clause and the First Amendment’s, but, in effect, construing and applying only the First Amendment’s free speech clause and not article I’s.”

2003(Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons , review granted Mar. 20, 2002, S104019.) 4 As the first (and most recent) example of a prior decision that had not considered California Constitution, article I’s free speech clause and commercial speech on their own terms, the court cited Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609, 614 , footnote 2 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 423 , 704 P.2d 183 ], which it described as “dealing with commercial speech under both article I’s free speech clause and the First Amendment’s, but, in effect, construing and applying only the First Amendment’s free speech clause and not article I’s.”