Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Marriage of Fredericigreen1 sentence2025And the district court reasonably applied the law, which required the petition to assert—and Matthew to ultimately prove—something very different from his sworn testimony: “that conditions since the decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that the children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change.” In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). 8 Last on this factual front, we note a loose end in the record: Matthew’s contention one of the boys made a threatening statement, possibly after the divorce was finalized but before he file | 1 | 1 |
Duck Creek Tire Service, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, and Midwest Mexican Connection, LTD., an Iowa Corporation v. Goodyear Corners, L.C.green1 sentence2021Khanna points to statements the Andersens’ attorney made in an affidavit and at the sanctions hearing that the mistrial was “justified” and “appropriate under [the] circumstances.” To preserve an issue for our review, “a party must raise [the] issue and the district court must decide it.” Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v. Goodyear Corners, L.C., 796 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Iowa 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Royce D. Turnergreen1 sentence2019See Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d at 422 (finding attorney violated rule 32:8.4(d) when, in one client matter, her failure to comply with discovery obligations resulted in additional court proceedings, “including a sanctions hearing and hearings on [the opposing party’s] motions to compel,” which required the court to leave the case open, even after it had granted summary judgment, so the sanctions issue could be resolved); see also Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 151 (finding attorney violated rule 32:8.4(d) when he, among other things, made improper filings in the bankruptcy court that delayed the proceedings) | 1 | 1 |
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co. v. Rowegreen1 sentence2014“Dismissal and entry of a default judgment should be the rare judicial act.” Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Iowa 1988). “[R]endering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” is one of the sanctions permitted by rule 1.517(2)(b)(3). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence1994See State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 689, 698 (Iowa 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Gold Crown Properties, Inc. v. Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie Countygreen1 sentence1989Court, 375 N.W.2d 692, 699 (Iowa 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Jeffrey K. McGinness
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 460 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.