appointed defense in Illinois

1980However, these cases predate the present dismissal procedure which provides for the appointment of an independent hearing officer in teacher dismissal disputes. ( Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314 , 388 N.E.2d 398 .) Under the now controlling statutory provisions "[o]nly one decision based on the evidence submitted is provided for, and this is the decision of the appointed hearing officer." ( Board of Education *824 v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill.

1980(Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 314 , 388 N.E.2d 398 .) Under the now controlling statutory provisions “[o]nly one decision based on the evidence submitted is provided for, and this is the decision of the appointed hearing officer.” (Board of Education v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill.

1980(Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 314 , 388 N.E.2d 398 .) Under the now controlling statutory provisions “[o]nly one decision based on the evidence submitted is provided for, and this is the decision of the appointed hearing officer.” (Board of Education v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill.

1980(Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 314 , 388 N.E.2d 398 .) Under the now controlling statutory provisions “[o]nly one decision based on the evidence submitted is provided for, and this is the decision of the appointed hearing officer.” (Board of Education v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill.

1994(See People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133 ; Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 14 (citing cases applying the per se rule).) In Stoval, the defendant’s appointed defense counsel had personally represented the jewelry store owner complainant and the jewelry corporation in the past.

1994Spreitzer found that any resulting conflict of interests could only have been created because the appointed defense counsel "might have been subliminally reluctant to attack the prior decisions or behavior of someone who was now her colleague and associate.” (Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 20 .) Distinguishing per se cases, the Spreitzer court reasoned that considerations in the case more closely paralleled those inherent to cases involving joint or multiple representation of codefendants, where the asserted conflict involved a choice between the interests of a client and the interests of a colleag

1994In Newberry, 55 Ill. 2d 74 , the appointed defense counsel had previously served as the head of the criminal division of the State’s Attorney’s office at the time that the defendant was indicted.

1994(See People v. Banks (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 36 ; People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147 ; People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173 .) The Spreitzer court found that, unlike per se cases, the asserted conflict did not involve a direct conflict between the interests of two opposing clients or between a present client and a past personal commitment.

1994(See People v. Banks (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 36 ; People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147 ; People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173 .) The Spreitzer court found that, unlike per se cases, the asserted conflict did not involve a direct conflict between the interests of two opposing clients or between a present client and a past personal commitment.

1994(See People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133 ; Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 14 (citing cases applying the per se rule).) In Stoval, the defendant’s appointed defense counsel had personally represented the jewelry store owner complainant and the jewelry corporation in the past.

1994(See People v. Banks (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 36 ; People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147 ; People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173 .) The Spreitzer court found that, unlike per se cases, the asserted conflict did not involve a direct conflict between the interests of two opposing clients or between a present client and a past personal commitment.

1987Under the amended section 24 — 12 of the School Code, “[o]nly one decision based on the evidence submitted is provided for, and this is the decision of the appointed hearing officer.” (Board of Education v. Illinois State Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.

1987App. 3d 820, 823-24 , 403 N.E.2d 277, 280 , quoting Board of Education, Niles Township High School District No. 219 v. Epstein (1979), 72 Ill.

1982More recently, the per se rule was applied in People v. Fife (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 418 , 392 N.E.2d 1345 , which found a disqualifying conflict of interest where an appointed defense counsel was also employed as a special assistant Attorney General for workman’s compensation litigation.

1982More recently, the per se rule was applied in People v. Fife (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 418 , 392 N.E.2d 1345 , which found a disqualifying conflict of interest where an appointed defense counsel was also employed as a special assistant Attorney General for workman’s compensation litigation.

1979The supreme court stated, “[W]e believe that a potential conflict of interest nevertheless exists in a situation such as this when a prosecutor who personally has been involved in the prosecution of a defendant in a particular criminal proceeding later assumes the duties of court-appointed defense counsel for the defendant in the same proceeding.” (People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167 , 361 N.E.2d 569, 571 .) It was also stressed that the defendant may have difficulty showing the extent to which the potential conflict of interest in his attorney prejudiced him.

1979The supreme court stated, “[W]e believe that a potential conflict of interest nevertheless exists in a situation such as this when a prosecutor who personally has been involved in the prosecution of a defendant in a particular criminal proceeding later assumes the duties of court-appointed defense counsel for the defendant in the same proceeding.” (People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167 , 361 N.E.2d 569, 571 .) It was also stressed that the defendant may have difficulty showing the extent to which the potential conflict of interest in his attorney prejudiced him.

1975(See People v. Darby, 30 Ill.App.3d 37 , 332 N.E.2d 64 .) Thus, in State v. Jenkins, 203 Kan. 354 , 454 P.2d 494 (1969), no error was found when the appointed defense counsel had served as deputy county attorney and has prosecuted the defendant for a similar offense a few years before.

1975App.3d 37 , 332 N.E.2d 64 .) Thus, in State v. Jenkins, 203 Kan. 354 , 454 P.2d 494 (1969), no error was found when the appointed defense counsel had served as deputy county attorney and has prosecuted the defendant for a similar offense a few years before. ( Cf. the reverse situation in People v. Wright, 23 Ill.

1975(See People v. Darby, 30 Ill.App.3d 37 , 332 N.E.2d 64 .) Thus, in State v. Jenkins, 203 Kan. 354 , 454 P.2d 494 (1969), no error was found when the appointed defense counsel had served as deputy county attorney and has prosecuted the defendant for a similar offense a few years before.

1975(See People v. Darby, 30 Ill.App.3d 37 , 332 N.E.2d 64 .) Thus, in State v. Jenkins, 203 Kan. 354 , 454 P.2d 494 (1969), no error was found when the appointed defense counsel had served as deputy county attorney and has prosecuted the defendant for a similar offense a few years before.

1975(Cf. the reverse situation in People v. Wright, 23 Ill.App.3d 43 , 318 N.E.2d 102 , where the prior attorney-client relationship was held not to suggest any impropriety or inference thereof on the part of the assistant prosecutor who did not acquire any usable information from an unrelated criminal matter a few years before.) Finally, even though a conflict of interest may appear, no prejudice results if the defendant’s interests are otherwise protected.

1975App.3d 37 , 332 N.E.2d 64 .) Thus, in State v. Jenkins, 203 Kan. 354 , 454 P.2d 494 (1969), no error was found when the appointed defense counsel had served as deputy county attorney and has prosecuted the defendant for a similar offense a few years before. ( Cf. the reverse situation in People v. Wright, 23 Ill.