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7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dc v. Sagreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 568-70 (1997) (noting the therapist-recipient privilege is not absolute and may yield to fundamental fairness or where the interests of justice demand that we tip the balance in favor of disclosure and truth). 8 No. 1-13-4048 ¶ 19 Even putting forfeiture and waiver aside, we observe that the Confidentiality Act provides an exception to the general rule against disclosures, "when, and to the extent, a therapist, in his or her sole discretion, determines that disclosure is necessary to *** protect the recipient[ 1] or other person against a clear, immine 2015See, e.g., D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 568-70 (1997) (noting the therapist-recipient privilege is not absolute and may yield to fundamental fairness or where the interests of justice demand that we tip the balance in favor of disclosure and truth). 8 No. 1-13-4048 ¶ 19 Even putting forfeiture and waiver aside, we observe that the Confidentiality Act provides an exception to the general rule against disclosures, "when, and to the extent, a therapist, in his or her sole discretion, determines that disclosure is necessary to *** protect the recipient[ 1] or other person against a clear, immine | 3 | 3 |
People v. Gemenygreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 568-70 (1997) (noting the therapist-recipient privilege is not absolute and may yield to fundamental fairness or where the interests of justice demand that we tip the balance in favor of disclosure and truth). 8 No. 1-13-4048 ¶ 19 Even putting forfeiture and waiver aside, we observe that the Confidentiality Act provides an exception to the general rule against disclosures, "when, and to the extent, a therapist, in his or her sole discretion, determines that disclosure is necessary to *** protect the recipient[ 1] or other person against a clear, immine 2015See, e.g., D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 568-70 (1997) (noting the therapist-recipient privilege is not absolute and may yield to fundamental fairness or where the interests of justice demand that we tip the balance in favor of disclosure and truth). 8 No. 1-13-4048 ¶ 19 Even putting forfeiture and waiver aside, we observe that the Confidentiality Act provides an exception to the general rule against disclosures, "when, and to the extent, a therapist, in his or her sole discretion, determines that disclosure is necessary to *** protect the recipient[ 1] or other person against a clear, immine | 3 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Deckergreen2 sentences1997See Goldberg, 151 Ill.2d at 277 , 176 Ill.Dec. 866 , 602 N.E.2d 812 (pointing out various provisions within Act which recognize exceptions); see also In re Marriage of Decker, 153 Ill.2d 298, 312-13 , 180 Ill.Dec. 17 , 606 N.E.2d 1094 (1992) (attorney-client privilege inapplicable where client seeks or obtains services of attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activities). 1997See Goldberg, 151 Ill.2d at 277 , 176 Ill.Dec. 866 , 602 N.E.2d 812 (pointing out various provisions within Act which recognize exceptions); see also In re Marriage of Decker, 153 Ill.2d 298, 312-13 , 180 Ill.Dec. 17 , 606 N.E.2d 1094 (1992) (attorney-client privilege inapplicable where client seeks or obtains services of attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activities). | 3 | 3 |
Goldberg v. Davisgreen2 sentences1997Disclosure may be had provided, and only to the extent, the trial court secondarily finds that the information sought to be disclosed is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial, otherwise clearly admissible, that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence, and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994); see Goldberg v. Davis, 151 Ill.2d 267 , 176 Ill.Dec. 866 , 602 N.E.2d 812 (1992). 1997Disclosure may be had provided, and only to the extent, the trial court secondarily finds that the information sought to be disclosed is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial, otherwise clearly admissible, that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence, and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994); see Goldberg v. Davis, 151 Ill.2d 267 , 176 Ill.Dec. 866 , 602 N.E.2d 812 (1992). | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997On this point, defendants charge that the authorities relied on by the appellate court, Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc., 126 Ill.App.2d 144 , 261 N.E.2d 533 (1970), and Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 73 Ill.App.2d 405 , 219 N.E.2d 165 (1966), are distinguishable. 1997On this point, defendants charge that the authorities relied on by the appellate court, Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc., 126 Ill.App.2d 144 , 261 N.E.2d 533 (1970), and Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 73 Ill.App.2d 405 , 219 N.E.2d 165 (1966), are distinguishable. | 3 | 1997–1997 |
Maxwell v. Hobart Corp.
green
2 sentences1997Defendants cite to Maxwell v. Hobart Corp., 216 Ill.App.3d 108 , 159 Ill.Dec. 599 , 576 N.E.2d 268 (1991), as an example of correct reasoning regarding waiver of the therapist-recipient privilege under section 10(a)(1) and assert that the appellate court's ruling below conflicts with Maxwell . 1997Defendants cite to Maxwell v. Hobart Corp., 216 Ill.App.3d 108 , 159 Ill.Dec. 599 , 576 N.E.2d 268 (1991), as an example of correct reasoning regarding waiver of the therapist-recipient privilege under section 10(a)(1) and assert that the appellate court's ruling below conflicts with Maxwell . | 3 | 1997–1997 |
Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997On this point, defendants charge that the authorities relied on by the appellate court, Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc., 126 Ill.App.2d 144 , 261 N.E.2d 533 (1970), and Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 73 Ill.App.2d 405 , 219 N.E.2d 165 (1966), are distinguishable. 1997On this point, defendants charge that the authorities relied on by the appellate court, Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc., 126 Ill.App.2d 144 , 261 N.E.2d 533 (1970), and Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 73 Ill.App.2d 405 , 219 N.E.2d 165 (1966), are distinguishable. | 3 | 1997–1997 |
Dc v. Sa
green
2 sentences1997In the dissent's view, the privilege, designed as a shield to protect the therapist-recipient relationship, was being unfairly utilized by plaintiff in this case as a sword to the detriment of defendants. 283 Ill.App.3d at 700 , 219 Ill.Dec. 248 , 670 N.E.2d 1136 (Lytton, J., dissenting). 1997In the dissent's view, the privilege, designed as a shield to protect the therapist-recipient relationship, was being unfairly utilized by plaintiff in this case as a sword to the detriment of defendants. 283 Ill.App.3d at 700 , 219 Ill.Dec. 248 , 670 N.E.2d 1136 (Lytton, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board
green
1 sentence1988(E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 33 .) Nevertheless, we find that in failing to take the necessary step to assert the therapist-recipient privilege, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1988(Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L. 1988(Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.