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56 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1941–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bigon v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("In the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.”); Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (“[A] double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal or even for the first time on collateral attack when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.”) (foo 2013Moreover, “[i]n the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.” Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 369 ; see Rangel v. State, 179 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (“However, an appellant may raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal (1) when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy claim violation is clearly apparent from the face of the record, and (2) when the enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serve no legitimate state purpose.”). | 8 | 9 |
Gonzalez v. Stategreen2 sentences2023App. 2008) (“In the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.” (citing Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. 2019App. 2008) (“In the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.” (citing Gonzales v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. | 8 | 8 |
Sanchez v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 2019) (not designated for publication) (“Generally, ‘appellate courts are free to review ‘unassigned error’ – a claim that was preserved in the trial court below but was not raised on appeal.’ However, errors that are subject to procedural default may not be remedied by the appellate court as unassigned error unless the error was in fact preserved in the trial court.”) (citing Sanchez v. Heath – 9 court that counsel’s discovery request was inadequate or failed to trigger its duty under Article 39.14. 16 Thus, we held the issue was not preserved and 15F the court of appeals erred to reach 2024App. 2019) (not designated for publication) (“Generally, ‘appellate courts are free to review ‘unassigned error’ – a claim that was preserved in the trial court below but was not raised on appeal.’ However, errors that are subject to procedural default may not be remedied by the appellate court as unassigned error unless the error was in fact preserved in the trial court.”) (citing Sanchez v. Heath – 9 court that counsel’s discovery request was inadequate or failed to trigger its duty under Article 39.14. 16 Thus, we held the issue was not preserved and 15F the court of appeals erred to reach | 6 | 6 |
Ramsey v. Dunlopgreen2 sentences2012Although the Alliance does not argue on appeal that the court’s judgment is void, it has long been held that courts of appeals may reverse the judgment of a trial court for an unassigned error if the error is truly “fundamental.” See Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196 , 205 S.W.2d 979, 982-83 (1947). “[Wjhen the record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error will also be regarded as fundamental.” McCauley v. Consol. 2012Although the Alliance does not argue on appeal that the court’s judgment is void, it has long been held that courts of appeals may reverse the judgment of a trial court for an unassigned error if the error is truly “fundamental.” See Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196 , 205 S.W.2d 979, 982-83 (1947). “[Wjhen the record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error will also be regarded as fundamental.” McCauley v. Consol. | 3 | 6 |
Pena v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 2006) (quoting Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Tex. Crim. 2015Similarly, only in rare circumstances may a court of appeals sua sponte decide “unassigned error.” Unassigned error refers to “a claim that was preserved in the trial below but was not raised on appeal.” See Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
In Re JFCgreen2 sentences2012Underwriters, Inc., 157 Tex. 475 , 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 290-92 (Tex.2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental-error doctrine). ‘With ‘jurisdictional-based’ fundamental— error review, an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the court below for error-without conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 291 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984)). 2012Underwriters, Inc., 157 Tex. 475 , 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 290-92 (Tex.2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental-error doctrine). ‘With ‘jurisdictional-based’ fundamental— error review, an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the court below for error-without conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 291 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984)). | 3 | 3 |
McCauley v. Consolidated Underwritersgreen2 sentences2012Underwriters, Inc., 157 Tex. 475 , 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 290-92 (Tex.2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental-error doctrine). ‘With ‘jurisdictional-based’ fundamental— error review, an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the court below for error-without conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 291 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984)). 2012Underwriters, Inc., 157 Tex. 475 , 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 290-92 (Tex.2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental-error doctrine). ‘With ‘jurisdictional-based’ fundamental— error review, an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the court below for error-without conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 291 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984)). | 3 | 3 |
Rangel v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Moreover, “[i]n the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.” Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 369 ; see Rangel v. State, 179 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref’d) (“However, an appellant may raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal (1) when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy claim violation is clearly apparent from the face of the record, and (2) when the enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serve no legitimate state purpose.”). 2013Moreover, “[i]n the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.” Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 369 ; see Rangel v. State, 179 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (“However, an appellant may raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal (1) when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy claim violation is clearly apparent from the face of the record, and (2) when the enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serve no legitimate state purpose.”). | 2 | 2 |
Denton, Ex Parte William Charlesgreen2 sentences2013Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("In the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.”); Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (“[A] double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal or even for the first time on collateral attack when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.”) (foo 2013Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("In the case of a double-jeopardy violation, the issue may be addressed as an unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.”); Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (“[A] double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal or even for the first time on collateral attack when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.”) (foo | 2 | 2 |
Central Education Agency v. Burkegreen2 sentences2006Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.1986). [2] To elude the unassigned error constraint with regard to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, an appeals court might take the position that the motion's failure to fulfill the specificity requirements for such a motion transforms it into a traditional motion and then reverse it for its failure to sustain the higher standard of proof applicable thereto. [1] The motion arguably had another defect because it was very misleading. 2006Agency v. Burke , 711 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1986). [2] To elude the unassigned error constraint with regard to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, an appeals court might take the position that the motion = s failure to fulfill the specificity requirements for such a motion transforms it into a traditional motion and then reverse it for its failure to sustain the higher standard of proof applicable thereto. | 2 | 2 |
Gonzalez v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (“[W]e find an unassigned error which should be reviewed in the interest of justice that is dispositive of the appeal and, accordingly, do not directly address the ground of error that is advanced.”). 2002See Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) ("[W]e find an unassigned error which should be reviewed in the interest of justice that is dispositive of the appeal and, accordingly, do not directly address the ground of error that is advanced."). | 2 | 2 |
Leal v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Lee, 555 S.W.2d at 122 ; see Leal v. State, 626 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no pet.) (reversing and remanding on an unassigned error in a fatal variance between the indictment and the charge). 2002Lee, 555 S.W.2d at 122 ; see Leal v. State, 626 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no pet.) (reversing and remanding on an unassigned error in a fatal variance between the indictment and the charge). | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. Stategreen2 sentences1985See Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). 1984Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). | 1 | 2 |
Texas Power & Light Company v. Colegreen2 sentences1979Appellate courts may, in rare situations, consider an unassigned error, but only if the error can be properly classified as “fundamental error.” Texas Power & Light Co. v. Cole, 158 Tex. 495 , 313 S.W.2d 524, 529 (1958); Wright v. Gernandt, 559 S.W.2d 864, 872 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). 1979Appellate courts may, in rare situations, consider an unassigned error, but only if the error can be properly classified as “fundamental error.” Texas Power & Light Co. v. Cole, 158 Tex. 495 , 313 S.W.2d 524, 529 (1958); Wright v. Gernandt, 559 S.W.2d 864, 872 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). | 1 | 2 |
Severance v. Pattersongreen1 sentence2018Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. 2012) (stressing “fundamental” nature of property rights). 5 The court of criminal appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over capital cases involving the death penalty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baileygreen1 sentence2015State v. Bailey, 201 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Paselk v. Rabungreen1 sentence2012Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 612 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied); 6 McDonald & Carlson, Texas Civil Practice § 38:3, 1025 (2d ed.1998); see Tex.R.App. | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Hansengreen1 sentence2012Underwriters, Inc., 157 Tex. 475 , 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 290-92 (Tex.2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental-error doctrine). ‘With ‘jurisdictional-based’ fundamental— error review, an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the court below for error-without conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 291 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shepardgreen1 sentence2000See State v. Shepard, 920 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Stategreen1 sentence1983In Garret v. State, 624 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1981, pet. granted), rev’d and remanded, 642 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), this Court applied the unassigned error rule and held that the failure to apply the law of transferred intent to the part of the charge dealing with the lesser and included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter constituted fundamental error. | 1 | 1 |
| Wright v. Gernandtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Krottinger v. Marchandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences2002Lee, 555 S.W.2d at 122 ; see Leal v. State, 626 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no pet.) (reversing and remanding on an unassigned error in a fatal variance between the indictment and the charge). 2002Lee, 555 S.W.2d at 122 ; see Leal v. State, 626 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no pet.) (reversing and remanding on an unassigned error in a fatal variance between the indictment and the charge). | 3 | 1985–2002 |
Blackmon v. Trail
green
2 sentences1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94 , 122 S.W. 533 , 124 S.W. 85 ; Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Tex. 489 , 294 S.W. 844 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Tex. 261 , 1 S.W.2d 857 ; Blackmon v. Trail, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 967 ; Texas & P. R. 1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Texas 94 , Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Texas 489 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Texas 261 ; Blackman v. Trail, 12 S. W. (2d) 967 ; Ry. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Kimball
green
2 sentences1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94 , 122 S.W. 533 , 124 S.W. 85 ; Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Tex. 489 , 294 S.W. 844 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Tex. 261 , 1 S.W.2d 857 ; Blackmon v. Trail, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 967 ; Texas & P. R. 1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Texas 94 , Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Texas 489 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Texas 261 ; Blackman v. Trail, 12 S. W. (2d) 967 ; Ry. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Clonts v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94 , 122 S.W. 533 , 124 S.W. 85 ; Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Tex. 489 , 294 S.W. 844 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Tex. 261 , 1 S.W.2d 857 ; Blackmon v. Trail, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 967 ; Texas & P. R. 1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Texas 94 , Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Texas 489 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Texas 261 ; Blackman v. Trail, 12 S. W. (2d) 967 ; Ry. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Hall Music Co. v. Robertson
green
2 sentences1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94 , 122 S.W. 533 , 124 S.W. 85 ; Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Tex. 489 , 294 S.W. 844 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Tex. 261 , 1 S.W.2d 857 ; Blackmon v. Trail, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 967 ; Texas & P. R. 1941Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Texas 94 , Clonts v. Johnson, 116 Texas 489 ; Hall Music Co. v. Robertson, 117 Texas 261 ; Blackman v. Trail, 12 S. W. (2d) 967 ; Ry. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Bowen, Deborah
green
1 sentence2019PROPER REMEDY In Bowen v. State, 374 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2011NOTES [1] Allen v. U.S., 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (a jury instruction designed to encourage the jury to reach a verdict after a period of deadlock). [2] The elements necessary are: 1. 2011NOTES [1] Allen v. U.S., 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (a jury instruction designed to encourage the jury to reach a verdict after a period of deadlock). [2] The elements necessary are: 1. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Gant v. State
green
1 sentence1987Appellant maintains that the testimony was highly prejudicial and relies on Gant v. State, 513 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), for the proposition that it is improper for the trial court to admit evidence of extraneous offenses committed by appellant’s associates and thereby create the impression of guilt by association in the mind of the jury. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Edwards v. Arizona green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Weinberg
green
1 sentence1983American General Fire and Casualty Co. v. Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Wininger v. Department of Human Resources neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Garrett v. State
green
1 sentence1983In Garret v. State, 624 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1981, pet. granted), rev’d and remanded, 642 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), this Court applied the unassigned error rule and held that the failure to apply the law of transferred intent to the part of the charge dealing with the lesser and included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter constituted fundamental error. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Scott v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Seaton v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Chance v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cowley green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Newman v. King green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Asbeck v. Asbeck green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Butler v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Dorsey v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Walthall v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hartman v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Nichols v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Long v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Ellis v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Guster v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lee v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| West v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Sanders v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lane v. Fair Stores, Inc. green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Grayce Oil Co. v. Peterson green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Dodge v. Childers neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Oar v. Davis green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| White v. Glengarry Oil Co. neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Stillman v. Hirsch green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Wandry v. Williams green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.