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7 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992). | 4 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992). | 3 | 1998–1999 |
Johnson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 1999The basic assumption underlying the defense is that drug and alcohol intoxication may be so severe as to prevent a person from forming a criminal intent, yet not so severe as to prevent that person from performing acts required to commit the crime. 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Ind.1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 853 , 113 S.Ct. 155 , 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Street v. State
green
1 sentence1992Street v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 102 ; Shackleford v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 698 , 349 N.E.2d 150 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Shackelford v. State
green
2 sentences1992Street v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 102 ; Shackleford v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 698 , 349 N.E.2d 150 . 1992Street v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 102 ; Shackleford v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 698 , 349 N.E.2d 150 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sering v. State
green
1 sentence1991Sering v. State (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 369, 374 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Whalen v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. ...” Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 691-92 , 100 S.Ct. at 1438 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 723-24 . 1981Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. ...” Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 691-92 , 100 S.Ct. at 1438 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 723-24 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.