impossibility defense in Indiana

1972Huffman v. Huffman (1913), 53 Ind. App. 201 , 101 N. E. 400 .’ (Our italics.) “ ‘The impossibility of applying the rule asserted in the Temme case, supra, as here attempted is demonstrated by the fact that, if the rule were followed a wife would be entitled to claim all the property of the parties, regardless of the source, if, at the time of the divorce, it was held under a condition of survivorship.

1972Huffman v. Huffman (1913), 53 Ind. App. 201 , 101 N. E. 400 .’ (Our italics.) “ ‘The impossibility of applying the rule asserted in the Temme case, supra, as here attempted is demonstrated by the fact that, if the rule were followed a wife would be entitled to claim all the property of the parties, regardless of the source, if, at the time of the divorce, it was held under a condition of survivorship.

2023The impossibility doctrine addresses “the tension between the changes a party bargains to avoid and the changes, unbargained for and radical, that make enforcement of the bargain unwise.” Cook, 753 F.2d at 1558 . [22] At bottom, the Executive Order amounted to an unforeseeable supervening event that “radically altered the world in which the parties were expected to fulfill their promises[.]” Id.

2023The impossibility doctrine addresses “the tension between the changes a party bargains to avoid and the changes, unbargained for and radical, that make enforcement of the bargain unwise.” Cook, 753 F.2d at 1558 . [22] At bottom, the Executive Order amounted to an unforeseeable supervening event that “radically altered the world in which the parties were expected to fulfill their promises[.]” Id.

1980By way of background-before considering the particular merits of the Marches’ argument in the case at bar-we observe the following language in Kruse pertaining generally to the impossibility defense in this State: “The law in Indiana in regard to impossibility of performance as a defense to a contract action is well stated in Krause v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 278, at 283-84 , 70 N.E. 264 , at 265: ‘We regard it as thoroughly settled that the words of a mere general covenant will not be construed as an undertaking to answer for a subsequent event, happening without the fault of the cove-na

1980By way of background-before considering the particular merits of the Marches’ argument in the case at bar-we observe the following language in Kruse pertaining generally to the impossibility defense in this State: “The law in Indiana in regard to impossibility of performance as a defense to a contract action is well stated in Krause v. Board, etc. (1904), 162 Ind. 278, at 283-84 , 70 N.E. 264 , at 265: ‘We regard it as thoroughly settled that the words of a mere general covenant will not be construed as an undertaking to answer for a subsequent event, happening without the fault of the cove-na

1980Where performance is thus rendered impossible, the inquiry naturally arises as to whether there was a purpose to covenant against such an extraordinary and therefore presumably unapprehended event, the happening of which it was not within the power of the covenantor to prevent.’ ” Id. 394 , 353 N.E.2d at 528 . (emphasis supplied in Kruse.) Significantly (in light of this language in Kruse), it does not appear the Marches argue it was absolutely impossible to rebuild the structure rented by Newberry at the time of the fire, since they suggest in their brief “[performance is possible, but the va