impossibility defense in Texas

2024But the impossibility defense applies in just this type of situation: when a party cannot both perform as agreed and, at the same time, “obey [a] governmental regulation.” Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. 1992).

2016Under the doctrine of impossibility, “[w]here a party’s performance is made impracticable by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged.” Id. (quoting Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. 1992)) (internal quotations and el lipses omitted).

2025Applicable Law “The impossibility defense has been referred to by Texas courts as impossibility of performance, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose.” Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Eustace, 290 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.).

2023Servs., LLC, No. 05-19-00153-CV, 2020 WL 4592791 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he terms ‘impracticability’ and ‘impossibility’ are interchangeable.”); Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Eustace, 290 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) (“The impossibility defense has been referred to by Texas courts as impossibility of performance, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose.”). 10 The Supreme Court of Texas has discussed and applied § 261 and related provisions in considering impossibility and impracticability of contract performance.

2011The impossibility defense, and when it is available, was explained in Chen v. State , 42 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim.

2011However, Taylor cites no case law in support of his argument. 8 The impossibility defense, and when it is available, was explained in Chen v. State, 42 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim.

2012For the purpose of this appeal, the impossibility defense generally applies upon "the death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance." Eustace , 290 S.W.3d at 340 (citing Tractebel , 118 S.W.3d at 65 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 (1981) ("If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death . . . is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made."); Hourani v. Katzen , 305 S.W.3d 239, 250-51 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (upholding summary judgment in favor

2012For the purpose of this appeal, the impossibility defense generally applies upon “the death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance.” Eustace, 290 S.W.3d at 340 (citing Tractebel, 118 S.W.3d at 65 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 (1981) (“If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death . . . is an event 9 the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”); Hourani v. Katzen, 305 S.W.3d 239 , 250–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (upholding summary judgment in favor

2012For the purpose of this appeal, the impossibility defense generally applies upon "the death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance." Eustace , 290 S.W.3d at 340 (citing Tractebel , 118 S.W.3d at 65 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 (1981) ("If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death . . . is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made."); Hourani v. Katzen , 305 S.W.3d 239, 250-51 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (upholding summary judgment in favor

2012For the purpose of this appeal, the impossibility defense generally applies upon “the death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance.” Eustace, 290 S.W.3d at 340 (citing Tractebel, 118 S.W.3d at 65 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 (1981) (“If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death . . . is an event 9 the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”); Hourani v. Katzen, 305 S.W.3d 239 , 250–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (upholding summary judgment in favor

2021See also United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866 , 873–75 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding defendant failed to properly object to the jury instructions on attempt and the impossibility defense, where charge conference was held in chambers and off- the-record; objections “could meet the specificity requirement only by incorporating the referred-to discussion in chambers”).

2014RP West’s subsequent mitigation of its damages when IRI proved unable either to obtain financing to complete its purchase of The Villas or to find another purchaser does not retroactively create an impossibility defense excusing IRI’s lack of performance. 3.Waiver In its third issue, IRI argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict and failing to submit its waiver and estoppel defenses to the jury. ‘Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 15

2007Solar counters the Huffines rule only applies to an impossibility arising after the contract is made, that is, a supervening event, citing Janak v. FDIC, 586 S.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).

2007Solar does not detail the elements of the impossibility defense, and Prince of Peace argues it does not apply where the inability to make Prince of Peace a co-insured was or could have been anticipated at the time the contract was made, citing Huffines v. Swor Sand & Gravel Co., 750 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1988, no writ).

2003See Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Mkts ., Inc. , 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (recognizing that New York has applied the impossibility defense narrowly, due in part to the fact that the purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks assumed by the parties and stating that the defense should not be available to a party that could have anticipated the impossibility and guarded against it in the contract).

1992In Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79 , 88 S.W. 197, 199 (1905), this court approved the general doctrine of impossibility due to illegality: “the performance of a contract is excused by a supervening impossibility caused by the operation of a change in the law....” See also Metrocon Const. Co. v. Gregory Const. Co., 663 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.App—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (implicitly recognizing the doctrine of impossibility).

1992In Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79 , 88 S.W. 197, 199 (1905), this court approved the general doctrine of impossibility due to illegality: "the performance of a contract is excused by a supervening impossibility caused by the operation of a change in the law...." See also Metrocon Const. Co. v. Gregory Const. Co., 663 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (implicitly recognizing the doctrine of impossibility).

1992In Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79 , 88 S.W. 197, 199 (1905), this court approved the general doctrine of impossibility due to illegality: “the performance of a contract is excused by a supervening impossibility caused by the operation of a change in the law....” See also Metrocon Const. Co. v. Gregory Const. Co., 663 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.App—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (implicitly recognizing the doctrine of impossibility).

1992In Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79 , 88 S.W. 197, 199 (1905), this court approved the general doctrine of impossibility due to illegality: “the performance of a contract is excused by a supervening impossibility caused by the operation of a change in the law....” See also Metrocon Const. Co. v. Gregory Const. Co., 663 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.App—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (implicitly recognizing the doctrine of impossibility).