7 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
RECP IV WG Land Investors LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.green1 sentence2024One Bank -7- USA, N.A., 295 Va. 268, 284 (2018) (emphasis added); Hampton Rds. | 1 | 1 |
Appalachian Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Appalachian Power Co. , 214 Va. at 534 -35 , 201 S.E.2d at 766 (assessing "fault" in this context as an issue of whether a party had committed a "breach of contractual duty which contributed to impossibility of performance"). 2018See Appalachian Power Co. , 214 Va. at 534 -35 , 201 S.E.2d at 766 (assessing "fault" in this context as an issue of whether a party had committed a "breach of contractual duty which contributed to impossibility of performance"). | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Pender-Doxey Grocery Co.green2 sentences2012See Wood v. Pender-Doxey Grocery Co., 151 Va. 706, 712 , 144 S.E. 635, 637 (1928) (describing goodwill as "one of those intangible assets of an established business difficult to describe and impossible of valuing with mathematical precision, but... of very real existence and of substantial value"). 2012See Wood v. Pender-Doxey Grocery Co., 151 Va. 706, 712 , 144 S.E. 635, 637 (1928) (describing goodwill as "one of those intangible assets of an established business difficult to describe and impossible of valuing with mathematical precision, but... of very real existence and of substantial value"). | 1 | 1 |
Housing Authority v. East Tennessee Light & Power Co.green2 sentences2011See Housing Auth. v. East Tenn. Light and Power Co., 183 Va. 64, 72 , 31 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1944). 2011See Housing Auth. v. East Tenn. Light and Power Co., 183 Va. 64, 72 , 31 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Winn v. Aleda Const. Co., Inc.green2 sentences1989In our opinion, this excusal of non-performance for a limited period binds both parties to a modified performance, and thus is a contractual expansion of the doctrine of impossibility which “becomes the law of the case unless it is repugnant to some rule of law or public policy.” Winn v. Aleda Const. Co., 227 Va. 304, 307 , 315 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1984). 1989In our opinion, this excusal of non-performance for a limited period binds both parties to a modified performance, and thus is a contractual expansion of the doctrine of impossibility which “becomes the law of the case unless it is repugnant to some rule of law or public policy.” Winn v. Aleda Const. Co., 227 Va. 304, 307 , 315 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kathleen E. Daburlos v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey and the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York
green
1 sentence2018Co ., 521 F.2d 18 , 23 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1975) (same); see generally , James P. Nehf, 14-75 Corbin on Contracts § 75.7 (Joseph M. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Trent v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2005While we found that "the conclusion is inevitable that [the] `worm' was . . . immediately available" and thus, not proven absent, we rejected the reasoning that the absence of the "worm" would justify an impossibility defense as an "extraneous fact not within the knowledge or control of [the defendant]." Id. at 1136-37 , 156 S.E. at 569 , 570 . 2005While we found that "the conclusion is inevitable that [the] `worm' was . . . immediately available" and thus, not proven absent, we rejected the reasoning that the absence of the "worm" would justify an impossibility defense as an "extraneous fact not within the knowledge or control of [the defendant]." Id. at 1136-37 , 156 S.E. at 569 , 570 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
The Opera Company of Boston, Inc. v. The Wolf Trap Foundation for the Performing Arts
green
2 sentences1989The Fourth Circuit recently analyzed the doctrine of impossibility in Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf trap Foundation, 817 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1986). 1989Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which as a basic assumption in which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged unless the language of the circumstances indicate the contrary. 817 F.2d at 1099 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.