pure defense in Kansas

2002Co. v. Cassell Truck Lines, 195 Kan. 51, 55 , 402 P.2d 782 [1965]). *865 “ “When considering the effect of the running of the statute of hmitations this court is committed to the general doctrine, almost universally recognized by the courts and textwriters, that there is a substantial distinction between a claim asserted as a pure defense and one where affirmative relief is sought.

2002Co. v. Cassell Truck Lines, 195 Kan. 51, 55 , 402 P.2d 782 [1965]). *865 “ “When considering the effect of the running of the statute of hmitations this court is committed to the general doctrine, almost universally recognized by the courts and textwriters, that there is a substantial distinction between a claim asserted as a pure defense and one where affirmative relief is sought.

2002Kan. 1990) (quoting Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 221 Kan. 448, 464 , 562 P. 2d 1 [1977]). *866 Here, Collis and Hughes filed a counterclaim on April 14,1997, alleging that on various dates Mynatt had dissipated corporate assets of Mynatt Truck for his own benefit in breach of his fiduciary duties.

2002Kan. 1990) (quoting Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 221 Kan. 448, 464 , 562 P. 2d 1 [1977]). *866 Here, Collis and Hughes filed a counterclaim on April 14,1997, alleging that on various dates Mynatt had dissipated corporate assets of Mynatt Truck for his own benefit in breach of his fiduciary duties.

1975Statutes of limitation are not intended to affect matters asserted strictly in the defense of an action.” (p. 56.) In Christenson v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P. 2d 313 , a vendor sued vendee for the balance due on a written contract of sale of a business.

1975Statutes of limitation are not intended to affect matters asserted strictly in the defense of an action.” (p. 56.) In Christenson v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P. 2d 313 , a vendor sued vendee for the balance due on a written contract of sale of a business.

1961The case of In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553 , 156 P. 2d 501 , is distinguishable on the ground that the administrator of the estate had possession of a number of items of real and personal property standing in the name of the decedent.

1961The case of In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553 , 156 P. 2d 501 , is distinguishable on the ground that the administrator of the estate had possession of a number of items of real and personal property standing in the name of the decedent.

1954Plaintiff also argues the city's cross demand cannot be pleaded as a pure defense because it is not connected with and does not grow out of the same transaction or matters which form the basis of plaintiff's claim, citing Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P.2d 291 .

1954Plaintiff also argues the city's cross demand cannot be pleaded as a pure defense because it is not connected with and does not grow out of the same transaction or matters which form the basis of plaintiff's claim, citing Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P.2d 291 .

1952(Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203 , 212 P. 2d 302 .) In the instant case an answer was filed by appellee setting up the pure defense of contributory negligence on the part of appellant which, if proved, would bar any right of recovery against appellee.

1952(Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203 , 212 P. 2d 302 .) In the instant case an answer was filed by appellee setting up the pure defense of contributory negligence on the part of appellant which, if proved, would bar any right of recovery against appellee.

1921In Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , it was said: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action [or defense] is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree the proper legal redress, which may or may not conform in whole or in part to the relief prayed for by the pleader.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) Jones’s pleading was a pure defense as to Beachy, and it was a proper defense against Campbell’s pleading that Jones was primarily and

1921In Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , it was said: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action [or defense] is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree the proper legal redress, which may or may not conform in whole or in part to the relief prayed for by the pleader.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) Jones’s pleading was a pure defense as to Beachy, and it was a proper defense against Campbell’s pleading that Jones was primarily and