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7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrackgreen2 sentences2016This is especially so, when, as in the instant case, the pleading fails to expressly demand a judgment for “punitive damages.” See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 175 , 122 A.2d 457, 461 (1956) (actual malice necessary to support punitive damages in a false imprisonment claim, but malice is not an element of the tort). 2016This is especially so, when, as in the instant case, the pleading fails to expressly demand a judgment for “punitive damages.” See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 175 , 122 A.2d 457, 461 (1956) (actual malice necessary to support punitive damages in a false imprisonment claim, but malice is not an element of the tort). | 3 | 3 |
Ashton v. Browngreen2 sentences2005Legal justification “may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Ashton, supra, 339 Md. at 120, 660 A.2d 447 ; see also, e.g., Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 336-37 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 125 (1974) (holding that, whether an officer had legal justification to arrest a person whose stage name was “Smokey Robinson” on a warrant issued for “Harold Cunningham also known as ‘Smokey Robinson,’ ” when the arrestee denied being “Harold Cunningham” and offered to show the officers identification to that effec 1999Ashton, 339 Md. at 121 , 660 A.2d 447 . | 1 | 2 |
Robinson v. City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2005Legal justification “may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Ashton, supra, 339 Md. at 120, 660 A.2d 447 ; see also, e.g., Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 336-37 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 125 (1974) (holding that, whether an officer had legal justification to arrest a person whose stage name was “Smokey Robinson” on a warrant issued for “Harold Cunningham also known as ‘Smokey Robinson,’ ” when the arrestee denied being “Harold Cunningham” and offered to show the officers identification to that effec 2005Legal justification “may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Ashton, supra, 339 Md. at 120, 660 A.2d 447 ; see also, e.g., Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 336-37 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 125 (1974) (holding that, whether an officer had legal justification to arrest a person whose stage name was “Smokey Robinson” on a warrant issued for “Harold Cunningham also known as ‘Smokey Robinson,’ ” when the arrestee denied being “Harold Cunningham” and offered to show the officers identification to that effec | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Henley
green
2 sentences2005Legal justification “may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Ashton, supra, 339 Md. at 120, 660 A.2d 447 ; see also, e.g., Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 336-37 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 125 (1974) (holding that, whether an officer had legal justification to arrest a person whose stage name was “Smokey Robinson” on a warrant issued for “Harold Cunningham also known as ‘Smokey Robinson,’ ” when the arrestee denied being “Harold Cunningham” and offered to show the officers identification to that effec 1999Ashton, 339 Md. at 121 , 660 A.2d 447 . | 2 | 1999–2005 |
Abeokuto v. State
green
2 sentences2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit 2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dixon v. State
green
2 sentences2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit 2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka & Kopasek
green
2 sentences1999Although probable cause may be “considered for the purpose of mitigation of damages,” Clark’s Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 186 , 227 A.2d 726 (1967), legal justification is the pertinent inquiry when considering the merits of a false imprisonment claim. 1999Although probable cause may be “considered for the purpose of mitigation of damages,” Clark’s Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 186 , 227 A.2d 726 (1967), legal justification is the pertinent inquiry when considering the merits of a false imprisonment claim. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brown v. Ashton
green
2 sentences1995In connection with the plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim, the intermediate appellate court, citing Brewer v. Mele, supra, 267 Md. 437 , 298 A.2d 156 , stated that “[t]he fact that there was probable cause [for the plaintiffs’ arrest], of course, eliminates one of the critical elements of the tort of false imprisonment.... ” Brown v. Ashton, supra, 93 Md.App. at 52 , 611 A.2d at 612 . 1995In connection with the plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim, the intermediate appellate court, citing Brewer v. Mele, supra, 267 Md. 437 , 298 A.2d 156 , stated that “[t]he fact that there was probable cause [for the plaintiffs’ arrest], of course, eliminates one of the critical elements of the tort of false imprisonment.... ” Brown v. Ashton, supra, 93 Md.App. at 52 , 611 A.2d at 612 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brewer v. Mele
green
2 sentences1995In connection with the plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim, the intermediate appellate court, citing Brewer v. Mele, supra, 267 Md. 437 , 298 A.2d 156 , stated that “[t]he fact that there was probable cause [for the plaintiffs’ arrest], of course, eliminates one of the critical elements of the tort of false imprisonment.... ” Brown v. Ashton, supra, 93 Md.App. at 52 , 611 A.2d at 612 . 1995In connection with the plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim, the intermediate appellate court, citing Brewer v. Mele, supra, 267 Md. 437 , 298 A.2d 156 , stated that “[t]he fact that there was probable cause [for the plaintiffs’ arrest], of course, eliminates one of the critical elements of the tort of false imprisonment.... ” Brown v. Ashton, supra, 93 Md.App. at 52 , 611 A.2d at 612 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.