imprisonment claim in Ohio

2011The elements of a false imprisonment claim are: “(1) expiration of the lawful term of confinement, (2) intentional confinement after the expiration, and (3) knowledge that the privilege initially justifying the confinement no longer exists.” Corder v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 315, 318 . {¶6} R.C. 2967.191 provides, in part: {¶7} “The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted

2011Corder v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 315, 318 . {¶7} In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant filed the affidavit of Melissa Adams, who states: 1 Plaintiff’s March 9, 2011 “motion to rule on plaintiff’s February 2, 2011 filing to amend complaint with request to change summary judgment hearing to oral hearing” is DENIED as moot.

2021Moreover, the Supreme Court confirmed the viability of Brinkman’s hypothetical false-imprisonment claim in the 1958 case Minor v. Seliga, holding that “ ‘where a justice of the peace, without authority of law, issues a warrant of arrest, both he and the person at whose instance he so acts are liable in an action for false imprisonment at the suit of the party illegally arrested by virtue of such warrant.’ ” Minor v. Seliga, 168 Ohio St. 1 , 5, 150 N.E.2d 852 (1958) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against a judge), citing Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohi

2021The court further determined that Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-03.2(E) requires that appellant must serve his 12-year definite prison term before he completes the 7-to-25-year indefinite prison term; accordingly, "to calculate appellant's maximum release date, the indefinite term and the definite term are added together, producing the maximum release date." (May 18, 2020 Decision at 9.) The court cited Jones v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-138, 2016-Ohio-5425, ¶ 16 , for this proposition, stating that Jones "[found] that defendant properly calculated an inmate's maximum release da

2020State v. Viccaro, 8th Dist. No. 99816, 2013-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10-14 ; State v. Rice, 8th Dist. No. 95100, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶ 8-9 ; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 95327, 2011-Ohio-14 , ¶ 9-10, 13. 3 Fryerson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1216, 2003-Ohio-2730 (declining to permit a false imprisonment claim to proceed because, despite improperly proceeding on some charges that should have been the subject of a discretionary bindover, the trial court was not entirely without jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter where the defendant was validly bound over with respect

2020In Jordan, the High Court determined that the "trial court 'lacked the authority to impose any prison sentence as a sanction for Bradley's community control violation * * *' because it never informed him of the specific sentence he would face for a community control violation as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)." Bradley, 2007-Ohio-7150, at ¶ 3 , quoting State v. Bradley, 151 Ohio App.3d 341 , 2003-Ohio-216 , ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).

2020State v. Viccaro, 8th Dist. No. 99816, 2013-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10-14 ; State v. Rice, 8th Dist. No. 95100, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶ 8-9 ; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 95327, 2011-Ohio-14 , ¶ 9-10, 13. 3 Fryerson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1216, 2003-Ohio-2730 (declining to permit a false imprisonment claim to proceed because, despite improperly proceeding on some charges that should have been the subject of a discretionary bindover, the trial court was not entirely without jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter where the defendant was validly bound over with respect

2020In Jordan, the High Court determined that the "trial court 'lacked the authority to impose any prison sentence as a sanction for Bradley's community control violation * * *' because it never informed him of the specific sentence he would face for a community control violation as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)." Bradley, 2007-Ohio-7150, at ¶ 3 , quoting State v. Bradley, 151 Ohio App.3d 341 , 2003-Ohio-216 , ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).

2020State v. Viccaro, 8th Dist. No. 99816, 2013-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10-14 ; State v. Rice, 8th Dist. No. 95100, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶ 8-9 ; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 95327, 2011-Ohio-14 , ¶ 9-10, 13. 3 Fryerson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1216, 2003-Ohio-2730 (declining to permit a false imprisonment claim to proceed because, despite improperly proceeding on some charges that should have been the subject of a discretionary bindover, the trial court was not entirely without jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter where the defendant was validly bound over with respect

2020State v. Viccaro, 8th Dist. No. 99816, 2013-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10-14 ; State v. Rice, 8th Dist. No. 95100, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶ 8-9 ; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 95327, 2011-Ohio-14 , ¶ 9-10, 13. 3 Fryerson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1216, 2003-Ohio-2730 (declining to permit a false imprisonment claim to proceed because, despite improperly proceeding on some charges that should have been the subject of a discretionary bindover, the trial court was not entirely without jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter where the defendant was validly bound over with respect

2008Criss v. Springfield Twp. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 82 . {¶ 32} In an action for malicious prosecution, the lack of probable cause is the gist of the action.

1991The state’s argument relies upon two appellate court opinions which suggest that the state cannot be held liable because “a private party does not operate a prison system, [and] has no duty to incarcerate criminals * * Ross v. Shoemaker (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 31, 32 , 3 OBR 33, 34, 443 N.E. 2d 1025, 1026 .

1991The state’s argument relies upon two appellate court opinions which suggest that the state cannot be held liable because “a private party does not operate a prison system, [and] has no duty to incarcerate criminals * * Ross v. Shoemaker (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 31, 32 , 3 OBR 33, 34, 443 N.E. 2d 1025, 1026 .

1988Ed. 2d 834 , 107 S. Ct. 2177 , as authority specifically addressing and controlling the application of the imprisonment clause of Ohio’s tolling provision to Section 1983 suits.