right of way rule in Maryland

1961Having disposed of Valench and Sklar , the opinion of the Court finds authority for its conclusion in Legum v. Hough, supra. The heart of that case as authority for the decision in this, is found in a passage quoted by the majority in this case, where the Court, speaking through Judge Henderson, after referring to the rather limited effect given to the car-on-the-right rule as to the right of way (§ 231) said ( 192 Md. at p. 6 ): “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look a

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1952As this Court said in Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545 , at page 548, 6 A. 2d 246 , at page 247, in setting forth that the right of way rule is not absolute, “It must be admitted that, under the cases cited, the question, though by statute made one of law, usually resolves itself into one of fact”.

1952As this Court said in Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545 , at page 548, 6 A. 2d 246 , at page 247, in setting forth that the right of way rule is not absolute, “It must be admitted that, under the cases cited, the question, though by statute made one of law, usually resolves itself into one of fact”.

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

2001They argue that even if the collision was due to the swinging of the trailer across the center line at a point 35 feet north of the intersection, “that action was not due to any negligence on the part of appellant Ness, but was due to his attempt to avoid an accident made imminent by appellee Males’ failure to yield the right of way.” The appellants .¡rely strongly upon the boulevard stop cases discussed in Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1 , 81 A. 2d 47 and Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227 , 81 A. 2d 617 .

2001They argue that even if the collision was due to the swinging of the trailer across the center line at a point 35 feet north of the intersection, “that action was not due to any negligence on the part of appellant Ness, but was due to his attempt to avoid an accident made imminent by appellee Males’ failure to yield the right of way.” The appellants .¡rely strongly upon the boulevard stop cases discussed in Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1 , 81 A. 2d 47 and Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227 , 81 A. 2d 617 .

2001They argue that even if the collision was due to the swinging of the trailer across the center line at a point 35 feet north of the intersection, “that action was not due to any negligence on the part of appellant Ness, but was due to his attempt to avoid an accident made imminent by appellee Males’ failure to yield the right of way.” The appellants .¡rely strongly upon the boulevard stop cases discussed in Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1 , 81 A. 2d 47 and Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227 , 81 A. 2d 617 .

2001They argue that even if the collision was due to the swinging of the trailer across the center line at a point 35 feet north of the intersection, “that action was not due to any negligence on the part of appellant Ness, but was due to his attempt to avoid an accident made imminent by appellee Males’ failure to yield the right of way.” The appellants .¡rely strongly upon the boulevard stop cases discussed in Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1 , 81 A. 2d 47 and Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227 , 81 A. 2d 617 .

1961Having disposed of Valench and Sklar , the opinion of the Court finds authority for its conclusion in Legum v. Hough, supra. The heart of that case as authority for the decision in this, is found in a passage quoted by the majority in this case, where the Court, speaking through Judge Henderson, after referring to the rather limited effect given to the car-on-the-right rule as to the right of way (§ 231) said ( 192 Md. at p. 6 ): “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look a

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1961On p. 6 it was said: “The limited effect thus given to the right of way rule has not escaped criticism. * * * Nevertheless, although a more stringent rule, comparable to the ‘stop, look and listen’ rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is controlled by lights (Sun Cab v. Paulkner, 163 Md. 477 , 163 A. 194 ; Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265 , 23 A. 2d 694 ) or by stop signs (Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 ; Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 ; Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174 , 49 A. 2d 537 ), the rule announced in the Ottenritter case [ 151 Md. 525

1939The plaintiff’s reliance is upon the cases of Taxicab Company v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 ; Hendler Creamery Co. v. Friedman, 160 Md. 526 , 154 A. 93 ; and Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285 , 157 A. 277 , wherein suits were brought by plaintiffs who had the right of way rule against them, and it was declared that the rule was not absolute, because the question must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case.

1939The plaintiff’s reliance is upon the cases of Taxicab Company v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 ; Hendler Creamery Co. v. Friedman, 160 Md. 526 , 154 A. 93 ; and Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285 , 157 A. 277 , wherein suits were brought by plaintiffs who had the right of way rule against them, and it was declared that the rule was not absolute, because the question must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case.

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

1939Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588 , 170 A. 190 ; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 ; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 ; Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 .

1939The plaintiff’s reliance is upon the cases of Taxicab Company v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 ; Hendler Creamery Co. v. Friedman, 160 Md. 526 , 154 A. 93 ; and Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285 , 157 A. 277 , wherein suits were brought by plaintiffs who had the right of way rule against them, and it was declared that the rule was not absolute, because the question must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case.

1939The plaintiff’s reliance is upon the cases of Taxicab Company v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 ; Hendler Creamery Co. v. Friedman, 160 Md. 526 , 154 A. 93 ; and Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285 , 157 A. 277 , wherein suits were brought by plaintiffs who had the right of way rule against them, and it was declared that the rule was not absolute, because the question must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case.

1937Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588, 593 , 170 A. 190 ; Friedman v. Hendler Creamery Co., 158 Md. 131 , 148 A. 426 ; Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 .

1937Yellow Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588, 593 , 170 A. 190 ; Friedman v. Hendler Creamery Co., 158 Md. 131 , 148 A. 426 ; Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525 , 135 A. 587 .

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,

1934If, on the other hand, there was evidence that the defendant’s cab approached the intersection at Charles Street at an excessive rate of speed and out of control (Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 530 , 135 A. 587 ), and that these factors- combined with Mr. Archer’s violation of the right of way rule to¡ produce the injuries, then the question as to whether both concurred and each contributed to produce the injury of an innocent guest or passenger was properly a question for the jury, and the modification of the prayer was proper, on the authority of Sline v. Hooper, 164 Md. 244, 251 ,