common-sense principle in Michigan

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2024It supposes that a defendant should have known about a condition because it had existed for such a time or was of such a character that the defendant should have discovered it in the ordinary course, like grapes that had been on the floor of a checkout lane for an hour, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 421 ; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), a hole in a rug just inside a doorway that numerous people traversed through, see Yarington v Huck, 218 Mich 100, 103-104 ; 187 NW 298 (1922), or a hole in pavement that had existed for months, see Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481 ; 122 NW2d 670 (1963); S

2022In People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 106 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986) (citation omitted), our Supreme Court explained that in answering the question of whether an expert’s opinion is necessary in aiding the jury to decide the ultimate issue, it is helpful to use “the common-sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from” experts.

2022In People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 106 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986) (citation omitted), our Supreme Court explained that in answering the question of whether an expert’s opinion is necessary in aiding the jury to decide the ultimate issue, it is helpful to use “the common-sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from” experts.

2006While defendants’ argument may appear viable in theory, it is inconsistent with this Court’s previous analyses and holdings. *667 A In Pendzsu v Beazer East, Inc, 219 Mich App 405, 411 ; 557 NW2d 127 (1996), this Court adopted a common-sense analysis used by other courts in construing the term “improvement”: “The issue is whether a component of a system which is definitely an improvement to real property is an improvement to real property itself.

2006While defendants’ argument may appear viable in theory, it is inconsistent with this Court’s previous analyses and holdings. *667 A In Pendzsu v Beazer East, Inc, 219 Mich App 405, 411 ; 557 NW2d 127 (1996), this Court adopted a common-sense analysis used by other courts in construing the term “improvement”: “The issue is whether a component of a system which is definitely an improvement to real property is an improvement to real property itself.