common-sense test in Wisconsin

2022“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common-sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶8 , 260 Wis. 2d 406 , 659 N.W.2d 394 . 6 No. 2020AP1526 ¶14 We conclude that Zastrow had reasonable suspicion to believe that Rich had committed a traffic violation.

2022“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common-sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶8 , 260 Wis. 2d 406 , 659 N.W.2d 394 . 6 No. 2020AP1526 ¶14 We conclude that Zastrow had reasonable suspicion to believe that Rich had committed a traffic violation.

2022Stated otherwise, "was the action of law enforcement officers reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present[.]" State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679 , 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).

2022Stated otherwise, "was the action of law enforcement officers reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present[.]" State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679 , 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).

2022“A finding of probable cause is a common- sense test”: “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit … there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶21 , 231 Wis. 2d 723 , 604 N.W.2d 517 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

2022“A finding of probable cause is a common- sense test”: “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit … there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶21 , 231 Wis. 2d 723 , 604 N.W.2d 517 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision

2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision

1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution “though not explicit is often obvious.” Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 .

1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution "though not explicit is often obvious." Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 .

1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution “though not explicit is often obvious.” Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 .

1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution "though not explicit is often obvious." Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 .

1980As a general rule when different victims are involved, there is a corresponding number of distinct crimes." 86 Wis.2d at 223 . [21] A common-sense analysis of the statutory language used by the legislature in creating sec. 940.09, Stats., viewed in conjunction with the provision's placement in ch. 940 of the criminal code, which enumerates the crimes against life and bodily security, clearly and unambiguously manifests that the legislature intended each death caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated driver to be chargeable as a separate offense.