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8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Postgreen2 sentences2021See Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 13 . ¶24 The trial court improperly relied on testimony about after-the-fact tint testing to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed for this traffic stop. 2019State v. Post , 2007 WI 60 , ¶13, 301 Wis. 2d 1 , 733 N.W.2d 634 . ¶13 A traffic stop may last only for the amount of time that is reasonably necessary to complete its purpose. | 2 | 3 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision 2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision | 1 | 1 |
Holifield v. Renored1 sentence2006Although Marquette is correct to point out that a "similarly situated" student must be similar in "all relevant respects," Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997), this determination, based on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, cannot be determined as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Guzy
green
2 sentences2022Stated otherwise, "was the action of law enforcement officers reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present[.]" State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679 , 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987). 2022Stated otherwise, "was the action of law enforcement officers reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present[.]" State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679 , 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Colstad
green
2 sentences2022“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common-sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶8 , 260 Wis. 2d 406 , 659 N.W.2d 394 . 6 ¶14 We conclude that Zastrow had reasonable suspicion to believe that Rich had committed a traffic violation. 2022“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common-sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶8 , 260 Wis. 2d 406 , 659 N.W.2d 394 . 6 ¶14 We conclude that Zastrow had reasonable suspicion to believe that Rich had committed a traffic violation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Sloan
green
2 sentences2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision 2008I respectfully dissent because in my view the Majority ignores both the deference to which we owe the warrant-issuing magistrate, see State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, ¶ 8 , 303 Wis.2d 438, 446 , 736 N.W.2d 189, 193 , and also the common-sense standard we must apply in assessing on appeal a warrant's validity, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238, 240 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (We must consider the "totality of the circumstances" as revealed by the affidavit and the "reasonable inferences" that permit the issuing magistrate "to make a practical, common-sense decision | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Dreske
green
2 sentences1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution “though not explicit is often obvious.” Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 . 1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution "though not explicit is often obvious." Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Harrell v. Israel
green
2 sentences1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution “though not explicit is often obvious.” Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 . 1980The intent of the legislature as to the allowable unit of prosecution "though not explicit is often obvious." Harrell, supra, 88 Wis.2d at 561 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Austin v. State
green
1 sentence1980As a general rule when different victims are involved, there is a corresponding number of distinct crimes." 86 Wis.2d at 223 . [21] A common-sense analysis of the statutory language used by the legislature in creating sec. 940.09, Stats., viewed in conjunction with the provision's placement in ch. 940 of the criminal code, which enumerates the crimes against life and bodily security, clearly and unambiguously manifests that the legislature intended each death caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated driver to be chargeable as a separate offense. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.