common-sense rule in New York

1958Co., supra.) ” In Heller v. Levinson ( 166 App. Div. 673, 674 ) the court stated with reference to the above rule as follows: ‘ ‘ This common-sense rule has been adopted in a number of cases, and wherever service by means other than personal delivery has been held ineffectual, it has been because the circumstances were such as to show that the defendant did not come into actual possession of the papers and that his attention was not drawn to their character, or that he had not willfully ignored them and refused to ascertain their nature for the purpose of evading service. ’ ’ In Levine v. Nati

1915Co. ( 70 N. Y. 223, 227 ): “The object of all service of process is said to be to give notice to the party on whom service is made, that he may be aware of and may resist what is sought of him, and it is a general rule that any service must be deemed sufficient which renders it reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of what is going on against him, and have an opportunity to defend.” This common-sense rule has been adopted in a number of cases, and wherever service by means other than personal delivery has been held ineffectual, it has been because the circumstan

1975The test of determining the sufficiency of the description has been characterized as a common-sense test (People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396 ; People v Mongno, 67 Misc 2d 815, 819 ).

1975It will be satisfied if there is a nonconfusing description by which any officer executing the warrant could not be misled into searching any premises other than the particular premises occupied by the defendant, and the execution of the warrant could not result in a blanket search which could interfere with the rights of law-abiding citizens (id., People v Rainey, 14 NY2d 35 ).

1975The test of determining the sufficiency of the description has been characterized as a common-sense test (People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396 ; People v Mongno, 67 Misc 2d 815, 819 ).

1958Co., supra.) ” In Heller v. Levinson ( 166 App. Div. 673, 674 ) the court stated with reference to the above rule as follows: ‘ ‘ This common-sense rule has been adopted in a number of cases, and wherever service by means other than personal delivery has been held ineffectual, it has been because the circumstances were such as to show that the defendant did not come into actual possession of the papers and that his attention was not drawn to their character, or that he had not willfully ignored them and refused to ascertain their nature for the purpose of evading service. ’ ’ In Levine v. Nati

1958Co. ( 204 Misc. 202 , affd. 282 App. Div. 720 ) the process server had been unable to serve a summons upon the defendant at his hotel.

1958Co. ( 204 Misc. 202 , affd. 282 App. Div. 720 ) the process server had been unable to serve a summons upon the defendant at his hotel.

1954(George Foltis Inc. v. City of New York, supra, pp. 114, 115; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234 ; Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283 ; Sandler v. Garrison, supra; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287 ; Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 661 .) It would be ridiculous in the extreme to postulate the responsibility of the defendant in terms of such unremitting, active vigilance as to require the posting of a continual guard at each incinerator-closet to examine the materials tenant-users proposed to deposit therein.

1954(George Foltis Inc. v. City of New York, supra, pp. 114, 115; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234 ; Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283 ; Sandler v. Garrison, supra; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287 ; Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 661 .) It would be ridiculous in the extreme to postulate the responsibility of the defendant in terms of such unremitting, active vigilance as to require the posting of a continual guard at each incinerator-closet to examine the materials tenant-users proposed to deposit therein.

1954(George Foltis Inc. v. City of New York, supra, pp. 114, 115; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234 ; Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283 ; Sandler v. Garrison, supra; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287 ; Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 661 .) It would be ridiculous in the extreme to postulate the responsibility of the defendant in terms of such unremitting, active vigilance as to require the posting of a continual guard at each incinerator-closet to examine the materials tenant-users proposed to deposit therein.

1954(George Foltis Inc. v. City of New York, supra, pp. 114, 115; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234 ; Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283 ; Sandler v. Garrison, supra; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287 ; Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 661 .) It would be ridiculous in the extreme to postulate the responsibility of the defendant in terms of such unremitting, active vigilance as to require the posting of a continual guard at each incinerator-closet to examine the materials tenant-users proposed to deposit therein.

1954(George Foltis Inc. v. City of New York, supra, pp. 114, 115; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234 ; Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283 ; Sandler v. Garrison, supra; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287 ; Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 661 .) It would be ridiculous in the extreme to postulate the responsibility of the defendant in terms of such unremitting, active vigilance as to require the posting of a continual guard at each incinerator-closet to examine the materials tenant-users proposed to deposit therein.

1953The test in brief is this: “If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own (Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Co., 231 N. Y. 273 ).