independently significant standard in Michigan

2003The independently significant standard was described well recently by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Madrid v St Joseph Hosp, 122 NM 524 , 531; 928 P2d 250 (1996), in which that court stated: [W]here a private organization's standards have significance independent of a legislative enactment, they may be incorporated into a statutory scheme without violating constitutional restrictions on delegation of legislative powers.

2003The independently significant standard was described well recently by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Madrid v St Joseph Hosp, 122 NM 524 , 531; 928 P2d 250 (1996), in which that court stated: [W]here a private organization’s standards have significance independent of a legislative enactment, they may be incorporated into a statutory scheme without violating constitutional restrictions on delegation of legislative powers.

2003It was, thus, incorrectly decided in light of the law's subsequent development in this area and is overruled. [16] *136 The Court of Appeals also cited Radecki v. Director of Worker's Disability Compensation, 208 Mich.App. 19 , 526 N.W.2d 611 (1994).

2003It was, thus, incorrectly decided in light of the law's subsequent development in this area and is overruled. [16] *136 The Court of Appeals also cited Radecki v. Director of Worker's Disability Compensation, 208 Mich.App. 19 , 526 N.W.2d 611 (1994).

2003By using such independent determinations as a referent, the Legislature is not delegating how that fact will be used, just as the Congress in 1810 was not delegating the making of rules to France or Great Britain in Cargo of the Brig Aurora, supra. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the independently significant standard, but placed an unjustified limitation on it.

2003By using such independent determinations as a referent, the Legislature is not delegating how that fact will be used, just as the Congress in 1810 was not delegating the making of rules to France or Great Britain in Cargo of the Brig Aurora, supra. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the independently significant standard, but placed an unjustified limitation on it.

2003This is to be understood, in Dean LeDuc’s useful characterization, as an example of the “measuring stick.” In our case, also, because the FDA decision is only the measure, i.e., the enabling fact, MCL 600.2946(5) is not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 17 Aff’d 396 Mich 660 ; 242 NW2d 749 (1976). 19 VI The dissent misunderstands the independently significant standard.18 What is central to grasping this doctrine is that if the fact or finding to which the Legislature refers has significance independent of a legislative enactment, because the agency or outside body making the fin

2003This is to be understood, in Dean LeDuc’s useful characterization, as an example of the “measuring stick.” In our case, also, because the FDA decision is only the measure, i.e., the enabling fact, MCL 600.2946(5) is not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 17 Aff’d 396 Mich 660 ; 242 NW2d 749 (1976). 19 VI The dissent misunderstands the independently significant standard.18 What is central to grasping this doctrine is that if the fact or finding to which the Legislature refers has significance independent of a legislative enactment, because the agency or outside body making the fin

2003The panel correctly stated that, "[a]ssimilation of standards adopted for a purpose separate from the incorporating legislation, and having independent significance, presents no problem," but added a condition, which was "if the standards are established and essentially unchanging." 248 Mich.App. at 485 , 639 N.W.2d 45 (emphasis added).

1973In People v Hempton, 43 Mich App 618 (1972), the Court attempted to further refine and specify the analytical element of the independently significant standard.