lawsuit immunity in Texas

2025Because the mayor of El Paso, who is also a and is entitled to be heard."); see Wichita Falls Board member, was named as a defendant in his State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 697-698 official capacity, Heinrich may seek liability from (Tex.2003) ("[I]f the Legislature requires that the the City through that officer, although her claims State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity against the City itself must be dismissed. would otherwise attach, the Legislature has 11.

2025Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (“We conclude that by authorizing declaratory judgment actions to construe the legislative enactments of governmental entities and authorizing awards of attorney’s fees, the [UDJA] necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards.”); see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-698 (Tex. 2003) (“[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State’s sovereign immunity.”). 5 Before the State filed its quo warr

2025Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (“We conclude that by authorizing declaratory judgment actions to construe the legislative enactments of governmental entities and authorizing awards of attorney’s fees, the [UDJA] necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards.”); see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-698 (Tex. 2003) (“[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State’s sovereign immunity.”). 5 Before the State filed its quo warr

2005Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 S.W.3d 510 , 515-16 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv. v. Mega Child Care Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the proposition that the UDJA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 697- 98 (Tex. 2003) (stating that if the Legislature required the State to be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature intentional

2019Bevil v. Johnson, 307 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. 1957).

2010See Bevil , 307 S.W.2d at 88 ; Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Labs. , 766 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by Villarreal , 994 S.W.2d at 633 .

2010See Bevil , 307 S.W.2d at 88 ; Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Labs. , 766 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by Villarreal , 994 S.W.2d at 633 .

2010See Bevil, 307 S.W.2d at 88 ; Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Labs., 766 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 633 .

2005Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 S.W.3d 510 , 515-16 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv. v. Mega Child Care Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the proposition that the UDJA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 697- 98 (Tex. 2003) (stating that if the Legislature required the State to be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature intentional

2005Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utilities Commission , 100 S.W.3d 510 , 515-16 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv. v. Mega Child Care Inc. , 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the proposition that the UDJA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex. 2003) (stating that if the Legislature required the State to be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature intentiona

2005Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 S.W.3d 510 , 515-16 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv. v. Mega Child Care Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the proposition that the UDJA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 697- 98 (Tex. 2003) (stating that if the Legislature required the State to be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature intentional

2005Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utilities Commission , 100 S.W.3d 510 , 515-16 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv. v. Mega Child Care Inc. , 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (citing Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the proposition that the UDJA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex. 2003) (stating that if the Legislature required the State to be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature intentiona

2005See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697-98 ; see also City of Mexia v. Tooke, 115 S.W.3d 618, 623-24 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. granted).

2005See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697-98 ; see also City of Mexia v. Tooke, 115 S.W.3d 618, 623-24 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. granted).

2015Id. at 697-98 ; see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430 , 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1935) (stating that “ambiguity or obscurity” in a statute will operate in favor of the State).

2015Id. at 697-98 ; see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430 , 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1935) (stating that “ambiguity or obscurity” in a statute will operate in favor of the State).

2008See also Ex parte Aguilar, supra note 10; Rutherford v. State, 926 So.2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla.2006) (rejecting the argument that the study published in The Lancet presented new scientific evidence that Florida's lethal-injection procedure possibly created a foreseeable risk of the gratuitous infliction of unnecessary pain on the person being executed), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 , 126 S.Ct. 1191 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1145 (2006). [12] 547 U.S. 573, 580 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 , 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). [13] Id. at 582 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 (stating that when a lawsuit does not challenge the procedure mandated by sta

2008See also Ex parte Aguilar, supra note 10; Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting the argument that the study published in The Lancet presented new scientific evidence that Florida’s lethal-injection procedure possibly created a foreseeable risk of the gratuitous infliction of unnecessary pain on the person being executed), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 (2006). 12 547 U.S. 573, 580 (2006). 13 Id. at 582 (stating that when a lawsuit does not challenge the procedure mandated by statute, relief would not imply the unlawfulness of the sentence, but noting, “If the relief

2008See also Ex parte Aguilar, supra note 10; Rutherford v. State, 926 So.2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla.2006) (rejecting the argument that the study published in The Lancet presented new scientific evidence that Florida's lethal-injection procedure possibly created a foreseeable risk of the gratuitous infliction of unnecessary pain on the person being executed), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 , 126 S.Ct. 1191 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1145 (2006). [12] 547 U.S. 573, 580 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 , 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). [13] Id. at 582 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 (stating that when a lawsuit does not challenge the procedure mandated by sta

2008See also Ex parte Aguilar, supra note 10; Rutherford v. State, 926 So.2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla.2006) (rejecting the argument that the study published in The Lancet presented new scientific evidence that Florida's lethal-injection procedure possibly created a foreseeable risk of the gratuitous infliction of unnecessary pain on the person being executed), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 , 126 S.Ct. 1191 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1145 (2006). [12] 547 U.S. 573, 580 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 , 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). [13] Id. at 582 , 126 S.Ct. 2096 (stating that when a lawsuit does not challenge the procedure mandated by sta

2026See Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (observing that parties may judicially admit facts in their appellate briefing). 4 As we concluded with respect to Key’s argument that the Association’s initial filing of the lawsuit and the claim therein for violation of deed restrictions implicated her right of association, we likewise conclude with respect to the tortious-interference claim that Key makes no cognizable argument that such claim is based on or in response to her right of association.

2024See, e.g., 1st & Trinity Super Majority, LLC v. Milligan, 657 S.W.3d 349 , 364–65 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (holding that a party to a judgment, and the party’s successors in interest, may not initiate a separate lawsuit to challenge the validity of a trial court’s order that is otherwise appealable, as any such lawsuit constitutes an impermissible “collateral attack” on the judgment) (citing Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 , 345–46 (Tex. 2005) (holding that where party failed to timely appeal confirmation order, filing a separate lawsuit challenging the validity of the order const

2024Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where court determined that “appellant was not a stranger” to a consent judgment, appellant could not collaterally attack the judgment).

2024Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621-22 ; McLane Co., Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 514 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied). “[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State’s sovereign immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 697–698.

2021See Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360 (noting that courts generally find waiver if the Legislature requires that governmental entity be joined in a lawsuit even though it would otherwise be immune); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 697–698 (Tex. 2003) (“[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State’s sovereign immunity.”).

2020See Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 186–87 (noting that “[i]t is insufficient for a shareholder plaintiff to allege a derivative right to relief against a corporation’s officers or directors for breach of a duty based upon ‘mere mismanagement or neglect . . . , or the abuse of discretion lodged in them in the conduct of the company’s business,’” which allegations “may be disposed of on special exceptions or summary judgment”) (quoting and citing Cates, 11 S.W. at 849 )).

2020See Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 186–87 (noting that “[i]t is insufficient for a shareholder plaintiff to allege a derivative right to relief against a corporation’s officers or directors for breach of a duty based upon ‘mere mismanagement or neglect . . . , or the abuse of discretion lodged in them in the conduct of the company’s business,’” which allegations “may be disposed of on special exceptions or summary judgment”) (quoting and citing Cates, 11 S.W. at 849 )).

2017According to the City and the City Officials, the Plaintiffs “cannot bring a lawsuit to challenge actions that they could have challenged during the administrative adjudication hearing, and, if necessary, during an appeal of a finding of liability at the administrative adjudication hearing.” Citing Edwards v. City of Tomball, 343 S.W.3d 213, 221 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.), the Defendants argue 'that- Chapter 707 sets forth an exclusive procedure and “perva: sive regulatory scheme” that must be exhausted prior to seeking judicial relief.

2015See Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. 2013) (reaffirming that consistent with the common law one becomes a “party” to a lawsuit when a claim is asserted it in a filed pleading, even though not served with process).