University plea in Texas

2025Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). 7 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 , 227–28 (Tex. 2004). -4- - 579 - occurred on March 29, 2024, in which it stated “we are still in the process of locating and gathering records responsive to your request.”8 Beckcom’s attached declaration confirms that the University has since produced some documents, but has withheld others.9 Because the “argument and authority” section of the University’s plea does not address this request at all, it has not conclusively established its compliance with the TPIA. ¾ With respect to Reques

2009Code Ann. § 21.122 ; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ; Fellows, 701 F.2d at 450-51 .13 13 The trial court also could have concluded that an investigation of retaliation “could reasonably be expected to grow out of [Poindexter’s] initial charges of discrimination” as an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s denial of the University’s plea to the jurisdiction as to her retaliation claims.

2009Because the University did not conclusively establish that Hayes was a trespasser, we hold that the University's plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied on this basis. [4] See City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex.2008).

2009Because the University did not conclusively establish that Hayes was a trespasser, we hold that the University’s plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied on this basis. 4 See City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex.2008).

2009See Fellows v. Universal Rests., Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir.1983); Texas Dep’t of Crim.

2009Code Ann. § 21.122 ; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ; Fellows, 701 F.2d at 450-51 .13 13 The trial court also could have concluded that an investigation of retaliation “could reasonably be expected to grow out of [Poindexter’s] initial charges of discrimination” as an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s denial of the University’s plea to the jurisdiction as to her retaliation claims.

2009See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 557 .

2009See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 557 .

2009See Chapman v. City of Houston, 839 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (explaining that state universities are state agencies and enjoy sovereign immunity except in statutorily defined circumstances).

2009See Chapman v. City of Houston, 839 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (explaining that state universities are state agencies and enjoy sovereign immunity except in statutorily defined circumstances).

2025Relying on National Railroad Passenger S.W.3d at 789.8 Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), the University argues Kearney cannot rely on "the Page 16 'background evidence' idea" to "save stale CONCLUSION allegations like the exhausted claims in Ms. Kearney's Petition." However, as discussed, Because Kearney has affirmatively negated Kearney has judicially admitted that her prior the required elements of her constructive claims are not actionable, see Texas Dep't of Pub. discharge claim based on retaliation, we reverse Safety v. Stanley, 34 S.W.3d 321, 322 (Tex. the district court's

2016Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 US 101, 113 (2002) (ruling that “each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act”). 14 of the University on this claim.

2019See Villasan v. O’Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied) (“The Legislature’s apparent goal of reducing cost is enhanced by the amended statutory provisions because they narrow the issues for trial, thereby reducing the delay and expense otherwise associated with discovery related to theories no longer relevant in light of the election made by claimants on their initial filing of suit.”); see also Lenoir v. Marino, 469 S.W.3d 669, 674-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015), aff’d, 526 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2017) (“The election-of-remedies provision forces plaintiffs to d

2013See Myers, 360 S.W.3d at 58 n.4 (citing Brown v. Xie, 260 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); and Villasan v. O’Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 762 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2005, pet. denied)); see also Skoda v. Montague County, No. 02-09-00362-CV, 2010 WL 3075718 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 5, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Even if the plaintiff amends her petition after the governmental entity files a motion to dismiss, the amended petition does not moot the right created by the filing of a motion under section 101.106.”).

2012See id. at 300 (majority opinion).

2012See id. at 300 (majority opinion).

2008“Texas law requires that a complaint of unlawful employment practices be filed with the EEOC or the Texas Commission on Human Rights within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Davis v. Autonation USA Corp. , 226 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville , 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996)); see Tex. Lab.

1999Cf. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d at 492 (statutory requirement that age discrimination complaint be filed with EEOC or TCHR within 180 days was mandatory and jurisdictional).

2001See, e.g., Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp. , 997 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999), rev'd , 39 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2001).

2001See, e.g., Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 997 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999), rev’d, 39 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2001).

2001See, e.g., Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp. , 997 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999), rev'd , 39 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2001).

2001See, e.g., Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 997 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999), rev’d, 39 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2001).

2010See Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 518-19 .

2010Id.

2011We affirmed the denial in University of Houston v. Barth, holding that issues of fact existed regarding whether Barth had timely initiated the grievance process and regarding whether Barth had suffered adverse employment actions. 178 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2008We affirmed the denial in University of Houston v. Barth, 178 S.W.3d 157 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2018“Accordingly, [the court concluded] the amending pleadings effected a voluntary dismissal of the University’s claim as to that part of the larger tract not included in the amended pleading.” Id. -7- 04-18-00063-CV The court next addressed whether FKM was entitled to recover its fees and expenses asserting whether section 21.019(b) allowed such a recovery “should turn on a common-sense view of events rather than an excessively formalistic, mechanical approach of looking only for particular words in the label on the condemnor’s pleading or in the pleading itself.” Id.

2018“Accordingly, [the court concluded] the amending pleadings effected a voluntary dismissal of the University’s claim as to that part of the larger tract not included in the amended pleading.” Id. -7- 04-18-00063-CV The court next addressed whether FKM was entitled to recover its fees and expenses asserting whether section 21.019(b) allowed such a recovery “should turn on a common-sense view of events rather than an excessively formalistic, mechanical approach of looking only for particular words in the label on the condemnor’s pleading or in the pleading itself.” Id.

1998Id.

1992In Bridges v. Texas A & M University System, 790 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ), the appellant claimed the legislature waived Texas A & M University’s immunity from suit under the Texas Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act because article 21.21 of the Insurance Code defined “person” as any legal entity engaged in the business of insurance.

2025Further, Kearney's counsel expressly Hill, 189 S.W.3d 369, 376 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth stated at the hearing on the University's plea to 2006, no pet.).

2025Relying on National Railroad Passenger S.W.3d at 789.8 Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), the University argues Kearney cannot rely on "the Page 16 'background evidence' idea" to "save stale CONCLUSION allegations like the exhausted claims in Ms. Kearney's Petition." However, as discussed, Because Kearney has affirmatively negated Kearney has judicially admitted that her prior the required elements of her constructive claims are not actionable, see Texas Dep't of Pub. discharge claim based on retaliation, we reverse Safety v. Stanley, 34 S.W.3d 321, 322 (Tex. the district court's

2025Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). 7 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 , 227–28 (Tex. 2004). -4- - 579 - occurred on March 29, 2024, in which it stated “we are still in the process of locating and gathering records responsive to your request.”8 Beckcom’s attached declaration confirms that the University has since produced some documents, but has withheld others.9 Because the “argument and authority” section of the University’s plea does not address this request at all, it has not conclusively established its compliance with the TPIA. ¾ With respect to Reques

2024Flores first argues that her strong record of performance in the director position, which involved many of the same duties as the chief-of-staff position, belies the University’s claim that President Lange believed Sanchez to be the better-qualified candidate. 7 Indeed, Dr. de 7 As an alternative to showing pretext by evidence that the employer’s proffered explanation is false, the Fifth Circuit has held that the plaintiff may also show pretext via evidence that she “is ‘clearly better qualified’ than the person selected for the position.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., 482 F.3d

2019If the State were suable and liable for every tortious act of its agents, servants, and employees committed in the performance of their official duties, there would result a serious impairment of the public service and the necessary administrative functions of government would be hampered.”) (quoting Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70 , 71–72 (Tex. 1949)); see also Hillman v. Nueces Cty., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2019 WL 1231341 , at *6 (Tex. Mar. 15, 2019) (quoting truism that, “just as immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is inherent to immunity.”) (quoting City of Galveston v

2019See id.; see also Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 , 271 n.9 (Tex. 2011) (stating that section 101.106 confers immunity in some instances to employees of a governmental unit).

2019See Villasan v. O’Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied) (“The Legislature’s apparent goal of reducing cost is enhanced by the amended statutory provisions because they narrow the issues for trial, thereby reducing the delay and expense otherwise associated with discovery related to theories no longer relevant in light of the election made by claimants on their initial filing of suit.”); see also Lenoir v. Marino, 469 S.W.3d 669, 674-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015), aff’d, 526 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2017) (“The election-of-remedies provision forces plaintiffs to d

2019Generally, the Recreational Use Statute limits the liability of all landowners—public and private—who permit others to use their property for activities the statute defines as “recreation.” Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Williams, 459 S.W.3d 48, 49 (Tex. 2015); see TEX.

2019See Villasan v. O’Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied) (“The Legislature’s apparent goal of reducing cost is enhanced by the amended statutory provisions because they narrow the issues for trial, thereby reducing the delay and expense otherwise associated with discovery related to theories no longer relevant in light of the election made by claimants on their initial filing of suit.”); see also Lenoir v. Marino, 469 S.W.3d 669, 674-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015), aff’d, 526 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2017) (“The election-of-remedies provision forces plaintiffs to d

2018See id.