University defendant in California

2017They also asserted the public interest lawsuit exemption to the *170 anti-SLAPP statute in section 425.17, subdivision (b) did not apply because under section 426.17, subdivision (d) and Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050 , 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ( Ingels ), news gathering and reporting are exceptions to the public interest lawsuit exemption.

2017They also asserted the public interest lawsuit exemption to the *170 anti-SLAPP statute in section 425.17, subdivision (b) did not apply because under section 426.17, subdivision (d) and Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050 , 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ( Ingels ), news gathering and reporting are exceptions to the public interest lawsuit exemption.

2017More recently, in San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611 , 628, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ( Har Construction ), this court approvingly cited Tourgeman for the same rule, stating whether the public interest exemption in section 425.17, subdivision (b) applies is based on the plaintiff's allegations and "does not require the plaintiff to proffer affirmative evidence." Although the University defendants do not mention it, other courts have agreed with Tourgeman on this point. ( Cruz v. City O f Culver City (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 239 , 249, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 736

2017More recently, in San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611 , 628, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ( Har Construction ), this court approvingly cited Tourgeman for the same rule, stating whether the public interest exemption in section 425.17, subdivision (b) applies is based on the plaintiff's allegations and "does not require the plaintiff to proffer affirmative evidence." Although the University defendants do not mention it, other courts have agreed with Tourgeman on this point. ( Cruz v. City O f Culver City (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 239 , 249, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 736

2017More recently, in San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611 , 628, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ( Har Construction ), this court approvingly cited Tourgeman for the same rule, stating whether the public interest exemption in section 425.17, subdivision (b) applies is based on the plaintiff's allegations and "does not require the plaintiff to proffer affirmative evidence." Although the University defendants do not mention it, other courts have agreed with Tourgeman on this point. ( Cruz v. City O f Culver City (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 239 , 249, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 736

2017More recently, in San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611 , 628, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ( Har Construction ), this court approvingly cited Tourgeman for the same rule, stating whether the public interest exemption in section 425.17, subdivision (b) applies is based on the plaintiff's allegations and "does not require the plaintiff to proffer affirmative evidence." Although the University defendants do not mention it, other courts have agreed with Tourgeman on this point. ( Cruz v. City O f Culver City (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 239 , 249, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 736

2023The trial court found that “the evidence is not that the [U]niversity had a good faith belief [that adjunct instructors were exempt under state law]; the evidence is that they never thought about it.” This factual finding is entitled to deference on review (Furry, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 ), and the University does not challenge it as unsupported by substantial evidence.

2023The trial court found that “the evidence is not that the [U]niversity had a good faith belief [that adjunct instructors were exempt under state law]; the evidence is that they never thought about it.” This factual finding is entitled to deference on review (Furry, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 ), and the University does not challenge it as unsupported by substantial evidence.

2021Code, § 12940 et seq.) The trial court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment but erroneously excluded evidence a University employee rejected a job candidate because she “wanted someone younger.” Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 535–545 (Reid) explained such remarks can be relevant in age discrimination suits.

2021Code, § 12940 et seq.) The trial court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment but erroneously excluded evidence a University employee rejected a job candidate because she “wanted someone younger.” Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 535–545 (Reid) explained such remarks can be relevant in age discrimination suits.

2018(Id. at pp. 248, 253.) Regents is the second and, as far as we have discovered, the only other California case addressing whether a fair hearing includes the ability of a student accused of sexual misconduct to question the complaining witness.8 In Regents, the university held a hearing at which both the accused student and the complaining witness appeared, although they were separated by a screen and could not see one another. ( Regents, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1081, 1093.) The university’s procedures allowed the parties to “provide written questions to the review panel chair or review of

2018(Id. at pp. 248, 253.) Regents is the second and, as far as we have discovered, the only other California case addressing whether a fair hearing includes the ability of a student accused of sexual misconduct to question the complaining witness.8 In Regents, the university held a hearing at which both the accused student and the complaining witness appeared, although they were separated by a screen and could not see one another. ( Regents, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1081, 1093.) The university’s procedures allowed the parties to “provide written questions to the review panel chair or review of

2026(See, e.g., Haidak v. University of Massachusetts- 8 Doe’s brief asserts at the investigation hearing he presented at his closing statement “and also listed some of the questions he would have asked the complainants if they had made themselves available for questioning at the University hearing.” 21 Amherst (1st Cir. 2019) 933 F.3d 56 , 69–70; Doe v. Haas (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 427 F.Supp.3d 336 , 351 [citing Haidak].) The Delay Was Not Error, Let Alone Prejudicial Error Doe’s second argument reads as follows: “The delay in this case was unreasonable.

2026(See, e.g., Haidak v. University of Massachusetts- 8 Doe’s brief asserts at the investigation hearing he presented at his closing statement “and also listed some of the questions he would have asked the complainants if they had made themselves available for questioning at the University hearing.” 21 Amherst (1st Cir. 2019) 933 F.3d 56 , 69–70; Doe v. Haas (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 427 F.Supp.3d 336 , 351 [citing Haidak].) The Delay Was Not Error, Let Alone Prejudicial Error Doe’s second argument reads as follows: “The delay in this case was unreasonable.

2019(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393 .) In a footnote in its opening brief, however, the University argues that the defamatory statements in the retaliation claim were also protected for the same reasons as argued in the context of the defamation claim.

2018(See Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 632 .) Due process jurisprudence nevertheless may be “instructive” in cases determining fair hearing standards for student disciplinary proceedings at private schools.

2018(Doe v. Regents of University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073 .) “‘The statute’s requirement of a “‘fair trial’” means that there must have been “a fair administrative hearing.”’” (Doe v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 239 , quoting Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, 96 .) “[T]he University’s rule-making powers and its relationship with its students are subject to federal constitutional guarantees.” (Goldberg v. Regents of University of California (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 875 .) In disciplining colle

2018(Doe v. Regents of University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073 .) “‘The statute’s requirement of a “‘fair trial’” means that there must have been “a fair administrative hearing.”’” (Doe v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 239 , quoting Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, 96 .) “[T]he University’s rule-making powers and its relationship with its students are subject to federal constitutional guarantees.” (Goldberg v. Regents of University of California (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 875 .) In disciplining colle

2016Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 .) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly sustained the University defendants’ demurrer with respect to plaintiff’s fifth cause of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2016Business and Professions Code “[s]ection 25602.1 is a narrow exception to the Legislature’s enactment of what our Supreme Court has termed ‘sweeping civil immunity’ from liability for injuries to third persons resulting from the furnishing of alcohol to another. [Citations.] As the sole exception to statutory immunity, section 25602.1 must be strictly construed to effect the Legislature’s intent.” (Hernandez v. Modesto Portuguese Pentecost Assn. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1281 .) Interpreting the phrase “causes to be sold” in Business and Professions Code section 25602.1, this court held in H

2016Similarly, the mere fact that students may have transported alcohol through this hallway has no meaningful causal connection to the sexual assault. 28 Moreover, as the University defendants observe, “[a] lack of human supervision and protection is not a deficiency in the physical characteristics of public property.” (Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1352 .) F. Conclusion - Negligence Based Causes of Action Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action

2016The court found the allegations of the complaint strikingly similar to those in Tanja H. v. Regents of University of California (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 434 (Tanja H.), the case on which the University defendants relied for the principle that a university is generally not liable for the consequences resulting from the combination of college students and alcohol.

2016(Tanja H., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 444 ; Crow, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 207-208; Baldwin, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pp. 286-287.) We note in this regard that plaintiff has not alleged that the University defendants were aware of a particularized threat posed by Richards, or a specific threat against plaintiff.

2016A. Breach of Contract “[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 .) To prove breach, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant failed to do something the contract required the defendant to do, or the defendant did something that the contract prohibited the defendant from doing.

2016We conclude that the conduct alleged by plaintiff here falls far short of that which will be deemed “ ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” (Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 210 , quoting Cervantez v. J.