Mendenhall test in Montana

7 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1894–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Jenkinsgreen mont · 1981 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2003–2011 2 sentences 2011This Court adopted the Mendenhall test in State v. Jenkins, 192 Mont. 539, 543 , 629 P.2d 761, 764 (1981), and has reaffirmed its use in later cases. 2011This Court adopted the Mendenhall test in State v. Jenkins, 192 Mont. 539, 543 , 629 P.2d 761, 764 (1981), and has reaffirmed its use in later cases.	2	2
State v. Claytongreen mont · 2002 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015 2 sentences 2015We have repeatedly relied on these factors, often referred to as the Mendenhall factors, in seizure cases but we have also explained that the test is an objective one and “is necessarily imprecise and will vary depending on the setting in which the conduct occurs.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citation omitted). 2015We have repeatedly relied on these factors, often referred to as the Mendenhall factors, in seizure cases but we have also explained that the test is an objective one and “is necessarily imprecise and will vary depending on the setting in which the conduct occurs.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citation omitted).	1	2
People v. Luedemanngreen ill · 2006 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that “‘a practical, realistic inquiry’ ... is not a description that one often sees applied to the Mendenhall standard.” Illinois v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 202 (Ill. 2006). 2011The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that “‘a practical, realistic inquiry’ ... is not a description that one often sees applied to the Mendenhall standard.” Illinois v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 202 (Ill. 2006).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Clayton green mont · 2002 2 sentences 2015We have repeatedly relied on these factors, often referred to as the Mendenhall factors, in seizure cases but we have also explained that the test is an objective one and “is necessarily imprecise and will vary depending on the setting in which the conduct occurs.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citation omitted). 2015We have repeatedly relied on these factors, often referred to as the Mendenhall factors, in seizure cases but we have also explained that the test is an objective one and “is necessarily imprecise and will vary depending on the setting in which the conduct occurs.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citation omitted).	2	2014–2015
State v. Roberts green mont · 1999 2 sentences 2004Therefore, the State argues, at that point the seizure of the vehicle occasioned by the traffic violation had ended, and the interaction which followed was voluntary and permissible. ¶10 In United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 . 1 2004Therefore, the State argues, at that point the seizure of the vehicle occasioned by the traffic violation had ended, and the interaction which followed was voluntary and permissible. ¶10 In United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 . 1	2	2003–2004
California v. Hodari D. green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2024Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 and 628-29, 111 S. Ct. at 1550-52 . 2024Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 and 628-29, 111 S. Ct. at 1550-52 .	1	2024–2024
United States v. Mendenhall green scotus · 1980 2 sentences 2004Therefore, the State argues, at that point the seizure of the vehicle occasioned by the traffic violation had ended, and the interaction which followed was voluntary and permissible. ¶10 In United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 . 1 2004Therefore, the State argues, at that point the seizure of the vehicle occasioned by the traffic violation had ended, and the interaction which followed was voluntary and permissible. ¶10 In United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 . 1	1	2004–2004
State v. Carlson green mont · 2000 2 sentences 2003See Jenkins, 192 Mont. at 543 , 629 P.2d at 764 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 16 , 293 Mont. 476, ¶ 16 , 977 P.2d 974, ¶ 16 ; State v. Carlson, 2000 MT 320, ¶ 20 , 302 Mont. 508, ¶ 20 , 15 P.3d 893, ¶ 20 . 2003See Jenkins, 192 Mont. at 543 , 629 P.2d at 764 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 16 , 293 Mont. 476, ¶ 16 , 977 P.2d 974, ¶ 16 ; State v. Carlson, 2000 MT 320, ¶ 20 , 302 Mont. 508, ¶ 20 , 15 P.3d 893, ¶ 20 .	1	2003–2003
Ryan v. Kinney neutral mont · 1876 2 sentences 1894Ryan v. Kinney, 2 Mont. 454 , did not mention or construe section 267 of the Probate Practice Act, or any similar provision, which section 267, we hold, authorizes the contest by Nixon and Crave. 1894Ryan v. Kinney, 2 Mont. 454 , did not mention or construe section 267 of the Probate Practice Act, or any similar provision, which section 267, we hold, authorizes the contest by Nixon and Crave.	1	1894–1894

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MT § Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-401 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 77 (1988–2023) WA 12 (1997–2019) PA 12 (1992–2018) TX 10 (1993–2022) CA 8 (1983–2021) OH 8 (1989–2025) VA 8 (1992–2012) WI 7 (2002–2024) MT 7 (1894–2024) TN 5 (1999–2019) NC 5 (1995–2018) MA 5 (2001–2015) NM 4 (2009–2015) FL 4 (2009–2012) LA 4 (1989–2009) MD 4 (1991–2019) NH 3 (1988–2004) MO 3 (1991–2016) DC 2 (1999–2019) HI 2 (1992–2011) NE 2 (1991–1992) CT 2 (1993–2008) KY 2 (2025–2026) WY 2 (1993–1994) ID 2 (1991–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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