8 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1992–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Chesternutgreen2 sentences2001Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Mendenhall test is “necessarily imprecise” and because it is “flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s response to the action of the police.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 , 100 L. 2001Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Mendenhall test is “necessarily imprecise” and because it is “flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s response to the action of the police.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 , 100 L. | 3 | 5 |
California v. Hodari D.green2 sentences2012This principle stated in Cochran reflects the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hodari D. that a seizure of a person requires either physical force by the police officer or, “where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 (emphasis in original); see Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 405 , 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (“Thus, as in Hodari D., because Woodson did not submit to [Detective] Carter’s command, we must focus upon what Woodson did, not what a reasonable person would have assumed under the circumstances.”). 2012This principle stated in Cochran reflects the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hodari D. that a seizure of a person requires either physical force by the police officer or, “where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 (emphasis in original); see Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 405 , 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (“Thus, as in Hodari D., because Woodson did not submit to [Detective] Carter’s command, we must focus upon what Woodson did, not what a reasonable person would have assumed under the circumstances.”). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Satchellgreen2 sentences1995Satchell, 15 Va. App. at 130 , 422 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573-74) .... 1995Satchell I, 15 Va.App. at 130 , 422 S.E.2d at 414 (citations omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Baldwin v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1995See generally Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 196-98 , 413 S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1992) (discussing the distinction between subjective response to a police request and objective belief of freedom to leave). 1995See generally Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 196-98 , 413 S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1992) (discussing the distinction between subjective response to a police request and objective belief of freedom to leave). | 1 | 2 |
Woodson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2012This principle stated in Cochran reflects the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hodari D. that a seizure of a person requires either physical force by the police officer or, “where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 (emphasis in original); see Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 405 , 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (“Thus, as in Hodari D., because Woodson did not submit to [Detective] Carter’s command, we must focus upon what Woodson did, not what a reasonable person would have assumed under the circumstances.”). 2012This principle stated in Cochran reflects the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hodari D. that a seizure of a person requires either physical force by the police officer or, “where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 (emphasis in original); see Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 405 , 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (“Thus, as in Hodari D., because Woodson did not submit to [Detective] Carter’s command, we must focus upon what Woodson did, not what a reasonable person would have assumed under the circumstances.”). | 1 | 1 |
Cochran v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2012However, as the Virginia Supreme Court held in Coch *392 ran, the Mendenhall test “is not applicable until the person submits to the officer’s show of authority.” Cochran, 258 Va. at 608 , 521 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis added). 2012However, as the Virginia Supreme Court held in Coch *392 ran, the Mendenhall test “is not applicable until the person submits to the officer’s show of authority.” Cochran, 258 Va. at 608 , 521 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgadogreen2 sentences1998Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” Accord California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). 1998Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” Accord California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Budd
green
2 sentences2001Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Mendenhall test is “necessarily imprecise” and because it is “flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s response to the action of the police.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 , 100 L. 2001Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Mendenhall test is “necessarily imprecise” and because it is “flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s response to the action of the police.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 , 100 L. | 2 | 1992–2001 |
United States v. Mendenhall
green
2 sentences2012According to the Mendenhall test, “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” Id. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 . 2012According to the Mendenhall test, “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” Id. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Greene v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1995In Green v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606 (1994), the Court acknowledged that: the "Mendenhall test ‘is necessarily imprecise’ and ‘flexible’ ” in order to accommodate “ ‘consistent application from one police encounter to the next’,” irrespective of individualized reactions. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.