Mendenhall standard in Pennsylvania

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lo vette, 498 Pa. 665 , 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 , 103 S.Ct. 830 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482 , 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187 , 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

2000This Court enunciated an essentially equivalent set of principles in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), a decision which preceded Mendenhall ; the Court specifically endorsed the pertinent principles from Mendenhall/Royer in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 457-58 , 672 A.2d 769, 773-74 (1996). [3] In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," see

1996Thus, “the purpose of the exclusionary rule as developed in Pennsylvania was not solely to deter police conduct, as the United States Supreme Court interpreted it, but rather was “unshakably linked to a right of privacy in this Commonwealth.”Id. at 456, 672 A.2d at 773 , quoting Edmunds, supra at 397 , 586 A.2d at 898 . (emphasis added) In preserving this right to privacy, the Pennsylvania courts have consistently applied the Jones/Mendenhall standard to determine whether the conduct of police amounts to a seizure or a mere encounter between citizen and police.

1993In Hawaii v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161 , 840 P.2d 358 (1992), the state's supreme court held "we decline to adopt the definition of seizure employed ... in Hodari D. and, instead, choose to afford greater protection to our citizens by maintaining the Mendenhall standard.” Connecticut, too, remained with the Mendenhall standard in Connecticut v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), holding that a person is seized for state constitutional purposes under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

1993In Hawaii v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161 , 840 P.2d 358 (1992), the state's supreme court held "we decline to adopt the definition of seizure employed ... in Hodari D. and, instead, choose to afford greater protection to our citizens by maintaining the Mendenhall standard.” Connecticut, too, remained with the Mendenhall standard in Connecticut v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), holding that a person is seized for state constitutional purposes under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

1993In Hawaii v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161 , 840 P.2d 358 (1992), the state's supreme court held "we decline to adopt the definition of seizure employed ... in Hodari D. and, instead, choose to afford greater protection to our citizens by maintaining the Mendenhall standard.” Connecticut, too, remained with the Mendenhall standard in Connecticut v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), holding that a person is seized for state constitutional purposes under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

1993In Hawaii v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161 , 840 P.2d 358 (1992), the state's supreme court held "we decline to adopt the definition of seizure employed ... in Hodari D. and, instead, choose to afford greater protection to our citizens by maintaining the Mendenhall standard.” Connecticut, too, remained with the Mendenhall standard in Connecticut v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), holding that a person is seized for state constitutional purposes under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

1992Hence the court held that a show of authority by a police officer such as a command to halt or stop when directed at a fleeing suspect who does not heed the command does not represent a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes and therefore the discarding of contraband during the ensuing chase may not be characterized as a *332 forced abandonment. [3] In discussing the court's prior Mendenhall test for "seizure," it was stated Respondent contends that his position is sustained by the so-called Mendenhall test, formulated by Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

1992Hence the court held that a show of authority by a police officer such as a command to halt or stop when directed at a fleeing suspect who does not heed the command does not represent a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes and therefore the discarding of contraband during the ensuing chase may not be characterized as a *332 forced abandonment. [3] In discussing the court's prior Mendenhall test for "seizure," it was stated Respondent contends that his position is sustained by the so-called Mendenhall test, formulated by Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

1992In dissent, Justice Stevens takes issue with the majority's interpretation of the Mendenhall test and finds that such a narrow interpretation marks an unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment case law as far back as the Supreme Court decisions in Terry and Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). [4] The Court fares no better when it tries to explain why the proper definition of the term `seizure' has been an open question until today.

1992In dissent, Justice Stevens takes issue with the majority's interpretation of the Mendenhall test and finds that such a narrow interpretation marks an unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment case law as far back as the Supreme Court decisions in Terry and Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). [4] The Court fares no better when it tries to explain why the proper definition of the term `seizure' has been an open question until today.