10 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Mendenhallgreen2 sentences2022United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (recognizing the Mendenhall factors). 2022United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (recognizing the Mendenhall factors). | 3 | 4 |
Morris v. Stategreen2 sentences1993In Morris v. State, 739 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), the Court adopted the Mendenhall test, and held that the defendant was “arrested” and in “custody” as these terms apply to § 38.07(a)(1) at the time “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Id. at 66. 1993In Morris v. State, 739 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), the Court adopted the Mendenhall test, and held that the defendant was “arrested” and in “custody” as these terms apply to § 38.07(a)(1) at the time “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Id. at 66. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Castleberrygreen2 sentences2013Wade Page 7 terminate the consensual encounter.19 This is the Mendenhall test.20 If ignoring the request or terminating the encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.21 But–as the Supreme Court made clear in California v. Hodari D.22 –if an officer through force or a show of authority succeeds in restraining a citizen in his liberty, the encounter is no longer consensual; it is a Fourth Amendment detention or arrest, subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.23 The question of whether the particular facts show that a consensual 19 State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 46 2013Wade Page 7 terminate the consensual encounter.19 This is the Mendenhall test.20 If ignoring the request or terminating the encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.21 But–as the Supreme Court made clear in California v. Hodari D.22 –if an officer through force or a show of authority succeeds in restraining a citizen in his liberty, the encounter is no longer consensual; it is a Fourth Amendment detention or arrest, subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.23 The question of whether the particular facts show that a consensual 19 State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 46 | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Johnson, 838 S.W.2d at 907-08 . 1999See Johnson, 838 S.W.2d at 907-08 . | 2 | 2 |
Gilbert v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Johnson v. State, 838 5.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd); Gilbert v. State, 787 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, no pet.). 1999See Johnson v. State, 838 5.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd); Gilbert v. State, 787 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
California v. Hodari D.green2 sentences1999The Mendenhall rule, that a person has been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes if a reasonable person in the position of the arrestee would have believed that he was not free to leave, was modified by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). 1999The Mendenhall rule, that a person has been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes if a reasonable person in the position of the arrestee would have believed that he was not free to leave, was modified by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). | 1 | 4 |
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (relying on Mendenhall to conclude that the circumstances — "a show of official authority such that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave" — indicated a Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ("a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave."); Morris v. State, 7 2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (relying on Mendenhall to conclude that the circumstances — "a show of official authority such that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave" — indicated a Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ("a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave."); Morris v. State, 7 | 1 | 2 |
Crain v. Stategreen2 sentences2022United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (recognizing the Mendenhall factors). 2022United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (recognizing the Mendenhall factors). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. at 626-28 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 ; Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(applying California v. Hodari D to Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution). *168 Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they merely approach a citizen in public and ask if he is willing to answer some questions or by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen. 1996See California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. at 626-28 , 111 S.Ct. at 1551 ; Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(applying California v. Hodari D to Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution). *168 Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they merely approach a citizen in public and ask if he is willing to answer some questions or by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Buddgreen2 sentences1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). 1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Snabb v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Snabb, 683 S.W.2d at 850 . 1993See Snabb, 683 S.W.2d at 850 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Woodard
green
2 sentences2022We also look to the surrounding circumstances, including the time and place of the interaction, “but the officer’s conduct is the most important factor when deciding whether an interaction was consensual or a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411 ; see also Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 50 (underscoring the officer’s use of language and tone of voice in determining whether an encounter was consensual). 2022We also look to the surrounding circumstances, including the time and place of the interaction, “but the officer’s conduct is the most important factor when deciding whether an interaction was consensual or a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411 ; see also Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 50 (underscoring the officer’s use of language and tone of voice in determining whether an encounter was consensual). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Michigan v. Chesternut
green
2 sentences1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). 1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado
green
2 sentences1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). 1995See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Plurality Opinion); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.