small claim in New Hampshire

2024We need not resolve this dispute, however, because the result in each case is the same: the district division of the circuit court, which is a court of limited statutory jurisdiction, see Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014), lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim.

2020See Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014) (observing that the district division of the circuit court “does not have jurisdiction to resolve . . . actions in equity”); Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 11-12 (2011) (holding that, because piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, district court lacked authority to grant that remedy regardless of whether it had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case); Matte v. Shippee Auto, 152 N.H. 216, 223 (2005) (rejecting tenant’s argument that district court could properly deny eviction based upon principles of equity bec

2020See RSA 503:1, I (Supp. 2019) (defining small claim as “any right of action . . . in which the . . . damages, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $10,000”); Thomas v. Crete, 141 N.H. 708, 710 (1997) (holding that district court lacked authority to award damages exceeding the small claim amount limitation of RSA 503:1, I). 7

2020See RSA 503:1, I (Supp. 2019) (defining a small claim as “any right of action not involving the title to real estate in which the debt or damages, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $10,000” (Emphasis added.)); Thomas v. Crete, 141 N.H. 708, 710 (1997) (holding that district court lacked authority to award damages on a small claim exceeding the small claim amount limitation of RSA 503:1, I). 2 been noticed or read by the Defendants.” The trial court denied the motion to reconsider, and this appeal followed.

2020See Osman v. Gagnon, 152 N.H. 359, 362 (2005).

2019It contends that: (1) the trial court erred by concluding that its claims were barred by res judicata arising from the defendant’s small claim default judgment against it, see Osman v. Gagnon, 152 N.H. 359, 363 (2005); (2) a default judgment in a small claim should have no res judicata effect because service in hand is not required; (3) barring its claims on the basis of res judicata from a small claim default judgment constituted an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process; (4) the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss; and (5) the trial court made findings

2023In ruling in favor of the defendants, the trial court found that: (1) the plaintiff had not satisfied his implied obligation to perform the contracted-for work in a workmanlike manner, see Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 436 (1975), thereby discharging the defendants’ obligations under the contract, see Fitz v. Coutinho, 136 N.H. 721, 724-25 (1993); and (2) at the time that the defendants terminated the contract, they paid the plaintiff $500.

2023In ruling in favor of the defendants, the trial court found that: (1) the plaintiff had not satisfied his implied obligation to perform the contracted-for work in a workmanlike manner, see Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 436 (1975), thereby discharging the defendants’ obligations under the contract, see Fitz v. Coutinho, 136 N.H. 721, 724-25 (1993); and (2) at the time that the defendants terminated the contract, they paid the plaintiff $500.

2022Second, a “trial court may consider factual allegations made by the plaintiff in a motion or objection, in addition to those in the small claim complaint.” Id.

2022Teatotaller, 173 N.H. at 446.

2020See Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014) (observing that the district division of the circuit court “does not have jurisdiction to resolve . . . actions in equity”); Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 11-12 (2011) (holding that, because piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, district court lacked authority to grant that remedy regardless of whether it had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case); Matte v. Shippee Auto, 152 N.H. 216, 223 (2005) (rejecting tenant’s argument that district court could properly deny eviction based upon principles of equity bec

2020ARNE argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to vacate the default because: (1) the trial court never held a hearing on damages under Cole v. Hobson, 143 N.H. 14 4 (1998); (2) the small claim complaint “was legally deficient” since, at the time of the complaint, no inspection had been completed; and (3) the default was allegedly obtained “by fraud.” We disagree.

2020See Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014) (observing that the district division of the circuit court “does not have jurisdiction to resolve . . . actions in equity”); Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 11-12 (2011) (holding that, because piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, district court lacked authority to grant that remedy regardless of whether it had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case); Matte v. Shippee Auto, 152 N.H. 216, 223 (2005) (rejecting tenant’s argument that district court could properly deny eviction based upon principles of equity bec

2020See Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014) (observing that the district division of the circuit court “does not have jurisdiction to resolve . . . actions in equity”); Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 11-12 (2011) (holding that, because piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, district court lacked authority to grant that remedy regardless of whether it had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case); Matte v. Shippee Auto, 152 N.H. 216, 223 (2005) (rejecting tenant’s argument that district court could properly deny eviction based upon principles of equity bec

2020See Bean, 151 N.H. at 250 .

2015See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (interpretation of a trial court order is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo).