constitutionally mandated presumption in New Jersey

1977The federal courts by contrast possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people's name. [ Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414-415 , 97 S.Ct. at 1833 , 52 L.Ed. 2d at 473-474 ] Accordingly, we hold that the present scheme is invalid and N.J.S.A. 18A:13-8 is unconstitutional as applied to the North Hunterdon regional school district.

1977The federal courts by contrast possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people's name. [ Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414-415 , 97 S.Ct. at 1833 , 52 L.Ed. 2d at 473-474 ] Accordingly, we hold that the present scheme is invalid and N.J.S.A. 18A:13-8 is unconstitutional as applied to the North Hunterdon regional school district.

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Equating "a presumption of life" in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was "no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death pena

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2007Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that "evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction." The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence f

2000"Where public officials and other public figures are aggrieved by defamatory publications, the constitutionally mandated standard of fault which constitutes that element of the cause of action is the defendant's knowledge that the defamatory statement is false or his reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 31 , 520 A. 2d 1154 .

2000"Where public officials and other public figures are aggrieved by defamatory publications, the constitutionally mandated standard of fault which constitutes that element of the cause of action is the defendant's knowledge that the defamatory statement is false or his reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 31 , 520 A. 2d 1154 .

1997In holding that the allocation of liabilities was in accordance with the constitutionally-mandated immunity (“if banks are allowed to deduct from their assets both federal obligations and the liabilities fairly chargeable to those federal obligations, their ownership [ie. of federal obligations] will shelter taxable income” First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, supra, 470 U.S. at 595 , 105 S.Ct. at 1523 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 545 ), the Court did not permit a limitation on the scope of 31 U.S.C.A § 3124’s immunity.

1997In holding that the allocation of liabilities was in accordance with the constitutionally-mandated immunity (“if banks are allowed to deduct from their assets both federal obligations and the liabilities fairly chargeable to those federal obligations, their ownership [ie. of federal obligations] will shelter taxable income” First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, supra, 470 U.S. at 595 , 105 S.Ct. at 1523 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 545 ), the Court did not permit a limitation on the scope of 31 U.S.C.A § 3124’s immunity.