constitutionally mandated standard (Texas) · Go Syfert
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constitutionally mandated standard in Texas

11 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Sharol Martin v. Stategreen
texapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014In Martin v. State, 405 S.W.3d 944, 948 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.), the court determined that the cost of a court- appointed investigator is a cost of provision of a defendant’s constitutionally mandated defense.

11
Sakil v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 25 (Tex. Crim.

11
cluster 295465green
ca5 · 1971 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
1 sentence

1993In the instant case the presence of these warnings leads us to conclude that any coercion flowing from the possible illegality of appellant's arrest was dissipated. 439 F.2d at 1046 (citations omitted).

11
Carter v. Bordenkirchergreen
wva · 1976 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981See Carter v. Bordenkircher, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1976).

1981See Carter v. Bordenkircher, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1976).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Addington neutral
tex · 1977
2 sentences

2015In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), rev'g, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.1977), the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process demands clear and convincing proof before the state may involuntarily confine a person in a mental institution.

2015In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), rev'g, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.1977), the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process demands clear and convincing proof before the state may involuntarily confine a person in a mental institution.

52002–2015
Addington v. Texas green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2015In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), rev'g, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.1977), the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process demands clear and convincing proof before the state may involuntarily confine a person in a mental institution.

2015In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), rev'g, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.1977), the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process demands clear and convincing proof before the state may involuntarily confine a person in a mental institution.

52002–2015
Sullivan v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

2015In addressing the harm of the error in Sullivan, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]lthough most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless error analysis, [internal citation omitted] some will always invalidate the conviction.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 .

12015–2015
Gonzales v. State green
texcrimapp · 1999
1 sentence

2015Gonzales v. State, 994 S.W.2d 170, at n. 4 . 10 ultimately served as a juror was capable of applying the constitutionally-mandated standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a rule involving a fundamental right that applies to the trial of every criminal case.

12015–2015
Reynolds v. Sims green
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

1991As the United States Supreme Court stated in Connor v. Fitch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 , 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34 , 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977): “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” Thus, “judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to ... constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 , 84 S.Ct. at 1394 .

1991As the United States Supreme Court stated in Connor v. Fitch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 , 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34 , 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977): “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” Thus, “judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to ... constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 , 84 S.Ct. at 1394 .

11991–1991
Connor v. Finch green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1991As the United States Supreme Court stated in Connor v. Fitch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 , 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34 , 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977): “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” Thus, “judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to ... constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 , 84 S.Ct. at 1394 .

1991As the United States Supreme Court stated in Connor v. Fitch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 , 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34 , 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977): “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” Thus, “judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to ... constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 , 84 S.Ct. at 1394 .

11991–1991

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007 (5) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001 (5) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 161.207 (5) TX § Tex. Educ. Code § 25.085 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 161.206 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 261.001 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 262.105 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 262.201 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405 (3) TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 51.11 (3) TX § Tex. Water Code § 11.086 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 13 (1982–2022) TX 11 (1981–2015) CT 11 (1981–2002) FL 9 (1996–2024) NY 9 (1975–2009) MA 7 (1974–2024) NH 7 (2002–2023) NJ 7 (1977–2007) GA 7 (1975–2024) WA 6 (1995–2022) PA 5 (1971–2018) HI 4 (1973–1996) MI 4 (1973–2013) SC 3 (2009–2014) ID 3 (1985–2020) MD 3 (1980–1997) ME 3 (1980–2004) OH 2 (1992–1992) LA 2 (1992–2004) UT 2 (1989–2005) SD 2 (1984–1987) KY 2 (1995–2006) OR 2 (2005–2011) IA 2 (1976–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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