54 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1969–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Dudleygreen2 sentences2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). 2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Thomas J.green2 sentences2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). 2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Coxgreen2 sentences2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). 2012Thus, any mistake in the SCI “with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the [SCI] or the guilty plea entered thereto” (People v Cox, 275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Dudley, 28 AD3d 1182, 1183 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 788 [2006]; People v Kepple, 98 AD2d 783, 783 [1983]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Carrollgreen2 sentences2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission 2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bellogreen2 sentences2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission 2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission | 2 | 2 |
People v. Millsgreen2 sentences2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission 2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission | 2 | 2 |
People v. Valeriogreen2 sentences2015Furthermore, the counts which additionally charged the defendant with aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (2), and harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26 (3), were facially insufficient (see CPL 100.15 [3]; People v Valerio, 60 NY2d 669, 670 [1983]; People v Singh, 1 Misc 3d 73, 74 [App Term, 2d Dept 2003]). 2005The factual allegations in the complaint set forth a cause of action that the plaintiffs arrest for harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26 (3) was not supported by probable cause and therefore, was not legally justified (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451 [1975], cert denied 423 US 929 [1975]; see also People v Valerio, 60 NY2d 669 [1983]; People v Otto, 40 NY2d 864 [1976]; People v Chasserot, 30 NY2d 898 [1972]; Krisanda v Miller, 205 AD2d 1029 [1994]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Golbgreen2 sentences2015Dismissal of the two counts which charged the defendant with aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) is required because that statute has been struck down by the Court of Appeals as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad (see People v Golb, 23 NY3d 455, 467 [2014]; People v Taylor, 126 AD3d 1018 [2015]). 2014Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree The People concede that the counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a) and (b) must be dismissed in light of the Court of Appeals’ holding in People v Golb ( 23 NY3d 455 [May 13, 2014]). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2020The defendant's contention that his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3) was not supported by legally sufficient evidence on the ground that he lacked the requisite mens rea of knowingly possessing a loaded firearm is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 492 ; People v Gray , 86 NY2d 10, 19 ; People v Ealey , 176 AD3d 735 , 735). 2010The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction of robbery in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 160.10 (1) is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492-493 [2008]; People v Finger, 95 NY2d 894, 895 [2000]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Parkergreen1 sentence2024Inasmuch as the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was exempt from prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon pursuant to Penal Law § 265.20 (a) (3), we modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 and dismissing count 2 of the indictment ( see generally People v Parker , 52 NY2d 935, 936 [1981], revg on dissent below 70 AD2d 387, 391-394 [1st Dept 1979] [Birns, J., dissenting]; People v Davis , 193 AD2d 954, 955-956 [3d Dept 1993]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Parkergreen1 sentence2024Inasmuch as the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was exempt from prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon pursuant to Penal Law § 265.20 (a) (3), we modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 and dismissing count 2 of the indictment ( see generally People v Parker , 52 NY2d 935, 936 [1981], revg on dissent below 70 AD2d 387, 391-394 [1st Dept 1979] [Birns, J., dissenting]; People v Davis , 193 AD2d 954, 955-956 [3d Dept 1993]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence2024Inasmuch as the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was exempt from prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon pursuant to Penal Law § 265.20 (a) (3), we modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 and dismissing count 2 of the indictment ( see generally People v Parker , 52 NY2d 935, 936 [1981], revg on dissent below 70 AD2d 387, 391-394 [1st Dept 1979] [Birns, J., dissenting]; People v Davis , 193 AD2d 954, 955-956 [3d Dept 1993]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen1 sentence2021The logic and rationale of Campbell control and dictate that the charge of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (4) does not qualify as a cognizable offense "because this crime imposes strict liability for a result—causing [physical] injury—[and] culpability would be imposed even if the resulting injury was wholly unintended" ( People v Miller , 87 NY2d 211, 217 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell , 72 NY2d at 605-606 ; Matter of V.L-W. , 64 Misc 3d 1224[A] , [*3] 2019 NY Slip Op 51285[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 201 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2021The logic and rationale of Campbell control and dictate that the charge of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (4) does not qualify as a cognizable offense "because this crime imposes strict liability for a result—causing [physical] injury—[and] culpability would be imposed even if the resulting injury was wholly unintended" ( People v Miller , 87 NY2d 211, 217 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell , 72 NY2d at 605-606 ; Matter of V.L-W. , 64 Misc 3d 1224[A] , [*3] 2019 NY Slip Op 51285[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 201 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Zohargreen1 sentence2019Second, to the extent that the presentment agency's argument relies upon Penal Law § 120.05(2), the portion of the petition alleging that the appellant had committed assault in the second degree in violation of that subsection of the statute was dismissed by the court after the hearing and, thus, is barred by double jeopardy ( see US Const Fifth Amend; CPL 350.10[5]; People v Coble , 94 AD3d 1520, 1520-1521 ; see generally People v Zohar , 158 Misc 2d 1028, 1030 [App Term, 2d Dept]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tun Aunggreen1 sentence2018Contrary to the assertion of the People, defendant's contention survives his guilty plea ( see People v Tun Aung , 117 AD3d 1492, 1493 [4th Dept 2014]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pricegreen1 sentence2018That contention, however, "is related to the sufficiency of the factual allegations, as opposed to a failure to allege the material elements of the crime," and thus it does not survive defendant's guilty plea ( People v Price , 234 AD2d 978, 978-979 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 862 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2018The record establishes that the discrepancy between the factual allegations of count two and the crime charged therein is the result "solely [of] a typographical error" inasmuch as the facts alleged in count two of the SCI make it clear that the crime intended to be charged is robbery in the second degree as a violation of Penal Law § 160.10 (1), and we conclude that the typographical error does not render the SCI jurisdictionally defective ( People v Jackson , 128 AD3d 1279, 1279-1280 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 930 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
McCormick v. Axelrodgreen1 sentence2018The essential elements of criminal contempt in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 215.50 (3) are that a lawful order of the court was in effect, that the defendant had knowledge of its provisions and that the defendant intentionally disobeyed it ( see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod , 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983]; People v Celifie , 47 Misc 3d 133 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50466[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]; People v Labagh , 40 Misc 3d at 56-57 ). | 1 | 1 |
| In re Daniel W.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re of Brian I.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Singhgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Riveragreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Laureanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jamisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carr-Elgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chatmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Contes
green
2 sentences2020In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes , 60 NY2d 620, 621 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant knowingly possessed a loaded firearm in violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3). 2010In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Carr-El, 287 AD2d 731, 732 [2001], affd 99 NY2d 546 [2002]; People v Washington, 283 AD2d 661, 661-662 [2001]). | 2 | 2010–2020 |
In re Desmond S.
green
2 sentences2004A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when "he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury." (Penal Law § 120.20.) "Serious physical injury" is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." (Penal Law § 10.00 [10].) The reckless endangerment in the second degree statute requires "an objective assessment of the degree of risk presented 2004A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when “he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury.” (Penal Law § 120.20.) “Serious physical injury” is defined as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” (Penal Law § 10.00 [10].) The reckless endangerment in the second degree statute requires “an objective assessment of the degree of risk presented | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Pons
green
2 sentences2004While agreeing that justification had to be charged with respect to the attempted murder and assault counts, the People objected to the charge with respect to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under the rule of People v Pons ( 68 NY2d 264 [1986]). 2004While agreeing that justification had to be charged with respect to the attempted murder and assault counts, the People objected to the charge with respect to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under the rule of People v Pons ( 68 NY2d 264 [1986]). [*2] Prior to Pons , justification was clearly a defense to a charge of weapons possession, at least where an intent to use unlawfully{** 4 Misc 3d at 784 } was an element of the crime. ( See, e.g. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025The defendants each pled not guilty and moved for hearings pursuant to People v Huntley (15 NY2d 72 [1965]) [FN1] and Mapp v Ohio (367 US 643 [1961]) [FN2] . 2025The defendants each pled not guilty and moved for hearings pursuant to People v Huntley ( 15 NY2d 72 [1965]) [FN1] and Mapp v Ohio ( 367 US 643 [1961]) [FN2] . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Huntley
green
2 sentences2025The defendants each pled not guilty and moved for hearings pursuant to People v Huntley (15 NY2d 72 [1965]) [FN1] and Mapp v Ohio (367 US 643 [1961]) [FN2] . 2025The defendants each pled not guilty and moved for hearings pursuant to People v Huntley ( 15 NY2d 72 [1965]) [FN1] and Mapp v Ohio ( 367 US 643 [1961]) [FN2] . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Erlinger v. United States
green
2 sentences2025Bryant's motion is predicated in part on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States , 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 2025Bryant's motion is predicated in part on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States , 602 U.S. 821 (2024). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Plastik
neutral
1 sentence2021The logic and rationale of Campbell control and dictate that the charge of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (4) does not qualify as a cognizable offense "because this crime imposes strict liability for a result—causing [physical] injury—[and] culpability would be imposed even if the resulting injury was wholly unintended" ( People v Miller , 87 NY2d 211, 217 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Campbell , 72 NY2d at 605-606 ; Matter of V.L-W. , 64 Misc 3d 1224[A] , [*3] 2019 NY Slip Op 51285[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 201 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2021Defendant's remaining contentions are that he was entitled to a jury trial due to his immigration status ( see People v Suazo , 29 NY3d 1087 [2017]) and that he was denied the right to present a defense. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gray
green
1 sentence2020The defendant's contention that his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3) was not supported by legally sufficient evidence on the ground that he lacked the requisite mens rea of knowingly possessing a loaded firearm is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 492 ; People v Gray , 86 NY2d 10, 19 ; People v Ealey , 176 AD3d 735 , 735). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Coble
green
1 sentence2019Second, to the extent that the presentment agency's argument relies upon Penal Law § 120.05(2), the portion of the petition alleging that the appellant had committed assault in the second degree in violation of that subsection of the statute was dismissed by the court after the hearing and, thus, is barred by double jeopardy ( see US Const Fifth Amend; CPL 350.10[5]; People v Coble , 94 AD3d 1520, 1520-1521 ; see generally People v Zohar , 158 Misc 2d 1028, 1030 [App Term, 2d Dept]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Labagh green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Wallace
green
1 sentence2018The police then arrested defendant and charged him with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03, a class C violent felony. {**31 NY3d at 506}In a pretrial omnibus motion, defendant moved to inspect the grand jury minutes and dismiss the indictment "or [to] reduce the charges to a misdemeanor," arguing that because he possessed the firearm at his workplace, the "place of business" exception to Penal Law § 265.03 (3) applies. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re Yamillette G. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Brudasca v. Cottone green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Suffolk County Deptartment of Social Services v. James M. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In re Pasternak neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In re Gaines neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Taylor green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In re Doumazios neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cote v. Berger green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Fazio green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Thies green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Ashley green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Carr-El green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Baker neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Garson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Suitte green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Weekes green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Rivera green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Tabernuro v. Jones neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Swersky v. Swersky neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Nina K. v. Victor K. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Yoba v. Yoba green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Swersky v. Swersky green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Chasserot green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Otto neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Krisanda v. Miller neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Colao v. Mills green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Kubik v. New York State Department of Social Services green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.