217 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2025 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2018On August 27, 2015, he pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine; see North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (allowing defendant to enter guilty plea without admitting guilt based on acknowledgement that state has strong evidence to support conviction); to two counts of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 and two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. 2018On August 27, 2015, he pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine; see North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (allowing defendant to enter guilty plea without admitting guilt based on acknowledgement that state has strong evidence to support conviction); to two counts of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 and two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. | 4 | 8 |
State v. Herseygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Hersey , 78 Conn. App. 141 , 161, 826 A.2d 1183 (considering different instructional challenge to charge that defined "harass" as "to trouble, worry or torment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003) ; State v. Charles , 78 Conn. App. 125 , 130, 826 A.2d 1172 (same), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 908 , 832 A.2d 73 (2003). 8 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the court erroneously instructed the jury on this element. *302 III The defendant finally claims that his conviction for threatening in the second degree in violation of § 2009See State v. Hersey, 78 Conn. App. 141, 167 , 826 A.2d 1183 (“[i]t is axiomatic that the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to each and every element comprising the offense charged” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission of New Londongreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Hersey , 78 Conn. App. 141 , 161, 826 A.2d 1183 (considering different instructional challenge to charge that defined "harass" as "to trouble, worry or torment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003) ; State v. Charles , 78 Conn. App. 125 , 130, 826 A.2d 1172 (same), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 908 , 832 A.2d 73 (2003). 8 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the court erroneously instructed the jury on this element. *302 III The defendant finally claims that his conviction for threatening in the second degree in violation of § 2009See State v. Hersey, 78 Conn. App. 141, 167 , 826 A.2d 1183 (“[i]t is axiomatic that the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to each and every element comprising the offense charged” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herseygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Hersey , 78 Conn. App. 141 , 161, 826 A.2d 1183 (considering different instructional challenge to charge that defined "harass" as "to trouble, worry or torment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003) ; State v. Charles , 78 Conn. App. 125 , 130, 826 A.2d 1172 (same), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 908 , 832 A.2d 73 (2003). 8 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the court erroneously instructed the jury on this element. *302 III The defendant finally claims that his conviction for threatening in the second degree in violation of § 2018See, e.g., State v. Hersey , 78 Conn. App. 141 , 161, 826 A.2d 1183 (considering different instructional challenge to charge that defined "harass" as "to trouble, worry or torment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903 , 832 A.2d 65 (2003) ; State v. Charles , 78 Conn. App. 125 , 130, 826 A.2d 1172 (same), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 908 , 832 A.2d 73 (2003). 8 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the court erroneously instructed the jury on this element. *302 III The defendant finally claims that his conviction for threatening in the second degree in violation of § | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Smith, 149 Conn.App. 149 , 160, 86 A.3d 524 (2014). 2016See State v. Smith, 149 Conn.App. 149 , 160, 86 A.3d 524 (2014). | 2 | 2 |
| Sullivan v. Thorndikegreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Marcialgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Mungroogreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. McElveengreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Salamongreen2 sentences2011The defendant, Marvin Kitchens, appeals [1] from the judgment of conviction, *947 rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) [2] and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a). [3] On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) failed to instruct the jury, in accordance with State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), that any confinement or movement of the victim had to exceed that which was incidental or necessary to the commission of the underlying of 2011The defendant, Marvin Kitchens, appeals [1] from the judgment of conviction, *947 rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) [2] and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a). [3] On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) failed to instruct the jury, in accordance with State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), that any confinement or movement of the victim had to exceed that which was incidental or necessary to the commission of the underlying of | 1 | 10 |
State v. Krijgergreen2 sentences2014Thereafter, a jury found the defendant guilty of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (3)1 and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Stat- utes § 53a-181 (a) (3).2 The trial court rendered judg- ment in accordance with the jury verdict, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the statements forming the basis of his conviction were protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution3 because they were not real or true threats.4 The Appellate Court, with one judge dissenting, 2014Thereafter, a jury found the defendant guilty of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (3)1 and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Stat- utes § 53a-181 (a) (3).2 The trial court rendered judg- ment in accordance with the jury verdict, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the statements forming the basis of his conviction were protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution3 because they were not real or true threats.4 The Appellate Court, with one judge dissenting, | 1 | 2 |
State v. Decarogreen2 sentences2006In State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229 , 745 A.2d 800 (2000), this court rejected all but one of the claims raised on appeal by the defendant, Rita DeCaro, who had been convicted, after a jury trial, of nine counts of forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-139 (a). 1 See id., 231-32. 2006In State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229 , 745 A.2d 800 (2000), this court rejected all but one of the claims raised on appeal by the defendant, Rita DeCaro, who had been convicted, after a jury trial, of nine counts of forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-139 (a). 1 See id., 231-32. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Kukuckagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Teixeira v. Home Depot, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kukuckagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shirley M. Critchlow v. First Unum Life Insurance Company of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reyesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marrerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. FERDINAND R.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joe's Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kantorowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Liebenguthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fernando V.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2025Count two charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (4), alleging that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, the victim was less than 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2025Count two charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (4), alleging that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, the victim was less than 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 12 | 1987–2025 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2015See General Statutes § 53a-133; General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-135 (a) (2); cf. State v. Avila, 223 Conn. 595, 603 , 613 A.2d 731 (1992). 7 Because the defendant failed to raise this instructional claim at trial, he sought to prevail on appeal under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 2015See General Statutes § 53a-133; General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-135 (a) (2); cf. State v. Avila, 223 Conn. 595, 603 , 613 A.2d 731 (1992). 7 Because the defendant failed to raise this instructional claim at trial, he sought to prevail on appeal under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). | 6 | 1994–2015 |
Osahar v. United States Postal Service
green
2 sentences2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , 2009In support of its judgment of guilty as to breach of the peace in the second degree, the court found that “the defendant’s actions and conduct . . . and words, amount to violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior that did portend physical violence.” On appeal, the defendant argues that the court’s finding “is inconsistent with the undisputed evidence that the defendant was but one of many people involved in the identical conduct at the same time.” To prove the defendant guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state was required to prove beyon | 4 | 2009–2020 |
PMI Photomagic, Ltd. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , 2009In support of its judgment of guilty as to breach of the peace in the second degree, the court found that “the defendant’s actions and conduct . . . and words, amount to violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior that did portend physical violence.” On appeal, the defendant argues that the court’s finding “is inconsistent with the undisputed evidence that the defendant was but one of many people involved in the identical conduct at the same time.” To prove the defendant guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state was required to prove beyon | 4 | 2009–2020 |
Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp.
green
2 sentences2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , 2009In support of its judgment of guilty as to breach of the peace in the second degree, the court found that “the defendant’s actions and conduct . . . and words, amount to violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior that did portend physical violence.” On appeal, the defendant argues that the court’s finding “is inconsistent with the undisputed evidence that the defendant was but one of many people involved in the identical conduct at the same time.” To prove the defendant guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state was required to prove beyon | 4 | 2009–2020 |
State v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , 2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , | 4 | 2009–2020 |
State v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , 2020To convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘‘(1) the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultu- ous or threatening behavior, (2) that this conduct occurred in a public place and (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoy- ance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk thereof.’’ State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381 , 386–87, 861 A.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923 , 871 A.2d 1033 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 , 126 S. Ct. 356 , | 4 | 2009–2020 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera 2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera | 3 | 2006–2019 |
State v. Whelan
green
2 sentences2002The defendant, James Meehan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), 1 one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 2 and 53a-123 (a) (3) 3 and three counts of perjury in violation of General Statutes § 53a-156 (a). 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance and three counts of perjury; (2) the trial c 2002The defendant, James Meehan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), 1 one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 2 and 53a-123 (a) (3) 3 and three counts of perjury in violation of General Statutes § 53a-156 (a). 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance and three counts of perjury; (2) the trial c | 3 | 2002–2017 |
California v. Tyberg
green
2 sentences2017The court heard the testimony of Gaspar and DiCocco, and Chris Zyck, a friend of the defendant who claimed to have been present during the arrest. 6 Following the presentation of testimony, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding (1) "the officers had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest of the defendant" from "the information the officers had from the [complainant]," and (2) "exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest." Thereafter, in their respective testimonies at trial, both the complainant and the defendant denied that the incident occurred. 2002The defendant, James Meehan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), 1 one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 2 and 53a-123 (a) (3) 3 and three counts of perjury in violation of General Statutes § 53a-156 (a). 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance and three counts of perjury; (2) the trial c | 3 | 2002–2017 |
Bowen v. Peoples
green
2 sentences2017The court heard the testimony of Gaspar and DiCocco, and Chris Zyck, a friend of the defendant who claimed to have been present during the arrest. 6 Following the presentation of testimony, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding (1) "the officers had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest of the defendant" from "the information the officers had from the [complainant]," and (2) "exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest." Thereafter, in their respective testimonies at trial, both the complainant and the defendant denied that the incident occurred. 2002The defendant, James Meehan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), 1 one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 2 and 53a-123 (a) (3) 3 and three counts of perjury in violation of General Statutes § 53a-156 (a). 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance and three counts of perjury; (2) the trial c | 3 | 2002–2017 |
Washington v. United States
green
2 sentences2017The court heard the testimony of Gaspar and DiCocco, and Chris Zyck, a friend of the defendant who claimed to have been present during the arrest. 6 Following the presentation of testimony, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding (1) "the officers had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest of the defendant" from "the information the officers had from the [complainant]," and (2) "exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest." Thereafter, in their respective testimonies at trial, both the complainant and the defendant denied that the incident occurred. 2002The defendant, James Meehan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), 1 one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 2 and 53a-123 (a) (3) 3 and three counts of perjury in violation of General Statutes § 53a-156 (a). 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of three counts of possession of a narcotic substance and three counts of perjury; (2) the trial c | 3 | 2002–2017 |
State v. Whistnant
green
2 sentences2009Those five lesser included offenses were manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1), manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2), manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1) and criminally negligent homicide in violation of General Statutes § 53a-58 (a). 3 A person is guilty of intentional manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to a 2009Those five lesser included offenses were manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1), manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2), manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1) and criminally negligent homicide in violation of General Statutes § 53a-58 (a). 3 A person is guilty of intentional manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to a | 3 | 1986–2009 |
State v. Webb
green
2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805 , 807 n.1, 772 A.2d 690 (2001). 4 Johnson had been charged with murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a), kidnapping in the second degree in violation of § 53a-94 (a), felony murder in violation of § 53a-54c, capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-54b (5) and conspiracy to commi 2024Ed. 2d 162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805 , 807 n.1, 772 A.2d 690 (2001). 4 Johnson had been charged with murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a), kidnapping in the second degree in violation of § 53a-94 (a), felony murder in violation of § 53a-54c, capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-54b (5) and conspiracy to commi | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Meadows
green
2 sentences2020State v. Meadows, 185 Conn. App. 287, 290 , 197 A.3d 464 (2018). 2020State v. Meadows, 185 Conn. App. 287, 290 , 197 A.3d 464 (2018). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Pond
green
2 sentences2019The defendant contends that the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous pursuant to State v. Pond, supra, 138 Conn. App. 228 ,3 in which the Appellate Court held that ‘‘the specific intent required by the conspiracy statute requires specific intent to bring about all of the elements of the conspired offense, even those that do not by themselves carry a specific intent with them.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 234 . ‘‘[I]n order to prove the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-135 (a) (2),’’ the Appellate Court re 2016III The defendant last claims that the court erred in declining to instruct the jury according to the principles set forth in State v. Pond , 138 Conn.App. 228 , 50 A.3d 950 (2012), aff'd, 315 Conn. 451 , 108 A.3d 1083 (2015) ; see State v. Pond , 315 Conn. 451 , 466, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015) (Appellate Court properly determined that trial court should have instructed jury that "to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of [General Statutes] §§ 53a-135 [a] [2] and 53a-48 [a], it had to find that the defendant specifically intended that the robbe | 2 | 2016–2019 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2019The defendant, Garyl Alexis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4)1 and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1).2 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an unduly prejudicial photograph of guns that had minimal, if any, probative value, and (2) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L. 2019The defendant, Garyl Alexis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4)1 and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1).2 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an unduly prejudicial photograph of guns that had minimal, if any, probative value, and (2) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Chicano
green
2 sentences2017Lee, was convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to make a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-157b (a) and 53a-48 (a), and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-155 (a) (2) and 53a-48 (a), arising from a single unlawful agreement. 2 The Appellate Court held that the defendant's conviction of both conspiracy counts on the basis of a single unlawful agreement violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy 3 and, relying on this court's decision in State v. Chicano , 216 Conn. 699 , 724-25, 584 A.2 2017Lee, was convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to make a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-157b (a) and 53a-48 (a), and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-155 (a) (2) and 53a-48 (a), arising from a single unlawful agreement. 2 The Appellate Court held that the defendant's conviction of both conspiracy counts on the basis of a single unlawful agreement violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy 3 and, relying on this court's decision in State v. Chicano , 216 Conn. 699 , 724-25, 584 A.2 | 2 | 2012–2017 |
State v. Morales
green
2 sentences2017On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his conviction violated his right to due process under the constitution of Connecticut because the police lost potentially exculpatory evidence, in the form of a text message, in violation of State v. Morales , 232 Conn. 707 , 720, 657 A.2d 585 (1995), and (2) his conviction for both sexual assault in the second degree (counts one and three) and risk of injury to a child (counts two and four) constituted a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. 2017On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his conviction violated his right to due process under the constitution of Connecticut because the police lost potentially exculpatory evidence, in the form of a text message, in violation of State v. Morales , 232 Conn. 707 , 720, 657 A.2d 585 (1995), and (2) his conviction for both sexual assault in the second degree (counts one and three) and risk of injury to a child (counts two and four) constituted a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. | 2 | 1995–2017 |
State v. Connelly
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. DeCaro , 252 Conn. 229 , 240-41, 745 A.2d 800 (2000) ; State v. Etienne , 103 Conn.App. 544 , 558, 930 A.2d 726 (2007) ; State v. Henderson , 47 Conn.App. 542 , 551, 706 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908 , 713 A.2d 829 (1998). 2001The relevant facts and unusual procedural history of this case are set forth in State v. Connelly, 46 Conn. App. 486 , 700 A.2d 694 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907 , 908, 713 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907 , 119 S. Ct. 245 , 142 L. | 2 | 2001–2017 |
Chicano v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2017Lee, was convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to make a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-157b (a) and 53a-48 (a), and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-155 (a) (2) and 53a-48 (a), arising from a single unlawful agreement. 2 The Appellate Court held that the defendant's conviction of both conspiracy counts on the basis of a single unlawful agreement violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy 3 and, relying on this court's decision in State v. Chicano , 216 Conn. 699 , 724-25, 584 A.2 2012IV The defendant claims that the court erred in convicting him of conspiracy to commit false statement in the second degree in violation of § 53a-157b, 15 and of conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of § 53a-155, 16 because these multiple convictions violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 17 In his main brief, the defendant argues that the appropriate remedy, pursuant to State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 724-25 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L. | 2 | 2012–2017 |
Hatch v. United States Department of Agriculture
green
2 sentences2017Lee, was convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to make a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-157b (a) and 53a-48 (a), and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-155 (a) (2) and 53a-48 (a), arising from a single unlawful agreement. 2 The Appellate Court held that the defendant's conviction of both conspiracy counts on the basis of a single unlawful agreement violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy 3 and, relying on this court's decision in State v. Chicano , 216 Conn. 699 , 724-25, 584 A.2 2012IV The defendant claims that the court erred in convicting him of conspiracy to commit false statement in the second degree in violation of § 53a-157b, 15 and of conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence in violation of § 53a-155, 16 because these multiple convictions violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 17 In his main brief, the defendant argues that the appropriate remedy, pursuant to State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 724-25 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L. | 2 | 2012–2017 |
| State v. Geisler green | 2 | 2009–2014 |
| State v. Luurtsema green | 2 | 2008–2011 |
| State v. Ovechka neutral | 2 | 2009–2010 |
| Batson v. Kentucky green | 2 | 1995–2009 |
| State v. Deloreto green | 2 | 2006–2008 |
| State v. Arena green | 2 | 1995–1999 |
| State v. Coleman green | 2 | 1997–1999 |
| State v. Plude green | 2 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Hall green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Khan v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Lanier neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Robert Wilson v. United States green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Zayas green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Pinnock green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Robinson v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Harris green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Domian green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.