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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Evers v. Dollingergreen2 sentences1990In this case, as in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 , 574 A. 2d 398 (1990), also decided today, we consider application of the doctrine of increased risk, see Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399 , *122 471 A. 2d 405 (1984), in medical-malpractice litigation. 1990In this case, as in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 , 574 A. 2d 398 (1990), also decided today, we consider application of the doctrine of increased risk, see Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399 , *122 471 A. 2d 405 (1984), in medical-malpractice litigation. | 1 | 3 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1996Our rules of evidence insist that only statements subject to cross-examination, or other statements where "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" exist, should be admitted as evidence. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253, at 130 (citation omitted) (4th ed. 1992); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 , 111 L.Ed. 2d 638, 655 (1990) (explaining that "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission.") C.A. contends that, because 1996Our rules of evidence insist that only statements subject to cross-examination, or other statements where "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" exist, should be admitted as evidence. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253, at 130 (citation omitted) (4th ed. 1992); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 , 111 L.Ed. 2d 638, 655 (1990) (explaining that "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission.") C.A. contends that, because | 1 | 1 |
Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co.green1 sentence1957Highway robbery is perhaps the most common fact situation to which this rule is applied, since, as one court pointed out, `its name indicates that it is a danger incident to, connected with, and "arising out of" the use of highways.' Note that in these cases the exposure to the risk on the highway is in itself enough to establish the causal connection; there need be no evidence of carrying the employer's money or of protecting his property." See also Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 449 ( E. & A. 1942); Bobertz v. Board of Education of Hillside Tp., 134 N.J.L. 444, 448 ( | 1 | 1 |
Bobertz v. Board of Education of Hillside Twp.green1 sentence1957Highway robbery is perhaps the most common fact situation to which this rule is applied, since, as one court pointed out, `its name indicates that it is a danger incident to, connected with, and "arising out of" the use of highways.' Note that in these cases the exposure to the risk on the highway is in itself enough to establish the causal connection; there need be no evidence of carrying the employer's money or of protecting his property." See also Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 449 ( E. & A. 1942); Bobertz v. Board of Education of Hillside Tp., 134 N.J.L. 444, 448 ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scafidi v. Seiler
green
2 sentences2003My colleagues analogize this situation to the increased risk analysis adopted by the Court in the context of medical malpractice litigation in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 , 574 A. 2d 398 (1990). 2003My colleagues analogize this situation to the increased risk analysis adopted by the Court in the context of medical malpractice litigation in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 , 574 A. 2d 398 (1990). | 2 | 1990–2003 |
Gardner v. Pawliw
green
2 sentences1997Consequently, Dr. Kalafer was unable to state “within a reasonable degree of medical probability” that either test would have produced positive results that could have led to the early delivery of the baby— Dr. Kalafer’s [testimony] constituted a bare conclusion, unsupported by any opinion as to the critical underlying fact of the fetus’s condition as of December 21, 1988. [ 285 N.J.Super. 113, 122 , 666 A.2d 592 (1995).] The majority disagrees, taking comfort in measuring Dr. Kalafer’s testimony against a lower standard of causation, the increased-risk standard. 1997Consequently, Dr. Kalafer was unable to state “within a reasonable degree of medical probability” that either test would have produced positive results that could have led to the early delivery of the baby— Dr. Kalafer’s [testimony] constituted a bare conclusion, unsupported by any opinion as to the critical underlying fact of the fetus’s condition as of December 21, 1988. [ 285 N.J.Super. 113, 122 , 666 A.2d 592 (1995).] The majority disagrees, taking comfort in measuring Dr. Kalafer’s testimony against a lower standard of causation, the increased-risk standard. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Gardner v. Pawliw
green
1 sentence1997Ante at 390-391, 696 A. 2d at 616-617 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lanzet v. Greenberg
green
2 sentences1991The majority's only explanation for ignoring that requirement is "[t]his case illustrates the complexities of presenting medical causation issues to a jury when there is a preexisting condition." Id. at 188 , 594 A. 2d at 1320 . 1991The majority's only explanation for ignoring that requirement is "[t]his case illustrates the complexities of presenting medical causation issues to a jury when there is a preexisting condition." Id. at 188 , 594 A. 2d at 1320 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bobertz v. Board of Education of Hillside Twp.
green
1 sentence1957Highway robbery is perhaps the most common fact situation to which this rule is applied, since, as one court pointed out, `its name indicates that it is a danger incident to, connected with, and "arising out of" the use of highways.' Note that in these cases the exposure to the risk on the highway is in itself enough to establish the causal connection; there need be no evidence of carrying the employer's money or of protecting his property." See also Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 449 ( E. & A. 1942); Bobertz v. Board of Education of Hillside Tp., 134 N.J.L. 444, 448 ( | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.