philosophy rule in New Jersey

1971State v. Laws, 51 N. J. 494, 501-515 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 971 , 89 S. Ct. 408 , 21 L.

1971State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 501-515 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971 , 89 S.Ct. 408 , 21 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1968); State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 491-492 (1971).

1971The philosophy of the rule as expressed in Lertch v. McLean, 18 N.J. 68 (1955), is applicable in the instant case, and worth repeating: The pretrial order is a cornerstone in the building of our practice in the trial of cases under the new judicial system.

1971State v. Laws, 51 N. J. 494, 501-515 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 971 , 89 S. Ct. 408 , 21 L.

1971State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 501-515 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971 , 89 S.Ct. 408 , 21 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1968); State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 491-492 (1971).

1970The philosophy for the rule allowing interest is best summarized by the quotation from Metler v. Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 37 N.J.L. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1874) approved in Nordstrom, 54 N.J. at 54 : Interest for the intermediate period is allowable, not strictly as damages for the taking, but as an equitable mode of compensating the owner for the necessary delay in ultimately ascertaining the amount he is entitled to be paid, and as the means of reaching the full measure of the just compensation which, by the constitution must *364 precede the taking of the property of a private citizen for publ

1970The philosophy for the rule allowing interest is best summarized by the quotation from Metler v. Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 37 N.J.L. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1874) approved in Nordstrom, 54 N.J. at 54 : Interest for the intermediate period is allowable, not strictly as damages for the taking, but as an equitable mode of compensating the owner for the necessary delay in ultimately ascertaining the amount he is entitled to be paid, and as the means of reaching the full measure of the just compensation which, by the constitution must *364 precede the taking of the property of a private citizen for publ

1962In Henry v. United States, 361 *506 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168 , 4 L.Ed. 2 d 134 (1959), Mr. Justice Douglas reviewed the philosophy of this principle which was later reflected in the Fourth Amendment.

1962At page 101, 80 S.Ct., at page 170 , the court said: "And as the early American decisions both before and immediately after its [the Fourth Amendment] adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even `strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest.

1944It operates, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Van Syckel in the Dixon Case, supra (at p. 12), “like a full pardon which releases the punishment and extinguishes the guilt.” The rationale of a holding as to a statute concerning a crime, or to a statute otherwise essentially penal cannot be applied to the applicable tax statute (R.

1944Const. Law 129 ” and that the “repeal of a law imposing a penalty, although after conviction, arrests the judgment.” The philosophy for the rule underlying the holding in these cases and urged upon us in the instant case, finds perfect expression in the case of Commonwealth v. Duane, supra, where the court held (at p. 609), “In nothing is the common law, which we have inherited from our ancestors, more conspicuous than its mild and merciful intendments towards those who are the objects of punishment.” The effect of this rule is that it “takes away punishment” whether it arises under a statute

1935The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.” The philosophy for this principle of law finds perfect expression in the case of Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577 ; 118 S. E.

1935The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.” The philosophy for this principle of law finds perfect expression in the case of Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577 ; 118 S. E.