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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1913–1972 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Westgreen2 sentences1972(People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 477 P.2d 409 ]; People v. Blunt, 241 Cal.App.2d 200, 204 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Defendant’s own actions not only show that he realized that he was put to the task of defending against the alternate charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but also show that he wanted the jury to think that that offense was all that he really was defending against. 1972(People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 477 P.2d 409 ]; People v. Blunt, 241 Cal.App.2d 200, 204 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Defendant’s own actions not only show that he realized that he was put to the task of defending against the alternate charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but also show that he wanted the jury to think that that offense was all that he really was defending against. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bluntgreen2 sentences1972(People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 477 P.2d 409 ]; People v. Blunt, 241 Cal.App.2d 200, 204 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Defendant’s own actions not only show that he realized that he was put to the task of defending against the alternate charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but also show that he wanted the jury to think that that offense was all that he really was defending against. 1972(People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 477 P.2d 409 ]; People v. Blunt, 241 Cal.App.2d 200, 204 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Defendant’s own actions not only show that he realized that he was put to the task of defending against the alternate charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but also show that he wanted the jury to think that that offense was all that he really was defending against. | 1 | 1 |
Powley v. Applebygreen2 sentences1962As said in Powley v. Appleby (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 727, 732 [ 318 P.2d 712 ], “Appellants are correct in their contention that it was error to accord the benefit of the presumption to the defendant automobile driver as to whom there were no special circumstances preventing him from testifying fully as to all of the circumstances prior to and through the happening of the accident.” While this is dicta, as the driver did testify, it illustrates the philosophy of the rule. 1962As said in Powley v. Appleby (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 727, 732 [ 318 P.2d 712 ], “Appellants are correct in their contention that it was error to accord the benefit of the presumption to the defendant automobile driver as to whom there were no special circumstances preventing him from testifying fully as to all of the circumstances prior to and through the happening of the accident.” While this is dicta, as the driver did testify, it illustrates the philosophy of the rule. | 1 | 1 |
Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1960He did not ask for a lawyer’s ‘ work product, ’ see Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 39 [ 132 N.E.2d 532 ], and in the light of both the letter and objectives of our discovery provisions, Rule 19-5 cannot be stretched to encompass this situation.” The ultimate philosophy of the rule requiring such disclosures seems to be stated in 4 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.), section 26.19, page 1079 where, referring to rule 26 of the Federal Rules, the author says: ‘ ‘ The sporting theory of litigation thrives on surprise—including surprise witnesses. 1960He did not ask for a lawyer’s ‘ work product, ’ see Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 39 [ 132 N.E.2d 532 ], and in the light of both the letter and objectives of our discovery provisions, Rule 19-5 cannot be stretched to encompass this situation.” The ultimate philosophy of the rule requiring such disclosures seems to be stated in 4 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.), section 26.19, page 1079 where, referring to rule 26 of the Federal Rules, the author says: ‘ ‘ The sporting theory of litigation thrives on surprise—including surprise witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coe v. Southern Pacific Co.
green
2 sentences1965“What is stated in the case of Coe v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal.App.2d 509 , at page 516 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 731 ], is pertinent with respect to the unusual factual situation presented in the ease at bar: “ ‘The philosophy which permits the presumption to be considered is, that when the person whose conduct is in question is unable to testify due to death, loss of memory or other circumstances beyond his control, the law provides testimony for him by the presumption of due care. 1965“What is stated in the case of Coe v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal.App.2d 509 , at page 516 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 731 ], is pertinent with respect to the unusual factual situation presented in the ease at bar: “ ‘The philosophy which permits the presumption to be considered is, that when the person whose conduct is in question is unable to testify due to death, loss of memory or other circumstances beyond his control, the law provides testimony for him by the presumption of due care. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
green
2 sentences1962Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1958) 162 Cal. App.2d 661 [ 328 P.2d 494 , 75 A.L.R.2d 807 ], involved a malpractice action. 1962Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1958) 162 Cal. App.2d 661 [ 328 P.2d 494 , 75 A.L.R.2d 807 ], involved a malpractice action. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
2 sentences1960As stated in Warner, “. . . the collective bargaining agreement should not control in determining the eligibility of a retired employee for unemployment compensation; rather, the factual matrix at the time of separation should govern.” As later stated in Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, supra, 396 Pa. 557 [ 154 A.2d 492 ], wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a ruling denying compensation benefits to a pregnant employee, “Here, although the pregnancy provision is a binding condition of employment, it cannot in any way thwart the appellant’s right to unemployment 1960As stated in Warner, “. . . the collective bargaining agreement should not control in determining the eligibility of a retired employee for unemployment compensation; rather, the factual matrix at the time of separation should govern.” As later stated in Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, supra, 396 Pa. 557 [ 154 A.2d 492 ], wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a ruling denying compensation benefits to a pregnant employee, “Here, although the pregnancy provision is a binding condition of employment, it cannot in any way thwart the appellant’s right to unemployment | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
2 sentences1960Bd. of Review, supra, 396 Pa. 545 [ 153 A.2d 906 ] repudiated the philosophy and doctrine of Rzepski . 1960Bd. of Review, supra, 396 Pa. 545 [ 153 A.2d 906 ] repudiated the philosophy and doctrine of Rzepski . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works v. Smith
green
1 sentence1913Rep. 42 , 78 Pac. 550 ], and cases there cited.) As said in the case just cited: “The philosophy of this rule is quite apparent, and its inflexibility is the strongest safeguard which the law can offer for the protection of the interests of the beneficiary. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.