reasonable expectation doctrine in New Jersey

2005An important corollary of the reasonable-expectation doctrine ... is that reasonable expectations will, in appropriate circumstances, prevail over policy language to the contrary.... *171 * * * * The natural, sensible and wholly justifiable inference is that by listing the drivers using the vehicle, including the insured himself, the purchaser of the policy is protecting all of them equally[.]... [N]othing in the declaration page suggests to the contrary[.] ... [ Id. at 347, 349 , 638 A. 2d 889 .] Lehrhoff, however, does not establish a bright line rule that the declaration page controls where

1998Co., 271 N.J.Super. 340, 347 , 638 A.2d 889 (App.Div.1994) (stating that a “corollary of the reasonable-expectation doctrine, at least in respect of the consumer market, is that reasonable expectations will, in appropriate circumstance, prevail over policy language to the contrary”).

2005Zacarias, supra, 168 N.J. at 603 , 775 A. 2d 1262 .

2005Zacarias, supra, 168 N.J. at 603 , 775 A. 2d 1262 .

1994In our view this termination of coverage is the type of unexpected result that defeats the reasonable expectations of the insured. [ Id. at 273-274 , 742 P. 2d at 284-285 ] In so applying the reasonable expectation doctrine, the Arizona court relied to a considerable degree on the declaration-page identification of immediate family-member drivers.

1994In our view this termination of coverage is the type of unexpected result that defeats the reasonable expectations of the insured. [ Id. at 273-274 , 742 P. 2d at 284-285 ] In so applying the reasonable expectation doctrine, the Arizona court relied to a considerable degree on the declaration-page identification of immediate family-member drivers.

1994Justice Jacobs put it this way in Kievit : *348 "Where particular provisions, if read literally, would largely nullify the insurance, they will be severely restricted so as to enable fair fulfillment of the stated policy objective." Id. at 483 , 170 A. 2d 22 .

1994Justice Jacobs put it this way in Kievit : *348 "Where particular provisions, if read literally, would largely nullify the insurance, they will be severely restricted so as to enable fair fulfillment of the stated policy objective." Id. at 483 , 170 A. 2d 22 .

1989In this case, the majority, I believe, fails to apply the reasonable-expectation standard “prescriptively” with the goal of preventing arbitrary conduct that “smacks of harassment.” See, e.g., State v. Gregory, supra, 66 N.J. at 518 .

1989In this case, the majority, I believe, fails to apply the reasonable-expectation standard "prescriptively" with the goal of preventing arbitrary conduct that "smacks of harassment." See, e.g., State v. Gregory, supra, 66 N.J. at 518 .

1982N.J.S.A. 2C:1-10(a)(3) bars a subsequent prosecution "for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts" unless "the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted ... and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil...." Apparently, the "rule of this subsection" was designed to be "more stringent than `the reasonable expectation' test" of State v. Currie, supra , and State v. Cormier, s

1982N.J.S.A. 2C:1-10(a)(3) bars a subsequent prosecution "for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts" unless "the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted ... and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil...." Apparently, the "rule of this subsection" was designed to be "more stringent than `the reasonable expectation' test" of State v. Currie, supra , and State v. Cormier, s