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8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 . ¶45 The dissent asserts that the reasonable expectation inquiry provides an “amorphous standard” that is absent in our constitutional text. 2021See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 . ¶45 The dissent asserts that the reasonable expectation inquiry provides an “amorphous standard” that is absent in our constitutional text. | 2 | 2 |
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurancegreen2 sentences1986Paul test by expanding the “reasonable condition” language so as to create a policy exclusion based upon the condition of the building at the time of the collapse. 1 Additionally, appellant argues that applying the reasonable condition requirement under these circumstances violates the reasonable expectation doctrine and the principles set forth in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 140 Ariz. 383 , 682 P.2d 388 (1984), since it was within the reasonable expectation of the insured that losses triggered by wind would be covered by the term “windstorm.” Appellant al 1986Paul test by expanding the “reasonable condition” language so as to create a policy exclusion based upon the condition of the building at the time of the collapse. 1 Additionally, appellant argues that applying the reasonable condition requirement under these circumstances violates the reasonable expectation doctrine and the principles set forth in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 140 Ariz. 383 , 682 P.2d 388 (1984), since it was within the reasonable expectation of the insured that losses triggered by wind would be covered by the term “windstorm.” Appellant al | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Miller
red
2 sentences2019Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented in Miller . 425 U.S. at 447 -56 , 96 S.Ct. 1619 . 2019Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented in Miller . 425 U.S. at 447 -56 , 96 S.Ct. 1619 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1978As Barker points out, however, the reasonable expectation test may not be applicable in a large number of design cases, for “in many situations . . . the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.” 20 Cal.3d at 430 , 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 , 573 P.2d at 454 , (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 829). 1978As Barker points out, however, the reasonable expectation test may not be applicable in a large number of design cases, for “in many situations . . . the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.” 20 Cal.3d at 430 , 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 , 573 P.2d at 454 , (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 829). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.