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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strubel v. Comenity Bankgreen2 sentences2021The "TILA seeks to 'protect . . . consumer[s] against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices' and promote 'the informed use of credit' by 'assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure' of credit terms." Vincent v. The Money A-0757-19 11 Store, 756, F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (a)); see also Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 2016). 2021The "TILA seeks to 'protect . . . consumer[s] against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices' and promote 'the informed use of credit' by 'assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure' of credit terms." Vincent v. The Money A-0757-19 11 Store, 756, F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (a)); see also Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. South Holland Dodge, Inc.green2 sentences2005Id. at 469-70. 2005Id. at 469-70. | 1 | 1 |
R.F. v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma 2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences2001Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 , 647 A. 2d 454, 460-61 (1994). 2001Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 , 647 A. 2d 454, 460-61 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Lincoln First Bank v. Rupertgreen2 sentences1981The phrase “any action to offset” does not refer to judicial proceedings, but to self-help actions by a debtor such as “deduct[ing] unilaterally from the amount he owes the amount of the civil penalty allegedly resulting from the Truth-in-Lending Act violations.” Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Rupert, 60 A.D.2d 193 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App.Div.1977) (citations omitted) (summary judgment for bank reversed because borrower should have been permitted to assert counterclaim for TILA violation more than three years after contract signed). 1981The phrase “any action to offset” does not refer to judicial proceedings, but to self-help actions by a debtor such as “deduct[ing] unilaterally from the amount he owes the amount of the civil penalty allegedly resulting from the Truth-in-Lending Act violations.” Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Rupert, 60 A.D.2d 193 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App.Div.1977) (citations omitted) (summary judgment for bank reversed because borrower should have been permitted to assert counterclaim for TILA violation more than three years after contract signed). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Younger v. Harris
green
1 sentence2019The court held appellant's claims were barred by the entire controversy doctrine and the Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) abstention doctrine; it also held appellant's TILA claim was untimely. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bank of New York v. Laks
red
2 sentences2012Amici Curiae Mortgage Bankers Association of New Jersey, the New Jersey Bankers Association, the Federal National Mortgage Association and New Jersey Foreclosure Attorneys argue that the Appellate Division’s determination should be affirmed, and Laks, supra, 422 N.J.Super. 201 , 27 A.3d 1222 , rejected, because the listing of the loan servicer on the notice of intention furthers the purpose of the FFA They also contend that any decision to the contrary should be prospective only, and that the remedy for any violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(ll) should be cure rather than dismissal. 2012Amici Curiae Mortgage Bankers Association of New Jersey, the New Jersey Bankers Association, the Federal National Mortgage Association and New Jersey Foreclosure Attorneys argue that the Appellate Division’s determination should be affirmed, and Laks, supra, 422 N.J.Super. 201 , 27 A.3d 1222 , rejected, because the listing of the loan servicer on the notice of intention furthers the purpose of the FFA They also contend that any decision to the contrary should be prospective only, and that the remedy for any violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(ll) should be cure rather than dismissal. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Psensky v. Am. Honda Finance Corp.
green
2 sentences2008On leave granted, we reversed, holding "that American Honda's compliance with the TILA is a complete defense to the state claims being asserted against American Honda that are factually based upon TILA disclosure requirements even in the absence of a specific TILA claim in plaintiff's complaint." Id. at 231 , 875 A. 2d 290 . 2008On leave granted, we reversed, holding "that American Honda's compliance with the TILA is a complete defense to the state claims being asserted against American Honda that are factually based upon TILA disclosure requirements even in the absence of a specific TILA claim in plaintiff's complaint." Id. at 231 , 875 A. 2d 290 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Scott v. Mayflower Home Imp. Corp.
green
2 sentences2005The trial judge in rejecting American Honda's preemption arguments found dispositive Scott v. Mayflower Home Improvement Corp., 363 N.J.Super. 145 , 831 A. 2d 564 (Law Div.2001), and held that the TILA assignee defense provision "limits assignees' liabilities on only one set of claims, that is, those specified in TILA." Because plaintiff did not assert any TILA claim, the judge determined that the FTC Holder Rule still applied. 2005The trial judge in rejecting American Honda's preemption arguments found dispositive Scott v. Mayflower Home Improvement Corp., 363 N.J.Super. 145 , 831 A. 2d 564 (Law Div.2001), and held that the TILA assignee defense provision "limits assignees' liabilities on only one set of claims, that is, those specified in TILA." Because plaintiff did not assert any TILA claim, the judge determined that the FTC Holder Rule still applied. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma 2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ellwest Stereo Theatres of Memphis, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma 2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma 2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma 2005See, e.g., R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 619-20 , 745 A. 2d 1174 (2000) (blood transfusion recipient's state law products claim of failure to warn against manufacturer of commercially-available HIV blood screening test which was used unsuccessfully to test blood at blood bank was impliedly preempted by FDA's unique regulation of test); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 133-56 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (although plaintiff only brought state negligence and strict products liability claims, Court performed preemption analysis and found that federal law did not preempt state law liability of ma | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. 1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Basham v. Finance America Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Cases denying a TILA claim as a separate transaction from the underlying debt include: Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 927-928 , 99 S.Ct. 1046 , 59 L.Ed. 89 (7 Cir. 1978), cert. den. sub nom. 1981Cases denying a TILA claim as a separate transaction from the underlying debt include: Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 927-928 , 99 S.Ct. 1046 , 59 L.Ed. 89 (7 Cir. 1978), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
DeJaynes v. General Finance Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Cases denying a TILA claim as a separate transaction from the underlying debt include: Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 927-928 , 99 S.Ct. 1046 , 59 L.Ed. 89 (7 Cir. 1978), cert. den. sub nom. 1981Cases denying a TILA claim as a separate transaction from the underlying debt include: Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 927-928 , 99 S.Ct. 1046 , 59 L.Ed. 89 (7 Cir. 1978), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Darrow v. Beneficial Fin. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. 1981Co., 370 So. 2d 1001 (Civ.App. 1979), cert. den., 370 So. 2d 1005 (Sup.Ct. 1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336 , 210 S.E. 2d 826 (Ga. App. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E. 2d 274 (Sup.Ct. 1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Barfield v. General Steel Tank Co.
green
2 sentences1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. 1981Co., 370 So. 2d 1001 (Civ.App. 1979), cert. den., 370 So. 2d 1005 (Sup.Ct. 1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336 , 210 S.E. 2d 826 (Ga. App. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E. 2d 274 (Sup.Ct. 1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Public Loan Co. v. Hyde
green
2 sentences1981Co. of Louisville v. Ewing, Ky., 558 S.W. 2d 619 (Sup.Ct.1977) (under Kentucky law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for recoupment, not setoff); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 47 N.Y.2d 182 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 390 N.E.2d 1162 (Ct.App.1979) (under New York law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations if it arises from the underlying transactions sued upon); Stephens v. Household Fin. 1981Co. of Louisville v. Ewing, Ky., 558 S.W. 2d 619 (Sup.Ct.1977) (under Kentucky law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for recoupment, not setoff); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 47 N.Y.2d 182 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 390 N.E.2d 1162 (Ct.App.1979) (under New York law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations if it arises from the underlying transactions sued upon); Stephens v. Household Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stephens v. Household Finance Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Corp., 566 P.2d 1163 (Okl.1977) (under Oklahoma law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations until the principal claim is so barred). 1981Corp., 566 P. 2d 1163 (Okl. 1977) (under Oklahoma law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations until the principal claim is so barred). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
EMPIRE FIN. CO. OF LOUISVILLE, INC. v. Ewing
green
2 sentences1981Co. of Louisville v. Ewing, Ky., 558 S.W. 2d 619 (Sup.Ct.1977) (under Kentucky law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for recoupment, not setoff); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 47 N.Y.2d 182 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 390 N.E.2d 1162 (Ct.App.1979) (under New York law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations if it arises from the underlying transactions sued upon); Stephens v. Household Fin. 1981Co. of Louisville v. Ewing, Ky., 558 S.W. 2d 619 (Sup.Ct. 1977) (under Kentucky law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for recoupment, not setoff); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 47 N.Y. 2d 182 , 417 N.Y.S. 2d 238 , 390 N.E. 2d 1162 (Ct.App. 1979) (under New York law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations if it arises from the underlying transactions sued upon); Stephens v. Household Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. 1981Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App.1979), cert, den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct.1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp., 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct.1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.