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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Body-Rite Repair Co. v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen2 sentences2014"There is a well-accepted principle that the practical administrative construction of a statute over a period of years 12 A-3906-11T4 without interference by the [L]egislature is evidence of its conformity with the legislative intent and should be given great weight by the Courts." Body-Rite Repair Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 89 N.J. 540, 545-46 (1982) (quoting Automatic Merchandising Council v. Glaser, 127 N.J. 2012Div. of Taxation, 89 N.J. 540, 545-46 , 446 A.2d 515 (1982) (There is a well-accepted principle that the practical administrative construction of a statute over a period of years without interference by the [Legislature is evidence of its conformity with the legislative intent and should be given great weight by the Courts.) (internal quotation and citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.green1 sentence2021On the contrary, the judge found that the arbitration clause contained in the PII agreement was "unambiguous and clear" and plaintiff could not "defeat the well-accepted presumption that [he] knew and understood what was being signed." In distinguishing the facts in Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 308 (2019), where our Supreme Court found no "mutuality of assent" to enforce an arbitration provision in a consumer contract that it deemed "confusing, and contradictory – and, in part, misleading," Judge Vena explained that, here, the word "Arbitration" appea | 1 | 1 |
Automatic Merchandising Council v. Glasergreen1 sentence2014"There is a well-accepted principle that the practical administrative construction of a statute over a period of years 12 A-3906-11T4 without interference by the [L]egislature is evidence of its conformity with the legislative intent and should be given great weight by the Courts." Body-Rite Repair Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 89 N.J. 540, 545-46 (1982) (quoting Automatic Merchandising Council v. Glaser, 127 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman
green
2 sentences1986Plaintiffs interpretation does not comport with the purpose of the statute expressed by its structure, title and legislative history, and is contrary to the well-accepted rule that "words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 477 , appeal dismissed and cert. denied 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1964). 1986Plaintiffs interpretation does not comport with the purpose of the statute expressed by its structure, title and legislative history, and is contrary to the well-accepted rule that "words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 477 , appeal dismissed and cert. denied 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1964). | 2 | 1986–2012 |
Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman
green
2 sentences2012Although we recognize an agency may in certain circumstances revise regulations, despite intervening legislative re-enactments, Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 484 , 197 A.2d 366 , cert. denied, 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964), an agency may not adopt regulations that, rather than fill in gaps in the statute, alter the terms of a legislative enactment or frustrate the policy embodied in the statute. 1986Plaintiffs interpretation does not comport with the purpose of the statute expressed by its structure, title and legislative history, and is contrary to the well-accepted rule that "words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 477 , appeal dismissed and cert. denied 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1964). | 2 | 1986–2012 |
Bohman v. City of Boston Real Estate Commission
green
2 sentences2012Although we recognize an agency may in certain circumstances revise regulations, despite intervening legislative re-enactments, Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 484 , 197 A.2d 366 , cert. denied, 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964), an agency may not adopt regulations that, rather than fill in gaps in the statute, alter the terms of a legislative enactment or frustrate the policy embodied in the statute. 1986Plaintiffs interpretation does not comport with the purpose of the statute expressed by its structure, title and legislative history, and is contrary to the well-accepted rule that "words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning." Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 477 , appeal dismissed and cert. denied 379 U.S. 14 , 85 S.Ct. 144 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1964). | 2 | 1986–2012 |
Budd v. Hancock
green
2 sentences1982This well-accepted standard is found in Budd v. Hancock, 66 N.J.L. 133 (Sup.Ct. 1901), which reads as follows: A law is special in a constitutional sense when, by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate. 1981This well-accepted standard is found in Budd v. Hancock, 66 N.J.L. 133 (Sup.Ct.1901), which reads as follows: A law is special in a constitutional sense when, by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate. | 2 | 1981–1982 |
State v. Hunt
green
2 sentences2003The Appellate Division, however, asserted the well-accepted principle that imprisonment after a parole revocation “does not constitute a new sentencing event within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b(2).” 272 N.J.Super. at 185 , 639 A.2d 411 . 2003The Appellate Division, however, asserted the well-accepted principle that imprisonment after a parole revocation “does not constitute a new sentencing event within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b(2).” 272 N.J.Super. at 185 , 639 A.2d 411 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.