well-accepted rule in California

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

1987(CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) Appellants repeat the well-accepted rule that “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy . . . .” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Appellants properly note: “The insurer’s obligation to defend is not dependent on the facts contained in the complaint alone; the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns of facts from any source that create the potential of liability under i

2023(In re N.R. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 590, 598 [claim involving “issue of fact rather than a pure question of law” is forfeited by failure to raise it below].) Further, a plaintiff may not avoid summary judgment by arguing the existence of a cause of action not alleged in the operative complaint.

2019(See Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050 (Sprague) [stating the well-accepted principle that " 'every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made," and that "[i]f none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration' [citation]].") To the contrary, the plain language of section 386, subdivision (e) provides otherwise.

2014However, in light of the unintelligible and unsupported nature of the challenges made to the judgment of dismissal, we are unable to " 'proceed to the merits of any unraised "points." ' " (Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 544, fn. 8 ; rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.204(a)(2)(C) [legal arguments and authorities required of an appellant, as well as summary of significant facts in the record].) We accordingly treat any underlying potential arguments as waived, and we resort to the well-accepted presumption that the judgment is legally sound and supported by the evidence.

2012(Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 270.) It observed that temporal proximity between those two events is most relevant when the alleged attenuating factor was a volitional act by the defendant, such as resisting arrest or flight, because in such cases a brief lapse of time makes it more likely the search was the product of the detention itself.

2004Placing this conclusion in the context of the well-accepted principle that “the tort of malicious prosecution has a potential chilling effect on the willingness of persons to report crimes” 7 (Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409, 413 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 683 ]), we hold that a malicious prosecution action predicated upon a defendant’s alleged participation in procuring a criminal prosecution against a plaintiff falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.

2004Placing this conclusion in the context of the well-accepted principle that “the tort of malicious prosecution has a potential chilling effect on the willingness of persons to report crimes” 7 (Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409, 413 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 683 ]), we hold that a malicious prosecution action predicated upon a defendant’s alleged participation in procuring a criminal prosecution against a plaintiff falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.

1997(Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 352 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 , 852 P.2d 377 ].) However, the authorities cited by respondent do not provide a helpful analogy, since Revenue and Taxation Code section 1605.6 does not set a time limit for doing some act, but prescribes a number of days of required notice.

1997(Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 352 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 , 852 P.2d 377 ].) However, the authorities cited by respondent do not provide a helpful analogy, since Revenue and Taxation Code section 1605.6 does not set a time limit for doing some act, but prescribes a number of days of required notice.

1993(ACLU, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 449 ; see, e.g., 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 52.02, pp. 198-201; Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 65 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 603 P.2d 1341 ].) Because the original version of the CPRA was “modeled on” the FOIA, the “judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve[d] to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart” (ACLU, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 447 ), particularly the CPRA’s undefined term “intelligence information” (§ 6254, subd. (f)).

1993(ACLU, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 449 ; see, e.g., 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 52.02, pp. 198-201; Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 65 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 603 P.2d 1341 ].) Because the original version of the CPRA was “modeled on” the FOIA, the “judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve[d] to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart” (ACLU, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 447 ), particularly the CPRA’s undefined term “intelligence information” (§ 6254, subd. (f)).

1992It is a well-accepted principle of contract interpretation that “[a]ll applicable laws and ordinances in existence when the agreement is made become a part thereof as fully as if incorporated by reference. [Citations.]” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 692, pp. 625-626.) For example, in Fong v. Rossi (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [ 195 P.2d 854 ], a lease was construed as impliedly providing for the transfer of certain licenses in the manner authorized by law.

1992It is a well-accepted principle of contract interpretation that “[a]ll applicable laws and ordinances in existence when the agreement is made become a part thereof as fully as if incorporated by reference. [Citations.]” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 692, pp. 625-626.) For example, in Fong v. Rossi (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [ 195 P.2d 854 ], a lease was construed as impliedly providing for the transfer of certain licenses in the manner authorized by law.

1992In Mulder v. Casho (1964) 61 Cal.2d 633, 637 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 394 P.2d 545 ], certain Vehicle Code sections, intended to provide protections to the general public as well as purchasers of vehicles, were held to constitute “implied-in-law terms of every sales contract to which they are applicable” (ibid) and could not be waived or defeated by the parties’ agreement.

1992In Mulder v. Casho (1964) 61 Cal.2d 633, 637 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 394 P.2d 545 ], certain Vehicle Code sections, intended to provide protections to the general public as well as purchasers of vehicles, were held to constitute “implied-in-law terms of every sales contract to which they are applicable” (ibid) and could not be waived or defeated by the parties’ agreement.

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §

1991It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that when “1 “ ‘a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject [or the same subject] ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” ’ ” ([Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 302 ], quoting People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 566 P.2d 622 ], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121,142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ], quoting 23 Cal.Jur. 778, §