support hearing in Pennsylvania

2026See Sichelstiel, 272 A.3d at 537.

2026See Sichelstiel, 272 A.3d at 537.

2015Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); [Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003)] (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce

2007Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; 2 Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa.Super.2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); Doran, supra at 1283 (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce action was pending prior to the su

2015Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); [Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003)] (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce

2007Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; 2 Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa.Super.2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); Doran, supra at 1283 (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce action was pending prior to the su

2015Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); [Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003)] (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce

2007Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; 2 Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa.Super.2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); Doran, supra at 1283 (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce action was pending prior to the su

2015Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); [Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003)] (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce

2007Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; 2 Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa.Super.2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); Doran, supra at 1283 (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce action was pending prior to the su

2015Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); [Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003)] (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce

2007Fish, supra at 528 , 741 A.2d at 723 ; Brinkley, supra at 250-51 , 701 A.2d at 181 ; 2 Barr v. Bartolo, 927 A.2d 635, 643 (Pa.Super.2007) (declining to apply the presumption of paternity in a case where, although the mother and her husband remained married and had not sought a divorce at the time of the paternity hearing, they had been separated for several years and there was no intact family to preserve); Doran, supra at 1283 (concluding that the presumption of paternity did not apply to a case in which the mother and her husband had separated and a divorce action was pending prior to the su

1990The Superior Court, citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925), noted that the Supreme Court had held that due process in the prosecution of contempt required that the accused be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges, which would include, if requested, the assistance of counsel.

1971In Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925), it was said: “Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, . . . requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation.

2024At the support hearing, the hearing officer explained that support deviations are warranted only “for other minor children.” Id. (quoting N.T., 12/7/22, at 11).

2007See McClain v. McClain, 872 A.2d 856 (Pa.Super.2005) (fact-finder is free to weigh the evidence presented and assess its credibility). ¶ 12 In a related argument, Father asserts that Dr. Lunsford, a neurosurgeon *492 who was deposed in this matter and drafted two letters on Kaitlin’s behalf at Mother’s request, 2 was unqualified to render a competent opinion on any relevant issues at the support hearing because Dr. Luns-ford conceded during his deposition that he did not perform the 2004 surgery and that he examined Kaitlin only one time.

2020See Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342 (“The use of the words ‘welfare and benefit’ in addition to the usual ‘support and maintenance’ language in the first clause of [the trust], which defines the support standard, also indicates an intent to give [the] trustee the discretion to do more than ensure a minimum standard of living for [the beneficiary].”); In re Swinson’s ____________________________________________ 4 James further argues that, because Gary’s receipt of trust funds would disqualify him from SSI benefits pursuant to federal regulations, James should be permitted to make distributions on Gary’

1996The court reasoned that “when a support standard is expressed in a trust instrument, the extent of the interest of the beneficiary depends upon the settlor’s intent,” citing A. Scott, The Law of Trusts (3d ed.1967) and “there should be an exact parallelism between the rights of a beneficiary in and to the trust estate and the rights of his creditors to reach his equitable interest in the estate.” Id. at 435-36 , 528 A.2d at 1339 .

1986“Where it is impossible for the appellate court to decide a case because the record is incomplete, the case should be remanded to the lower court for clarification and completion of the record.” Johnson v. Keystone Insurance Company, 299 Pa.Super. 187, 193 , 445 A.2d 517, 520 (1982) (remand necessary when record contains neither a transcript of a master’s hearing nor a master’s report and parties disagree *20 as to what evidence was actually presented at the hearing, and trial court’s Opinion has no findings of fact and no discussion of facts); Pawol v. Pawol, 293 Pa.Super. 29 , 437 A.2d 974 (

1986“Where it is impossible for the appellate court to decide a case because the record is incomplete, the case should be remanded to the lower court for clarification and completion of the record.” Johnson v. Keystone Insurance Company, 299 Pa.Super. 187, 193 , 445 A.2d 517, 520 (1982) (remand necessary when record contains neither a transcript of a master’s hearing nor a master’s report and parties disagree *20 as to what evidence was actually presented at the hearing, and trial court’s Opinion has no findings of fact and no discussion of facts); Pawol v. Pawol, 293 Pa.Super. 29 , 437 A.2d 974 (

2024Id. at 86-87. - 11 - J-S41018-23 available financial resources of the [parent, and] all benefits flowing from corporate ownership must be considered in determining income available to calculate a support obligation” (citations and original quotation marks omitted)); see also Woskob, 843 A.2d at 1255 (reiterating that, “earning capacity is measured as of the date of the support hearing”).

2023Id. at 467 (noting an argument that a sentence is excessive only raises a substantial question where there is a plausible argument that the sentence is prima facie excessive based on the criminal conduct involved).

2023See Sirio, 951 A.2d at 1195 ; Doherty, 859 A.2d at 812 .

2023See Sirio, 951 A.2d at 1195 ; Doherty, 859 A.2d at 812 .11 For these reasons Father is not entitled to relief on this issue.

2023The DRS presented evidence that notices of the hearing were sent by regular and certified mail to the defendant’s last ____________________________________________ 5 See also In re Messmore’s Estate, 141 A. 724, 726 (Pa. 1928) (explaining liability for contempt arises where a party had actual, personal knowledge of a court order, even where the order has not been served upon them). -8- J-A27028-22 known residential address — these went returned and unclaimed — and the defendant testified that he lived at the address “off and on” that season and still had personal effects at that address.

2016Id.; see Com. v. Cox, 863 A.2d 536, 549-50 (Pa. 2004) (holding that jury instructions must be read as a whole to support a claim of error, not in separate portions).

2014Krankowski v. O'Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 286-87 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). -6- J-A18032-14 At the support hearing on October 15, 2013, Mother presented a vocational expert who testified about her earning capacity.

2012See Catroppa, supra. Because our disposition in the first issue encompasses Nancy Vignola’s argument in the second claim, whether a support hearing officer can make a determination regarding the validity of a common law marriage, we need not address it further. 8 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in granting Cort Vignola’s petition for declaratory judgment and we affirm the court’s order.

2010Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 537 (Pa.Super.2009); Rule 1910.19(a) (“A petition for modification of a support order may be filed at any time and shall be granted if the requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances”).

2010Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 537 (Pa.Super.2009); Rule 1910.19(a) ("A petition for modification of a support order may be filed at any time and shall be granted if the requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances").