54 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Commitment of Daygreen2 sentences2023See Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199 ; see also In re Commitment of Alvarado, No. 09-13-00217-CV, 2014 WL 1285136 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 27, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 2021In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193 , 198–99 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied); see also Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex. 2003) (stating that unless the record demonstrates otherwise, appellate courts must presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions); In re Commitment of Alvarado, No. 09-13-00217-CV, 2014 WL 1285136 , at *11 (Tex. App—Beaumont Mar. 27, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | 5 | 6 |
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Garcia v. State , 201 S.W.3d 695, 704 ( Tex.Crim.App . 2006). 2011See Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 704 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). | 4 | 4 |
Lane v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 2011) (noting that jury is presumed to have understood and followed trial court’s jury-charge instructions absent evidence to the contrary); see also Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Gamboa v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. Crim. 2024With respect to factors (3), (4) and (5), although there may have been a possibility that the jury would be improperly influenced or confused by the extraneous drug transaction referenced in the Facebook messages which took place about a year prior to the execution of the search warrant, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction before the evidence was mentioned during the trial, and then included another limiting instruction in the court’s charge, so any such risk was 13 minimized. 1 See Majors v. State, 554 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, no pet.) (citing Gamboa v. State, 29 | 2 | 2 |
Renteria v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 707 (Tex. Crim. 2020See Renteria, 206 S.W.3d at 707 . | 2 | 2 |
Delgado v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. 2015See Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Pavlacka v. Stategreen2 sentences2008The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding C.J.’s testimony, instructing them to “consider her testimony only so far as it indicates knowledge or absence of mistake on behalf of the defendant.” Rule 404(b) “It is a fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system that an accused may be tried only for the offense for which he is charged and not for being a criminal generally.” Pavlacka v. State, 892 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tex. Crim. 2008The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding C.J.'s testimony, instructing them to "consider her testimony only so far as it indicates knowledge or absence of mistake on behalf of the defendant." Rule 404(b) "It is a fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system that an accused may be tried only for the offense for which he is charged and not for being a criminal generally." Pavlacka v. State , 892 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Isenhower v. Stategreen2 sentences2011In our harm analysis in Smith, we analyzed any possible harm in light of Phillips‘s four purposes of the election requirement and held that the trial court‘s failure to 3 In Isenhower, at least twice prior to the introduction of certain evidence, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction to consider testimony regarding extraneous acts for the limited purpose of determining the previous relationship between the appellant and the complainant. 261 S.W.3d at 176 . 2011In Isenhower , at least twice prior to the introduction of certain evidence, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction to consider testimony regarding extraneous acts for the limited purpose of determining the previous relationship between the appellant and the complainant. 261 S.W.3d at 176 . | 1 | 3 |
in Re Commitment of Michael Elbert Younggreen1 sentence2026See In re Commitment of Young, 410 S.W.3d 542, 557 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Willie Dan Majors, III v. Stategreen1 sentence2024With respect to factors (3), (4) and (5), although there may have been a possibility that the jury would be improperly influenced or confused by the extraneous drug transaction referenced in the Facebook messages which took place about a year prior to the execution of the search warrant, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction before the evidence was mentioned during the trial, and then included another limiting instruction in the court’s charge, so any such risk was 13 minimized. 1 See Majors v. State, 554 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, no pet.) (citing Gamboa v. State, 29 | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen1 sentence2024And here, like in Harris, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction,11 which “minimized any risk that the jury would have considered the extraneous bad act for an improper purpose or given it undue weight.” Id. at 338; see Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Wilson, 90 S.W.3d at 393-94 ; see also TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2023“Without evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction.” Id. (citing Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d)). | 1 | 1 |
Edwin Alvarez v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Moreover, they had both experienced similar 3 See Alvarez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (explaining that when victim’s testimony is the only direct evidence of sexual assault of a child, and if the defendant impeaches the victim’s credibility, it becomes a “he said, she said” case). | 1 | 1 |
Thrift v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See id.; see also Garcia, 614 S.W.3d at 757; Dixon, 201 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex.Crim.App 2006). 14 Appellant, however, contends that he was nevertheless harmed by the admission of the second incident of sexual abuse because the trial court did not give the jury a limiting instruction explaining that it could only consider the second incident for the purposes expressed in Article 38.37. | 1 | 1 |
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2021In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193 , 198–99 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied); see also Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex. 2003) (stating that unless the record demonstrates otherwise, appellate courts must presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions); In re Commitment of Alvarado, No. 09-13-00217-CV, 2014 WL 1285136 , at *11 (Tex. App—Beaumont Mar. 27, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | 1 | 1 |
Elizondo, Jose Guadalupe Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2020See Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185, 208 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Madden v. Stategreen1 sentence2019App. P. 33.1. 28 Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Hammock v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Hammock, 46 S.W.3d at 895 (jury instructions, if requested, should be given when evidence is admitted and then again at final jury charge). –6– When we find error in the jury charge to which the appellant did not object, as here, we will reverse only if the error was so egregious and created such harm that the appellant did not have a fair and impartial trial. | 1 | 1 |
Casmir Irielle v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Cf. Irielle v. State, 441 S.W.3d 868, 879-80 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet. h.) (concluding that the trial court did not err by giving a limiting instruction that failed to track the language of Rule 404(b) when the defendant never requested a limiting instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Devoe, Paul Gilbertgreen1 sentence2014See Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 471 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Williams, 273 S.W.3d at 230 . | 1 | 1 |
| Daggett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Booker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'NEAL v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phillips v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rankin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lopez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Commerce Bank Reagan Ex Rel. Texas Commerce Bank National Ass'n v. Lebco Constructors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gibson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arline v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilkerson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirkpatrick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Antonio Parra Perez v. State
green
1 sentence2024Both parties also acknowledge that the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction that specifically addressed its consideration of Roof’s extraneous offenses.9 This instruction This injury was consistent with the same child complainant’s outcry that 8 “grandpa like[d] to bite her boobs” and that it made her “a little sore.” Perez, 562 S.W.3d at 680 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mayhue v. State
green
1 sentence2018Mayhue v. State, 969 S.W.2d 503 , 506–07 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)(concluding that an unofficial transcript of an audio recording of defendant’s conversation with an investigator was admissible to aid the jury in understanding the recorded conversation where the jury was instructed that the transcript was merely an aid, the transcript read “inaudible” where it corresponded to portions of the conversation that were indecipherable because of background noise, and there were no material differences between recorded conversation and transcript). –65– Here, prior to the distribution of copie | 1 | 2018–2018 |
in Re Commitment of Dennis Ray Stuteville
green
1 sentence2018Talley, 522 S.W.3d at 748 ; Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 554–55; see TEX. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
in Re Commitment of Lester G. Talley
green
1 sentence2018Talley, 522 S.W.3d at 748 ; Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 554–55; see TEX. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2016A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel – Guilt/Innocence To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must meet the two-pronged test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by Texas two years later in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hernandez v. State
green
1 sentence2016A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel – Guilt/Innocence To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must meet the two-pronged test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by Texas two years later in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sifuentes v. State
green
1 sentence2016“We generally presume a jury followed a trial court’s instruction regarding consideration of evidence.” Sifuentes, —S.W.3d—, 2016 WL 1128175, at *8 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Prince v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Abdnor v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Ernster v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Parasco v. State red | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.