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6 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences1983Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, supra. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 164-165 (1978). 1980See note 9, supra. The sole value of Cole’s responses was the inference that could be drawn from them on the issue of criminal responsibility. 16 The judge did not give the jury a limiting instruction on the use of Cole’s responses, and the defendant did not request a limiting instruction. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Auclairgreen1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Auclair, supra. Although he does not raise it in his direct appeal, in his motion for a new trial, the defendant also argued that evidence of his lack of gainful employment also was improperly admitted as bad act evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Watkinsgreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997). 8 Regardless, after the trial, the Supreme Judicial Court released Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), which now allows “substantive use of pretrial identification evidence, even if the witness testifies that he or she did not make such an identification.” Id. at 432 , overruling Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 60-63 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Legreen2 sentences2006See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997). 8 Regardless, after the trial, the Supreme Judicial Court released Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), which now allows “substantive use of pretrial identification evidence, even if the witness testifies that he or she did not make such an identification.” Id. at 432 , overruling Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 60-63 (1984). 2006See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997). 8 Regardless, after the trial, the Supreme Judicial Court released Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), which now allows “substantive use of pretrial identification evidence, even if the witness testifies that he or she did not make such an identification.” Id. at 432 , overruling Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 60-63 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dayegreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997). 8 Regardless, after the trial, the Supreme Judicial Court released Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), which now allows “substantive use of pretrial identification evidence, even if the witness testifies that he or she did not make such an identification.” Id. at 432 , overruling Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 60-63 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Kaltsas v. Duralite Co.green1 sentence1985See Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 93-94 (1967); Goldman v. Mahony, 354 Mass. 705, 711 (1968); Kaltsas v. Duralite Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 638 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co.green1 sentence1985See Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 93-94 (1967); Goldman v. Mahony, 354 Mass. 705, 711 (1968); Kaltsas v. Duralite Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 638 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Goldman v. Mahonygreen1 sentence1985See Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 93-94 (1967); Goldman v. Mahony, 354 Mass. 705, 711 (1968); Kaltsas v. Duralite Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 638 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Monsengreen1 sentence1980Cf. Commonwealth v. Monsen, 377 Mass. 245, 253 (1979) (ordinarily a judge has no obligation to instruct the jury sua sponte as to the purposes for which evidence is offered at trial). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Koney
green
1 sentence2003Citing Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295 (1995), the judge gave the jury a limiting instruction: that they could not use the business record “to prove that this defendant actually purchased those items, or that he actually lived at that address, 3 Picard [sic\ Lane in Littleton, Massachusetts, or that... his telephone number was [the one given] . . . .” But the judge, in his final charge, went to some trouble to explain the difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, and clearly permitted the business record to be used as evidence that someone, if not the defendant himse | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1983Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, supra. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 164-165 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.