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7 New York opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coniber v. Center Point Transfer Station, Inc.green1 sentence2012Contrary to Bovis’s further contention, we conclude that the court properly determined that it is premature to grant Bovis’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the YMCA’s first cause of action, for breach of contract, because discovery has not been completed, including depositions concerning Bovis’s performance of its obligations under the Agreement (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Coniber v Center Point Transfer Sta., Inc., 82 AD 3d 1629, 1629 [2011]; Syracuse Univ. v Games 2002, LLC, 71 AD3d *1246 1531, 1531-1532 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Nicastro v. Parkgreen1 sentence2010Furthermore, the jury’s findings, which turned largely on assessments of the credibility of witnesses, were based on a fair interpretation of the evidence, and therefore were not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]; Alatzas v National R.R. | 1 | 1 |
Szczerbiak v. Pilatgreen1 sentence2010Since there was legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that the accident was caused solely by Bovis’ negligence, thus voiding the parties’ indemnification agreement, the court properly denied Bovis’ motion for a directed verdict (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]; Healy v Carmel Bowl, Inc., 65 AD3d 665, 667 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Lolik v. Big v. Supermarkets, Inc.green1 sentence2010Furthermore, the jury’s findings, which turned largely on assessments of the credibility of witnesses, were based on a fair interpretation of the evidence, and therefore were not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]; Alatzas v National R.R. | 1 | 1 |
Healy v. Bowlgreen1 sentence2010Since there was legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that the accident was caused solely by Bovis’ negligence, thus voiding the parties’ indemnification agreement, the court properly denied Bovis’ motion for a directed verdict (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]; Healy v Carmel Bowl, Inc., 65 AD3d 665, 667 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Bovis Lend Lease LMB Inc. v. Garito Contracting, Inc.green1 sentence2009This Court affirmed, finding that “[although the contract was lost, Bovis properly established, through extrinsic evidence, that it required Garito to procure insurance coverage on its behalf’ (Bovis Lend Lease LMB Inc. v Garito Contr, Inc., 38 AD3d 260, 260 [2007]) (Bovis I). | 1 | 1 |
Mennerich v. Espositogreen1 sentence2008The Feldman defendants failed to demonstrate their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the common-law negligence cause of action by establishing that the actions of their employees in loading the truck did not create an unreasonable risk of harm that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Marano v Commander Elec., Inc., 12 AD3d 571, 572-573 [2004]; Mennerich v Esposito, 4 AD3d 399, 400 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Marano v. Commander Electric, Inc.green1 sentence2008The Feldman defendants failed to demonstrate their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the common-law negligence cause of action by establishing that the actions of their employees in loading the truck did not create an unreasonable risk of harm that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Marano v Commander Elec., Inc., 12 AD3d 571, 572-573 [2004]; Mennerich v Esposito, 4 AD3d 399, 400 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Landa v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s 2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s | 1 | 1 |
Cabezas v. Consolidated Edisongreen2 sentences2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s 2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s 2008Although Labor Law § 240 (1) generally does not apply when construction workers are injured by material which falls as it is being loaded onto or unloaded from a truck (see Landa v City of New York, 17 AD3d 180, 181 [2005]; Rice v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 302 AD2d 578, 580 [2003]; Cabezas v Consolidated Edison, 296 AD2d 522, 523 [2002]), in the instant matter there are material issues of fact as to whether there was an elevation-related risk posed by the position of the planks when they fell and struck the plaintiff and whether the Bovis defendants were obligated to provide additional s | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bovis Lend Lease (LMB), Inc. v. Arch Insurance Co.
neutral
1 sentence2019Nothing in the agreements supports Bovis's claim that the Companion Agreement was an "interim funding mechanism for pre-fire regulatory issues which caused cost overruns at the Project." Further, our prior decision dismissing all claims under the Companion Agreement did not implicate only the $28.3 million that Lower Manhattan Development Corporation had advanced to Bovis ( see 153 AD3d 432 [1st Dept 2017]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Chelsea Piers Management v. Forest Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence2016Corp., 281 AD2d 252 [1st Dept 2001]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Francis v. Foremost Contracting Corp.
green
1 sentence2008Corp., 47 AD3d 672 [2008]; Mentesana v Bernard Janowitz Constr. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mohammed
neutral
1 sentence2006Co. v Mohammed, 14 AD3d 710 [2005]; Ougourlian v New York City Health & Hosps. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.