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7 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2016To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final” (Teague, 489 US at 301 [citations omitted]). 13 A result is not deemed “dictated by precedent,” however, unless it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists” (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]). 2016To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final" (Teague, 489 US at 301 [citations omitted] [emphasis in original]).13 A result is not deemed "dictated by precedent," however, "unless it would have been apparent to all reasonable jurists" (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]). | 3 | 7 |
Lambrix v. Singletarygreen2 sentences2016To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final” (Teague, 489 US at 301 [citations omitted]). 13 A result is not deemed “dictated by precedent,” however, unless it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists” (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]). 2016To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final" (Teague, 489 US at 301 [citations omitted] [emphasis in original]).13 A result is not deemed "dictated by precedent," however, "unless it would have been apparent to all reasonable jurists" (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]). | 2 | 2 |
Graham v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2014Subsequent decisions defined “dictated by precedent” to mean that the result was “apparent to all reasonable jurists” at the time the defendant’s conviction became final (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]; see also Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 477 [1993] [the “determinative question is whether reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed in 1984 could have concluded that (the defendant’s) sentencing was not constitutionally infirm”]; Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407, 415 [1990] [a constitutional rule that is “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” qualifies as a new 2010“While there can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule if it expressly overrules a prior decision, it is more difficult ... to determine whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases” (Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 467 [1993], quoting Saffle v Parks, 494 US 484, 488 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
Whorton v. Bocktinggreen1 sentence2014Teague established as a guiding principle that new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases that had become final on direct review before the new rule was announced (see Whorton v Bockting, 549 US 406, 416 [2007] [“Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review”]). 1 Additionally, Teague created a test to differentiate a new rule from an existing or old rule; namely, “[i]n general, ... a case announces a new rule when it break | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. McKellargreen1 sentence2014Subsequent decisions defined “dictated by precedent” to mean that the result was “apparent to all reasonable jurists” at the time the defendant’s conviction became final (Lambrix v Singletary, 520 US 518, 527-528 [1997]; see also Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 477 [1993] [the “determinative question is whether reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed in 1984 could have concluded that (the defendant’s) sentencing was not constitutionally infirm”]; Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407, 415 [1990] [a constitutional rule that is “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” qualifies as a new | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2010(Id.; Teague, 489 US at 301 .) The Teague Court explained, however, that generally “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new oblíga tion on the States or the Federal Government.” (Id.) “And it can hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new ground’ ” (Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 391 [2000], quoting Teague at 301 ). 2010(See Williams v Taylor at 410; Wright v West, 505 US 277, 304 [1992].) Conclusions After careful consideration this court finds that Padilla did not create a new rule, despite the fact that in New York and federal courts deportation was considered merely a collateral consequence. | 1 | 1 |
Saffle v. Parksgreen1 sentence2010“While there can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule if it expressly overrules a prior decision, it is more difficult ... to determine whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases” (Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 467 [1993], quoting Saffle v Parks, 494 US 484, 488 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Westgreen1 sentence2010(See Williams v Taylor at 410; Wright v West, 505 US 277, 304 [1992].) Conclusions After careful consideration this court finds that Padilla did not create a new rule, despite the fact that in New York and federal courts deportation was considered merely a collateral consequence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Eastmangreen1 sentence2005Similarly, the court in Dobbin described the retroactivity standard it employed as follows: “Eastman states that the second exception to the general rule is that ‘[p]ursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively . . . where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see, Teague v Lane, 489 US [288], at 311-312)’ and that ‘ “[a] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government; [or | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pignataro
green
1 sentence2016The Teague court explained that "a case announces a new rule when 12 In light of this assumption, we need not address the People's argument that our holding in People v Pignataro ( 22 NY3d 381 [2013]) established that a Catu error constitutes only a violation of the state constitution, thereby taking it out of the realm of CPL 400.15 (7) (b). - 19 - - 20 - Nos. 149 & 150 it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government (citations omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Dobbin
green
1 sentence2005Similarly, the court in Dobbin described the retroactivity standard it employed as follows: “Eastman states that the second exception to the general rule is that ‘[p]ursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively . . . where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see, Teague v Lane, 489 US [288], at 311-312)’ and that ‘ “[a] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government; [or | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g., People v McNeil, 24 NY2d 550 ; People v Galloway, 24 NY2d 935 ; People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 , supra). 1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g. , People v McNeil , 24 N.Y.2d 550 ; People v Galloway , 24 N.Y.2d 935 ; People v Cruz , 66 N.Y.2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph , 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States , 391 US 123 , supra) . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
MacKey v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Pursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively in one of two situations: (1) where the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe” or (2) where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see, Teague v Lane, 489 US, at 311-312 , supra, citing Mackey v United States, 401 US, at 692 , supra; cf., People v Pepper, 53 NY2d, at 220-221 , supra). "[A] case announce 1995Pursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively in one of two situations: (1) where the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe" or (2) where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see , Teague v Lane , 489 US, at 311-312 , supra , citing Mackey v United States , 401 US, at 692 , supra; cf. , People v Pepper , 53 NY2d, at 220-221 , supra) . "[A] case a | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. McNeil
green
2 sentences1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g., People v McNeil, 24 NY2d 550 ; People v Galloway, 24 NY2d 935 ; People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 , supra). 1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g. , People v McNeil , 24 N.Y.2d 550 ; People v Galloway , 24 N.Y.2d 935 ; People v Cruz , 66 N.Y.2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph , 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States , 391 US 123 , supra) . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Galloway
neutral
2 sentences1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g., People v McNeil, 24 NY2d 550 ; People v Galloway, 24 NY2d 935 ; People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 , supra). 1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g. , People v McNeil , 24 N.Y.2d 550 ; People v Galloway , 24 N.Y.2d 935 ; People v Cruz , 66 N.Y.2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph , 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States , 391 US 123 , supra) . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Parker v. Randolph
red
2 sentences1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g., People v McNeil, 24 NY2d 550 ; People v Galloway, 24 NY2d 935 ; People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 , supra). 1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g. , People v McNeil , 24 N.Y.2d 550 ; People v Galloway , 24 N.Y.2d 935 ; People v Cruz , 66 N.Y.2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph , 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States , 391 US 123 , supra) . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Pepper
green
2 sentences1995Pursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively in one of two situations: (1) where the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe” or (2) where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see, Teague v Lane, 489 US, at 311-312 , supra, citing Mackey v United States, 401 US, at 692 , supra; cf., People v Pepper, 53 NY2d, at 220-221 , supra). "[A] case announce 1995Pursuant to Teague , new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied retrospectively in one of two situations: (1) where the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe" or (2) where the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial (see , Teague v Lane , 489 US, at 311-312 , supra , citing Mackey v United States , 401 US, at 692 , supra; cf. , People v Pepper , 53 NY2d, at 220-221 , supra) . "[A] case a | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Cruz
green
2 sentences1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g., People v McNeil, 24 NY2d 550 ; People v Galloway, 24 NY2d 935 ; People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 , supra). 1995Cruz unquestionably departs from established precedent, and implicates a bedrock procedural element — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation (see, e.g. , People v McNeil , 24 N.Y.2d 550 ; People v Galloway , 24 N.Y.2d 935 ; People v Cruz , 66 N.Y.2d 61 , supra; Parker v Randolph , 442 US 62 ; Bruton v United States , 391 US 123 , supra) . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.