case announces a new rule in California

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2025(In re Milton, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 905 .) Under the state test, a rule is new where, among other things, a decision disapproves a “longstanding and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous body of lower-court authorities.” (Id. at p. 906.) 2.

2025(In re Milton, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 905 .) Under the state test, a rule is new where, among other things, a decision disapproves a “longstanding and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous body of lower-court authorities.” (Id. at p. 906.) 2.

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2019To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S at p. 301; see Welch, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1264 ; In re Gomez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) “A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent”’ to apply the rule in question, the rule

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2018It is not as easy as it might seem to ascertain when a case announces a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. ( Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 .) Teague explained that a case does so if its result was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) A case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." ( Butler v. McKellar (1990) 494 U.S. 407 , 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Therefore, "unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at

2009(Id. at pp. 305-310.) “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. [Citations.] To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , italics omitted.) “Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant ‘habeas corpus relief to . . . state prisoners] ’ [Citation.]” (Beard v. Banks, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 412 .) “The ‘new rule’ pri

2009In Blakely, the high court held that the prescribed 1 “statutory maximum” ’ for purposes of the right to a jury trial is not necessarily the maximum penalty stated in the statute for the crime; rather, it is ‘the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303 .)” (Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1250 , italics omitted.) “We agree with the assessment of a federal court that ‘[w]ith its clarification of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Blakely court worked a sea change

2009(Id. at pp. 305-310.) “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. [Citations.] To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , italics omitted.) “Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant ‘habeas corpus relief to . . . state prisoners] ’ [Citation.]” (Beard v. Banks, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 412 .) “The ‘new rule’ pri

2009In Blakely, the high court held that the prescribed 1 “statutory maximum” ’ for purposes of the right to a jury trial is not necessarily the maximum penalty stated in the statute for the crime; rather, it is ‘the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303 .)” (Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1250 , italics omitted.) “We agree with the assessment of a federal court that ‘[w]ith its clarification of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Blakely court worked a sea change

2009(Id. at pp. 305-310.) “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. [Citations.] To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , italics omitted.) “Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant ‘habeas corpus relief to . . . state prisoners] ’ [Citation.]” (Beard v. Banks, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 412 .) “The ‘new rule’ pri

2009(Id. at pp. 305-310.) “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. [Citations.] To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 301 , italics omitted.) “Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant ‘habeas corpus relief to . . . state prisoners] ’ [Citation.]” (Beard v. Banks, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 412 .) “The ‘new rule’ pri

2009In Blakely, the high court held that the prescribed 1 “statutory maximum” ’ for purposes of the right to a jury trial is not necessarily the maximum penalty stated in the statute for the crime; rather, it is ‘the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303 .)” (Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1250 , italics omitted.) “We agree with the assessment of a federal court that ‘[w]ith its clarification of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Blakely court worked a sea change

2007The high court determined that Crawford clearly announced a new rule, since it was "flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, ... which Crawford overruled." ( Whorton, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 127 S.Ct. at p. 1181.) In Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 , the United States Supreme Court considered whether the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ( Ring ) [4] was retroactive to cases final on direct review.

2007The high court determined that Crawford clearly announced a new rule, since it was "flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, ... which Crawford overruled." ( Whorton, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 127 S.Ct. at p. 1181.) In Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 , the United States Supreme Court considered whether the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ( Ring ) [4] was retroactive to cases final on direct review.

2007The high court determined that Crawford clearly announced a new rule, since it was "flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, ... which Crawford overruled." ( Whorton, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 127 S.Ct. at p. 1181.) In Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 , the United States Supreme Court considered whether the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ( Ring ) [4] was retroactive to cases final on direct review.

2007The high court determined that Crawford clearly announced a new rule, since it was "flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, ... which Crawford overruled." ( Whorton, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 127 S.Ct. at p. 1181.) In Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 , the United States Supreme Court considered whether the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ( Ring ) [4] was retroactive to cases final on direct review.