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7 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Silbergreen1 sentence2011Furthermore, since the 91 East defendants demonstrated that a “young child” did not “live[ ] in the apartment,” they established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence (Chapman v Silber, 97 NY2d 9, 15 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
Skerritt v. Bachgreen2 sentences2011Lefferts and the 91 East defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that neither of the plaintiffs was a purchaser or lessee of the subject apartments and, thus, they had no standing to assert a cause of action under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (see 42 USC § 4852d [a] [1] [A]-[C]; Brown v Maple3, LLC, 88 AD3d 224 [2d Dept 2011]; Skerritt v Bach, 23 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2005]). 2011Lefferts and the 91 East defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that neither of the plaintiffs was a purchaser or lessee of the subject apartments and, thus, they had no standing to assert a cause of action under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (see 42 USC § 4852d [a] [1] [A]-[C]; Brown v Maple3, LLC, 88 AD3d 224 [2d Dept 2011]; Skerritt v Bach, 23 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Tishman Construction Corp.green1 sentence2011Corp., 40 AD3d 305, 306 [2007]; Burgalassi v Mandell Mech. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). 2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Lolik v. Big v. Supermarkets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). 2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Stacy S. Killon v. Robert A. Parrotta
green
2 sentences2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). 2021The jury's verdict finding Tri-Star to have been negligent was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Killon v Parrotta , 28 NY3d 101 [2016]; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493 [1978]). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital
green
1 sentence2014Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied 18 East’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Byrd v. 2015 Caton Avenue, LLC
neutral
1 sentence2011Thus, they satisfied their prima facie burden of demonstrating their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action, in effect, pursuant to Local Law No. 1 (see Byrd v 2015 Caton Ave., LLC, 57 AD3d 933 [2008]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brown v. Maple3, LLC
green
2 sentences2011Lefferts and the 91 East defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that neither of the plaintiffs was a purchaser or lessee of the subject apartments and, thus, they had no standing to assert a cause of action under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (see 42 USC § 4852d [a] [1] [A]-[C]; Brown v Maple3, LLC, 88 AD3d 224 [2d Dept 2011]; Skerritt v Bach, 23 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2005]). 2011Lefferts and the 91 East defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that neither of the plaintiffs was a purchaser or lessee of the subject apartments and, thus, they had no standing to assert a cause of action under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (see 42 USC § 4852d [a] [1] [A]-[C]; Brown v Maple3, LLC, 88 AD3d 224 [2d Dept 2011]; Skerritt v Bach, 23 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2005]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
M & B Joint Venture, Inc. v. Laurus Master Fund, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2009The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting in part, modified, by granting Lauras’ and 14-16 East’s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, but otherwise affirmed ( 49 AD3d 258 [2008]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re Clement
neutral
1 sentence1911In other words, for illustration, that it would mean that a certificate holder occupying premises on the ground floor of a great office building might be held liable to be guilty of an unlawful act if, from some door in the certificated premises, you could get into the office building, and thence by hallways, or elevators, could reach some room in the fifteenth story of the building, where gambling was being conducted; the respondent contending that the "law does not contemplate such a situation as in the supposed case, or in the case here under consideration; that the present law was enacted | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.