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9 New York opinions name it 3 courts 2004–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Glinsmangreen1 sentence2017Repetition of previously given Miranda warnings is not necessary “where there ha[s] been no break in custody and defendant’s statement [is] made within a reasonable time after his initial . . . waiver of Miranda rights.” (People v Irizarry, 199 AD2d 180, 181 [1st Dept 1993]; see People v Encarnacion, 259 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 1999] [“Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6-hour interval was unnecessary, since defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights (initially) and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during (the interval)” (internal | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shomogreen1 sentence2017Repetition of previously given Miranda warnings is not necessary “where there ha[s] been no break in custody and defendant’s statement [is] made within a reasonable time after his initial . . . waiver of Miranda rights.” (People v Irizarry, 199 AD2d 180, 181 [1st Dept 1993]; see People v Encarnacion, 259 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 1999] [“Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6-hour interval was unnecessary, since defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights (initially) and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during (the interval)” (internal | 1 | 1 |
People v. Encarnaciongreen1 sentence2017Repetition of previously given Miranda warnings is not necessary “where there ha[s] been no break in custody and defendant’s statement [is] made within a reasonable time after his initial . . . waiver of Miranda rights.” (People v Irizarry, 199 AD2d 180, 181 [1st Dept 1993]; see People v Encarnacion, 259 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 1999] [“Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6-hour interval was unnecessary, since defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights (initially) and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during (the interval)” (internal | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ferrogreen1 sentence2017(Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-301 [1980]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984] [following Innis in holding that the effective equivalent of express interrogation occurs when the police “should have known (that their words or actions) were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)].) Thus, the defendant’s statement is admissible only if the requirement of Miranda warnings was satisfied by those warnings that were unquestionably administered on August 19th. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodneygreen1 sentence2017While employment-related questions may fall under the pedigree exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings, we do not find that exception applicable to the facts presented (see People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 293 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Irizarrygreen1 sentence2017Repetition of previously given Miranda warnings is not necessary “where there ha[s] been no break in custody and defendant’s statement [is] made within a reasonable time after his initial . . . waiver of Miranda rights.” (People v Irizarry, 199 AD2d 180, 181 [1st Dept 1993]; see People v Encarnacion, 259 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 1999] [“Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6-hour interval was unnecessary, since defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights (initially) and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during (the interval)” (internal | 1 | 1 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen1 sentence2017(Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-301 [1980]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984] [following Innis in holding that the effective equivalent of express interrogation occurs when the police “should have known (that their words or actions) were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)].) Thus, the defendant’s statement is admissible only if the requirement of Miranda warnings was satisfied by those warnings that were unquestionably administered on August 19th. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2018Under the circumstances of this case, the officer's question to the defendant was permissible under the public safety exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 ; People v Golden , 147 AD3d 780 ). 2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials concerning the location of a gun, prior to having received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), as well as the gun recovered as a result of those statements. *781 Under the circumstances of this case, in which the location of the weapon was unknown when the defendant was apprehended, and there was reason to believe that it may have been discarded in a location where it could have been discovered | 5 | 2004–2018 |
People v. Dorvil
neutral
2 sentences2025While employment related questions may fall under the pedigree exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings, we do not find that exception applicable to the facts presented ( citation omitted)."); People v Dorvil, 175 AD3d 708 , 709 (2nd Dept 2019) (Pre- Miranda interrogation [*10]regarding, inter alia , defendant's employment, the length of his tenure at his current job, and his job responsibilities were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.")]. 2025While employment related questions may fall under the pedigree exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings, we do not find that exception applicable to the facts presented ( citation omitted)."); People v Dorvil, 175 AD3d 708 , 709 (2nd Dept 2019) (Pre- Miranda interrogation [*10]regarding, inter alia , defendant's employment, the length of his tenure at his current job, and his job responsibilities were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.")]. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Oquendo
green
2 sentences2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials concerning the location of a gun, prior to having received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), as well as the gun recovered as a result of those statements. *781 Under the circumstances of this case, in which the location of the weapon was unknown when the defendant was apprehended, and there was reason to believe that it may have been discarded in a location where it could have been discovered 2004The record supports the court’s finding that police questioning of defendant as to how to unload a pistol of a type that was unfamiliar to the recovering officer was justified under the safety exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Oquendo, 252 AD2d 312 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 901 [1999]). | 2 | 2004–2017 |
People v. Golden
neutral
1 sentence2018Under the circumstances of this case, the officer's question to the defendant was permissible under the public safety exception to the requirement of Miranda warnings ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 ; People v Golden , 147 AD3d 780 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials concerning the location of a gun, prior to having received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), as well as the gun recovered as a result of those statements. *781 Under the circumstances of this case, in which the location of the weapon was unknown when the defendant was apprehended, and there was reason to believe that it may have been discarded in a location where it could have been discovered | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Reyes
green
1 sentence2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials concerning the location of a gun, prior to having received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), as well as the gun recovered as a result of those statements. *781 Under the circumstances of this case, in which the location of the weapon was unknown when the defendant was apprehended, and there was reason to believe that it may have been discarded in a location where it could have been discovered | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.