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7 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Longgreen2 sentences2011“Inasmuch as the risks in . . . police/civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, ‘[the] police may [also] order [passengers] out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation’ ” (id. at 775, quoting Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 ). 2011“Inasmuch as the risks in . . . police/ civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, ‘[the] police may [also] order [passengers] out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation’ ” (id. at 775, quoting Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 [1983]). | 1 | 4 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2011In addition, police officers may frisk passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to the extent necessary to guard their safety, provided that they act on “ ‘reasonable suspicion that -2- 660 KA 07-02376 criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for [their] own safety’ ” (People v Jones, 39 AD3d 1169, 1170-1171 , quoting People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 ). 2011In addition, police officers may frisk passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to the extent necessary to guard their safety, provided that they act on “ ‘reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for [their] own safety’ ” (People v Jones, 39 AD3d 1169, 1170-1171 [2007], quoting People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 [1989]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Torresgreen2 sentences2011In addition, police officers may frisk passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to the extent necessary to guard their safety, provided that they act on “ ‘reasonable suspicion that -2- 660 KA 07-02376 criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for [their] own safety’ ” (People v Jones, 39 AD3d 1169, 1170-1171 , quoting People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 ). 2011In addition, police officers may frisk passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to the extent necessary to guard their safety, provided that they act on “ ‘reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for [their] own safety’ ” (People v Jones, 39 AD3d 1169, 1170-1171 [2007], quoting People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 [1989]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2006As a safety precaution, the police may order a passenger out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation (People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 775 [1989]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. McLauringreen1 sentence1989Inasmuch as the risks in these police/civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, "police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation” (Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 , citing Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 , supra; see also, People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779 ; People v Livigni, 58 NY2d 894 , affg on opn below 88 AD2d 386 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hollman
green
2 sentences1997First, they argue that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Division, the requirement of a founded suspicion of criminal activity does not apply when the police seek consent to search a vehicle following a stop for a traffic violation (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 ). 1993We find that the police request to search the car was justified upon their founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on the obvious spurious response to the inquiry about the origin and destination of the trip (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People v Irizarry, 79 NY2d 890, 892 ). | 2 | 1993–1997 |
Pennsylvania v. Mimms
green
2 sentences1993It is further established that the police had authority to order other persons out of the automobile during the stop for a traffic violation (see, Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 ; Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ). 1989Inasmuch as the risks in these police/civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, "police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation” (Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 , citing Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 , supra; see also, People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779 ; People v Livigni, 58 NY2d 894 , affg on opn below 88 AD2d 386 ). | 2 | 1989–1993 |
People v. De Bour
green
1 sentence1997First, they argue that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Division, the requirement of a founded suspicion of criminal activity does not apply when the police seek consent to search a vehicle following a stop for a traffic violation (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Irizarry
green
1 sentence1993We find that the police request to search the car was justified upon their founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on the obvious spurious response to the inquiry about the origin and destination of the trip (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People v Irizarry, 79 NY2d 890, 892 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Livigni
green
1 sentence1989Inasmuch as the risks in these police/civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, "police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation” (Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 , citing Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 , supra; see also, People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779 ; People v Livigni, 58 NY2d 894 , affg on opn below 88 AD2d 386 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Livigni
green
1 sentence1989Inasmuch as the risks in these police/civilian vehicle encounters are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger, "police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation” (Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1047-1048 , citing Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 , supra; see also, People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779 ; People v Livigni, 58 NY2d 894 , affg on opn below 88 AD2d 386 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Marin
green
1 sentence1986In People v Marin ( 80 AD2d 541 , lv denied 53 NY2d 844 ), decided in 1981, we stated that "passengers may not be ordered out [of a car] absent some suspicion directed at them”. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.