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8 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2016–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wampler v. Higginsgreen2 sentences2025(Frizzell Affidavit, ¶ 9.) {¶16} Examining the factors for determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, first, regarding the specific language used, “it is often appropriate to begin an assessment of the totality of the circumstances by analyzing ‘the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves.’” Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111 , 127 (2001), quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-980 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 2025(Frizzell Affidavit, ¶ 9.) {¶16} Examining the factors for determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, first, regarding the specific language used, “it is often appropriate to begin an assessment of the totality of the circumstances by analyzing ‘the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves.’” Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 127 (2001), quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-980 (D.C. Cir. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Bertell Ollman v. Rowland Evans, Robert Novakgreen2 sentences2025(Frizzell Affidavit, ¶ 9.) {¶16} Examining the factors for determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, first, regarding the specific language used, “it is often appropriate to begin an assessment of the totality of the circumstances by analyzing ‘the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves.’” Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111 , 127 (2001), quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-980 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 2025(Frizzell Affidavit, ¶ 9.) {¶16} Examining the factors for determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, first, regarding the specific language used, “it is often appropriate to begin an assessment of the totality of the circumstances by analyzing ‘the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves.’” Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 127 (2001), quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-980 (D.C. Cir. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Univ. of Toledogreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-979 , 98 N.E.3d 305, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2018-Ohio-3026 , 103 N.E.3d 831 . {¶14} Based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law, it therefore follows that under R.C. 2743.75 an allegedly aggrieved party is required to show an entitlement to relief by clear-and-convincing evidence, while under R.C. 2743.75 a party who claims that an exception applies is required to prove that the requested records fall squarely within the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. {¶15} Th 2019See, e.g., Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-979 , 98 N.E.3d 305, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2018-Ohio-3026 , 103 N.E.3d 831 . {¶14} Based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law, it therefore follows that under R.C. 2743.75 an allegedly aggrieved party is required to show an entitlement to relief by clear-and-convincing evidence, while under R.C. 2743.75 a party who claims that an exception applies is required to prove that the requested records fall squarely within the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. {¶15} Th | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Univ. of Toledogreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-979 , 98 N.E.3d 305, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2018-Ohio-3026 , 103 N.E.3d 831 . {¶14} Based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law, it therefore follows that under R.C. 2743.75 an allegedly aggrieved party is required to show an entitlement to relief by clear-and-convincing evidence, while under R.C. 2743.75 a party who claims that an exception applies is required to prove that the requested records fall squarely within the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. {¶15} Th 2019See, e.g., Cameron v. Univ. of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-979 , 98 N.E.3d 305, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2018-Ohio-3026 , 103 N.E.3d 831 . {¶14} Based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law, it therefore follows that under R.C. 2743.75 an allegedly aggrieved party is required to show an entitlement to relief by clear-and-convincing evidence, while under R.C. 2743.75 a party who claims that an exception applies is required to prove that the requested records fall squarely within the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. {¶15} Th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown Suber
green
2 sentences2024Specifically, the trial judge failed to advise Abdus-Salaam that: (1) the ODRC must hold a hearing to rebut the presumption that appellant would be released after serving his mandatory minimum sentence; (2) the ODRC could maintain appellant’s incarceration more than one time; and (3) the ODRC may make specified determinations regarding his conduct while confined, his rehabilitation, his threat to society, his restrictive housing, if any, while confined, and his security classification in rebutting the presumption. {¶83} In State v. Brown Suber, 2021-Ohio-2291 (12th Dist.), the trial court prov 2022Butler No. CA2020-09-099, 2021-Ohio-2291 , the trial court provided some of the required notifications but failed to notify the defendant that: (1) the DRC must hold a hearing to rebut the presumption that appellant would be released after serving his mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years; (2) the DRC could maintain his incarceration after the expiration of the minimum term for the length the DRC determines is reasonable, subject to his maximum penalty of 15 years; and (3) the DRC could maintain appellant's incarceration more than one time. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
Swarthout v. Cooke
green
2 sentences2021“When a state creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication — and courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 , 131 S.Ct. 859 , 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). 2021“When a state creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication — and courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 , 131 S.Ct. 859 , 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State ex rel. Hogan Lovells US, L.L.P. v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr
neutral
2 sentences2018On May 31, 2017, we denied DRC's motion to dismiss and granted Hogan Lovells an alternative writ. 149 Ohio St.3d 1416 , 2017-Ohio-4038 , 75 N.E.3d 234 . 2018On May 31, 2017, we denied DRC's motion to dismiss and granted Hogan Lovells an alternative writ. 149 Ohio St.3d 1416 , 2017-Ohio-4038 , 75 N.E.3d 234 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State ex rel. Beavercreek Twp. Fiscal Officer v. Graff
neutral
2 sentences2018On May 31, 2017, we denied DRC’s motion to dismiss and granted Hogan Lovells an 2 January Term, 2018 alternative writ. 149 Ohio St.3d 1416 , 2017-Ohio-4038 , 75 N.E.3d 234 . 2018On May 31, 2017, we denied DRC's motion to dismiss and granted Hogan Lovells an alternative writ. 149 Ohio St.3d 1416 , 2017-Ohio-4038 , 75 N.E.3d 234 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Franks v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction
green
1 sentence2017Thus, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from appellant's amended complaint and the evidence produced in connection with DRC's motion for summary judgment is that appellant's claim against DRC arises out of Dr. Eddy's medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of appellant. {¶ 19} Appellant argues, however, that case law from this court holds that claims against DRC alleging negligent medical care, diagnosis, or treatment of an inmate are construed as ordinary negligence claims absent either an allegation in the complaint that DRC is a "hospital" for purposes of R.C. 2305.113 or proof by DR | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Frash v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
green
1 sentence2016No. 14AP-932, 2016-Ohio-3134 ("Frash II"), this court denied DRC's motion. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.