specification requirement in Ohio

2016Lawrence entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. {¶3} On August 27, 2015, Lawrence filed a motion to suppress all statements Lawrence made to the police and children service representatives arguing that he was not given warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before being interviewed by the police. -2- Case No. 12-15-11 {¶4} A hearing on Lawrence’s motion to suppress was held on September 25, 2015, where the following testimony was presented. {¶5} Chief Dennis Cupp of the Leipsic Police Department was the first witness to testify.

2016Lawrence entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. {¶3} On August 27, 2015, Lawrence filed a motion to suppress all statements Lawrence made to the police and children service representatives arguing that he was not given warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before being interviewed by the police. -2- Case No. 12-15-11 {¶4} A hearing on Lawrence’s motion to suppress was held on September 25, 2015, where the following testimony was presented. {¶5} Chief Dennis Cupp of the Leipsic Police Department was the first witness to testify.

2016He argued that the prosecutor added the repeat OVI offender specification to the underlying offense to arbitrarily obtain a higher prison sentence without proof of additional facts, elements, or circumstances. {¶25} Therefore, stating there was cumulative punishment for identical conduct without a rational basis, this court reversed the trial court and reasoned that criminal statutes violate equal protection if they require identical proof but impose different penalties. {¶26} In a recent Supreme Court of Ohio decision, State v. Klembus, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1092 (“Klembus II”), it rever

2009Broum at ¶ 22 (holding that the notice was fatally defective when the claimed error “might * * * have been raised in any income tax case in Ohio” (emphasis sic)); Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 290 , 2006-Ohio-2420 , 847 N.E.2d 420 , ¶ 41 (“The wording of Castle’s constitutional claim is so general that it could be used in almost every use tax case”); Queen City Valves, Inc. v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 579 , 583, 53 O.O. 430 , 120 N.E.2d 310 (an assertion that “might be advanced in nearly any case” is not specific under R.C. 5717.02). {¶ 18} Applying these standards, the BTA

2009Brown at ¶ 22 (holding that the notice was fatally defective when the claimed error “might * * * have been raised in any income tax case in Ohio” (emphasis sic)); Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 290 , 2006-Ohio-2420 , 847 N.E.2d 420 , ¶ 41 (“The wording of Castle’s constitutional claim is so general that it could be used in almost every use tax case”); Queen City Valves, Inc. v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 579 , 583, 53 O.O. 430 , 120 N.E.2d 310 (an assertion that “might be advanced in nearly any case” is not specific under R.C. 5717.02). {¶ 18} Applying these standards, the BTA

2009Co. v. Wilkins, 108 Ohio St.3d 90 , 2006-Ohio-162 , 840 N.E.2d 1065 , ¶ 41. {¶ 17} We have made clear that a specification of error must not be so generic that it fails to set the case apart from any other case involving the same tax.

2009Co. v. Wilkins, 108 Ohio St.3d 90 , 2006-Ohio-162 , 840 N.E.2d 1065 , ¶ 41. {¶ 17} We have made clear that a specification of error must not be so generic that it fails to set the case apart from any other case involving the same tax.

2008Co. v. Lindley (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 71, 75 , 23 O.O.3d 118 , 430 N.E.2d 939 (“a notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction upon the Board of Tax Appeals to resolve an issue, unless that issue is clearly specified in the notice of appeal”). {¶ 18} Third, the specification requirement is stringent.

2008Co. v. Lindley (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 71, 75 , 23 O.O.3d 118 , 430 N.E.2d 939 (“a notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction upon the Board of Tax Appeals to resolve an issue, unless that issue is clearly specified in the notice of appeal”). {¶ 18} Third, the specification requirement is stringent.

1995It has been said that the weight of the evidence standard and the sufficiency of evidence standard are synonymous, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 , 52 O.O.2d 376 , 262 N.E.2d 685 .

1995It has been said that the weight of the evidence standard and the sufficiency of evidence standard are synonymous, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 , 52 O.O.2d 376 , 262 N.E.2d 685 .

1923It is argued by plaintiffs in error that under the facts the defendant in error was clearly guilty of contributory negligence, and they rely on the cases of Schell v. DuBois, Admr., 94 Ohio St., 93 , and Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio St., 282 , where the Supreme Court of Ohio laid down the rule that the violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public is negligence per se.